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Executive Summary 
Based on a multi-dimensional scheme as a conceptual framework, this working 
paper maps the structural conditions relevant to journalism and conflict communication 
in Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and South Africa, using a wide range of country-specific 
academic literature and reports compiled by various non-academic organisations 
active in the media sector. 
 
- µ6WUXFWXUDO FRQGLWLRQV¶ are to be understood as the totality of (formal and 
informal) orders and structures that characterise media and journalism in a 
certain space, most commonly, a country. 
- Eleven interrelated and interdependent dimensions of structural conditions 
relevant to media and journalism have been extracted and adapted from 
existing literature, guiding structured and comprehensive analysis within 
specific (country) contexts: (1) historical development, (2) political system, (3) 
political culture, (4) media freedom, (5) level of state control and regulation of 
media by the state, (6) media ownership and financing, (7) structure of media 
markets and patterns of information distribution, (8) orientation of media, (9) 
political/societal activity and parallelism of media, (10) journalism culture, and 
(11) journalistic professionalism.  
- Country reports feature a unique set and combination of structural factors 
shaping media and journalism in the four countries, demonstrating the 
importance of conflict communication as a case study with regard to structural 
conditions. For example, different degrees of democratisation regarding media 
structures become evident in varying levels of media freedom and state 
interference in the media sector. Moreover, there are significant differences in 
media landscapes and the structure of media markets, reflecting the different 
size, economic situation, infrastructure and cultural, ethnic and linguistic 
diversity of the four countries, as well as the differing degrees of literacy and 
spending power of inhabitants. 
- As to cross-national similarities, media and journalism face highly complex, 
ambivalent, contradictory and changing structural conditions in all four 
countries. These are shaped by the legacies of a non-democratic past, hybrid 
forms of political governance and a political culture which features a strong 
cleavage of ideologies and high level of clientelism. The constitutional 
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guarantee of media freedom which exists in all countries is challenged by 
ambivalent or openly repressive media laws and a reluctance of governments 
to implement fundamental media reforms. Accordingly, the state plays an 
important role in the media sector, mirrored in political influence especially in 
the governance of (public/state) broadcasting and regulatory bodies, financing 
and interference in editorial decisions. Journalists in all four countries are likely 
to face pressures, harassment and the risk of prosecution, leading to a 
considerable gap between legal provision and the practice of media freedom. 
Furthermore, all countries are confronted not only with a relatively high level of 
media concentration but also with a considerable degree of political ownership. 
While the journalistic profession faces challenges regarding journalistic 
education and training, professional organisation and self-regulation, journalists 
in all four countries execute their jobs under precarious conditions, marked by 
professional insecurity, low salaries, as well a low professional status and fragile 
social reputation. 
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Introduction 
In specific situations such as democratisation conflicts and in certain countries, 
as well as in general terms journalistic performance and journalism culture are 
informed by various interrelated constituents: journalistic work practices, role 
perceptions, ethical orientations, and, last but not least, the structural conditions of 
journalism (Neverla et al. 2015).  
Based on Kleinsteuber (2005, p.275), by structural conditions, we understand 
the totality of (formal and informal) orders and structures that characterise media and 
journalism in a certain space, most commonly, a country. 
These structural conditions are established on four levels: (1) the respective 
society in general, (2) the media system, (3) the professional field of journalism and (4) 
WKHSDUWLFXODUPHGLDRUJDQLVDWLRQ 
It is important to keep in mind that while structures are often referred to as 
VRPHWKLQJVWDWLFRUµJLYHQ¶WKH\DUHHVWDEOLVKHGE\GLIIHUHQWactors and always subject 
to changes (Hallin and Mancini 2012b, p.302±303). This particularly applies to 
countries in transition. Thus, agency and the procedural dimension are also an 
important focus of analysis when investigating the structural dimensions of journalism.  
In this working paper we aim to map the structural conditions of journalism in 
the four MeCoDEM countries and by doing so: 
 
x Develop a consistent and comprehensive scheme of dimensions relevant to 
structural conditions of journalism by existing literature 
x Systematically and comprehensively map the structural conditions relevant to 
journalism and conflict communication in the four MeCoDEM case study 
countries - Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and South Africa - based on this scheme  
x Provide a useful basis for an informed analysis of the data gathered in 
0H&R'(0¶VLQWHUYLHZVZLWKMRXUQDOLVWV 
x Identify the shortcomings of existing research and knowledge gaps with regard 
to structural conditions of journalism in the four countries and outline how 
0H&R'(0¶VLQWHUYLHZVZLWK journalists can expand existing knowledge in this 
context.  
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This working paper is structured as follows:  
Section 2 will provide an overview of existing literature focusing on structural 
conditions of media and journalism, largely based in the field of comparative studies 
on media systems. Based on critical discussion of the state of research, several 
dimensions constituting structural conditions of journalism, extracted and adapted from 
existing literature, will be listed and introduced.  
The scheme of dimensions will serve as a conceptual framework for critical 
exploration and systematic in-depth analysis of structural conditions of media and 
journalism in Egypt (chapter 3.1), Kenya (chapter 3.2), Serbia (chapter 3.3) and South 
Africa (3.4) These reports will build on country-specific literature that touches on 
subjects raised within each of the dimensions, allowing for a comprehensive overview 
of the structural conditions of media and journalism within each of the countries under 
study. Moreover, using country-specific literature will enable identification of possible 
additional factors relating to structural conditions of relevance to the specific country.  
In terms of the levels mentioned above, the focus of existing literature means 
that this paper will concentrate on the structural conditions regarding (1) the respective 
society in general, (2) the media system, and (3) the professional field of journalism. 
6WUXFWXUDOFRQGLWLRQVDWlevel 4 (particular media organisation) will be examined in detail 
in the MeCoDEM interviews with journalists in Egypt, Kenya, South Africa and Serbia. 
In conclusion (chapter 4), we will summarise and categorise findings from the 
country reports, point out knowledge gaps with regard to structural conditions in the 
four countries and outline how the empirical data gathered within work package 4 can 
broaden existing knowledge in this context.  
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Dimensions of Analysis for mapping structural conditions of journalism 
There is a long tradition of research into the structures relevant to media and 
journalism in specific societal contexts. As a starting point, one can consider ³)RXU
WKHRULHVRIWKHSUHVV´ by Siebert et al. (1963) which presents four models of media 
systems ruled by (1) the authoritarian theory, (2) the libertarian theory, (3) the 
communist theory and (4) the social responsibility theory. Influenced by the cold war, 
the model reflects a polarised conception of the world and an ethnocentrism on the 
8QLWHG6WDWHV:HLVFKHQEHUJODEHOOHGWKH³IRXUWKHRULHV´DVD³QRUPDWLYHGLYHUJHQFH-
DSSURDFK´SDQGWKH\ZHUHFULWLFLsHGIRU³MXGJLQJWKHZRUOGSUHVVV\VWHPV
LQWHUPVRIWKHLUGLVWDQFHIURPWKHOLEHUDOLGHDORIDQHXWUDOµZDWFKGRJ¶SUHVVIUHHIURP
VWDWHLQIOXHQFH´+DOOLQDQG0DQFLQL, p.12).1  
There have been attempts to classify media systems ever since, for example by 
'HQLV0F4XDLO  LQ ³0DVV&RPPXQLFDWLRQ7KHRU\´:LLR  LQ ³7KH0DVV
0HGLD5ROHLQWKH:HVWHUQ:RUOG´$OWVFKXOOLQ³$JHQWVRI3RZHU´3LFDUG
LQ³)LYHWKHRULHVRIWKHSUHVV´DQGE\2VWLQL)XQJVHHRYHUYLHZLQ%OXP
pp.25±51). All these approaches have been built on general philosophical and political 
theories rather than in depth empirical analyses of particular systems (Hallin and 
Mancini 2012c, p.1). 
In contrast, +DOOLQ DQG 0DQFLQL¶V (2004) developed a set of media models 
EDVHGRQHPSLULFDOGDWDDQGWKHPHWKRGRORJLFDOSUHPLVH³WKDWWKHFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQRI
media systems needs to be rooted in detailed empirical analysis of particular systems 
LQWKHLURZQKLVWRULFDODQGVWUXFWXUDOFRQWH[W´+DOOLQDQG0ancini 2012b, p.280). With 
WKLV LQ PLQG +DOOLQ DQG 0DQFLQL ZHUH LQWHUHVWHG ³QRW LQ PHDVXULQJ PHGLD V\VWHPV
against a normative ideal, but in analysing their historical development as institutions 
ZLWKLQ SDUWLFXODU VHWWLQJV´ +DOOLQ DQG 0DQFLQL  S, an approach that is of 
relevance to MeCoDEM¶V aims to explore media systems as outcomes of their 
particular setting, as opposed to comparing them against a normative ± western ± 
PHGLDPRGHO7KHDXWKRUV³GHYHORSDIUDPHZRUNIRUFRPSDULQJPHGLDV\VWHPVDQd a 
set of hypotheses about how they are linked structurally and historically to the 
                                                          
1
 Normative and often western inspired understandings of the press widen the gap between the ideal and reality, 
so much so that journalists working within other media PRGHOVZLOORIWHQ³H[SUHVVDOOHJLDQFHWRWKH/LEHUDO0RGHORI
QHXWUDOLW\DQGREMHFWLYLW\´HYHQLIWKHLU MRXUQDOLVWLFSUDFWLFHLVURRWHGLQRWKHUPRGHOWUDGLWLRQV+DOOLQDQG0DQFLQL
2004, p.14). 
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GHYHORSPHQWRIWKHSROLWLFDOV\VWHP´KRZHYHUWKH\³GRQRWFODLPWRKDYHWHVWHGWKRVH
K\SRWKHVHV´ibid., p.5). Their study focuses on media systems in the United States, 
&DQDGDDQGPRVWFRXQWULHVRI:HVWHUQ(XURSHZKLFKVKDUH ³FRPSDUDEOH OHYHOVRI
HFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQWDQGPXFKFRPPRQFXOWXUHDQGSROLWLFDOKLVWRU\´ ibid., p.6). 
%DVHGRQWKLVµPRVWVLPLODUV\VWHPV¶GHVLJQWKHRXWFRPHRI+DOOLQDQG0DQFLQL¶VVWXG\
was three media models: The Liberal Model (Britain, Ireland and North America) which 
LV³FKDUDFWHUL]HGE\DUHODWLYHGRPLQDQFHRIPDUNHWPHFKDQLVPVDQGRIFRPPHUFLDO
PHGLD´7KHDemocratic Corporatist Model (northern continental Europe), defined by 
³DKLVWRULFDOFoexistence of commercial media and media tied to organized social and 
SROLWLFDO JURXSV´ DQG WKH Polarized Pluralist Model (Mediterranean countries of 
VRXWKHUQ(XURSHFKDUDFWHULVHGE\³LQWHJUDWLRQRIWKHPHGLDLQWRSDUW\SROLWLFVZHDNHU
historical develRSPHQWRIFRPPHUFLDOPHGLDDQGDVWURQJUROHRIWKHVWDWH´ibid., p.11). 
Although their models made a significant contribution to the field, they faced various 
criticisms that were then acknowledged in their 2012 publication (Hallin and Mancini 
2012a). GLYHQWKHLQLWLDOVWXG\¶VOLPLWHGIRFXVRQZHVWHUQFRXQWULHV, one of the risks 
noted was that the PolarisHG3OXUDOLVWPRGHOZDVVHHQDVD³FDWFK-DOOUHVLGXDOPRGHO´
against which a diversity of non-western media systems would be analysed ± a model 
whose FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQ³LQYROYHGQHJDWLYHQRUPDWLYHLPSOLFDWLRQV´ibid., p.279). 
Against this background, rather than relying too heavily on specific models to 
categorise media systems, more useful are the variables/dimensions which allow us to 
note similaritiHVDQGGLIIHUHQFHVDPRQJPHGLDV\VWHPVDVRSSRVHG WR ³DSSO\´RU WR
³FODVVLI\´WKHPZKLOHEHDULQJLQPLQGWKDWWKHVHDUHQHYHUWKHOHVVOLQNHGWRDVSHFLILF
set of media systems, and cannot be isolated from a particular time and space and 
treated as general categories) (Hallin and Mancini 2012c, p.4). Though the original 
dimensions developed by +DOOLQDQG0DQFLQL¶VWRDQDO\VHPHGLDV\VWHPVLQ:HVWHUQ
Europe and North America are to an extent transferable to the analysis of media 
systems outside these regions, they are rooted in the systems from which they 
originated, and therefore require reconceptualising for analysis of other media systems 
(ibid., p.6). In examining the non-western countries analysed by contributors to their 
2012 compilation, Hallin and Mancini summarised that in some of the countries, their 
RULJLQDOYDULDEOHVKHOGXS³UHDVRQDEO\ZHOO´ibid., p.5). However, reconceptualisation 
was necessary particularly for political dimensions conceived away from West 
European and North American political systems and histories making the variables 
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difficult to apply outside of this geographical context (ibid., p.5). Although Hallin and 
0DQFLQL¶V ZRUN SURYLGHV D ³PXFK QHHGHG LQWHOOHFWXDO WRRONLW IRU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKH
immense variations between systems of public communication in different cultural and 
SROLWLFDOFRQWH[WV´9ROWPHUS9ROWPHUVWUHVVHVWKDWXQGHUVWDQGLQJPHGLD
V\VWHPV RXWVLGH RI ZHVWHUQ GHPRFUDFLHV UHTXLUHV WKDW ZH ³H[SDQGDQG UHILQH´ WKH
dimensions of analysis used by Hallin and Mancini (ibid., p.225). As an example, 
Voltmer suggests that rather than measuring only the degree of influence of a certain 
dimension, we also need to consider the nature of that influence (e.g. the degree of 
state intervention in media, and also the objectives of that intervention) (Voltmer 2012, 
pp.227-228). 
Another comprehensive, empirically based approach has been published by 
Blum (Blum 2014). +H GHYHORSV KLV ³SUDJPDWLF GLIIHUHQFHGHYLDWLRQ-DSSURDFK´ WR
analysing media systems based on an empirical study which incluGHVµZHVWHUQ¶DQG
µQRQ-ZHVWHUQ¶FRXQWULHVIURPVL[ZRUOGUHJLRQVLQFOXGLQJ(J\SW,UDQ6\ULD/HEDQRQ
as Arab countries and Senegal and Ghana as African countries) and representing 
different political systems. Based on his analysis, Blum developed six models which 
he describes using 11 criteria for analysis: liberal model, public-service-model, 
clientele model, shock model, patriotic model and command model. 
Existing literature on media systems allows us to conclude that understanding 
D FRXQWU\¶V PHGLD V\VWHP DOVR UHTXLUHV XQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKH ³VRFLDO DQG SROLWLFDO
VWUXFWXUHV ZLWKLQ ZKLFK LW RSHUDWHV´ 6LHEHUW HW DO  SS±2): the structural 
conditions of media and journalism cannot be understood without understanding the 
FRXQWU\¶VKLVWRU\WKHQDWXUH of the state, the system of political parties, the patterns or 
relations between economic and political interests, and the development of civil 
society, among other elements of social structure (Hallin and Mancini 2004, p.8). The 
underlying argument for using the political system to understand the media system is 
that it is WKH³SROLWLFDOV\VWHPWKDWXOWLPDWHO\KDVWKHSRZHUWRPDNHELQGLQJGHFLVLRQV
DQG WKXVVKDSHV WKHEDVLFVWUXFWXUHDQGIXQFWLRQLQJRI WKHPHGLDV\VWHP´ 9ROWPHU
2012, p.240). However, also with regard to structural conditions, it has to be kept in 
mind that a close relationship and mutual dependence exist between the political and 
the media system, and ³PHGLDLQVWLWXWLRQVFDQKDYHDQLPSDFWRIWKHLURZQRQRWKHU
VRFLDO VWUXFWXUHV´ +DOOLQ and Mancini 2004, p.8). This is of particular relevance to 
0H&R'(0DQGSDUWLFXODUO\WKHSURMHFW¶VUHVHDUFKLQWRWKHUROHRIMRXUQDOLVWVDVZHWU\
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to examine whether and to what extent journalists and media institutions ± through 
their coverage of democratisation conflicts ± have an impact on the democratisation 
process itself, contrasting the perception that journalists are merely reporting on the 
events within their environment. Moreover, structural conditions as to media and 
journalism are shaped within the media system and professional field. 
Current literature underlines the importance of the (nation) state as a framework 
IRUVWUXFWXUDOFRQGLWLRQVRIPHGLDDQGMRXUQDOLVPDV³PHGLDV\VWHPVKDYHKLVWRULFDOO\
been rooted in the institutions of the nation state, in part because of their close 
UHODWLRQVKLS WR WKHSROLWLFDOZRUOG´+DOOLQDQG0DQFLQLS+RZHYHUDV WKLV
statement refers to the historical development of journalism in Western countries 
throughout the 19th and 20th century and globalisation has also had an impact on the 
media sector in the 21th century, one should take into account that influences on 
structural conditions of media and journalism might possibly be broader than the nation 
state.  
Based on these considerations, 11 dimensions have been extracted and 
adapted from existing literature and will be further elaborated on below.  
x Historical development 
x Political system 
x Political culture 
x Media freedom 
x Level of state control and regulation of media by the state 
x Media ownership and financing  
x Structure of Media Markets and patterns of information distribution 
x Orientation of media 
x Political/societal activity and parallelism of media 
x Journalism culture 
x Professionalisation/Professionalism of journalism 
These dimensions have been developed empirically and represent broad 
patterns of comparison outlining characteristics of both media and political systems. 
As such they can be considered an extensive foundation for further critical exploration 
and analysis of structural conditions of media and journalism in different countries. 
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However, it should be kept in mind that the dimensions are not mutually exclusive but 
interrelated and interdependent. Moreover, as they have been deduced from existing 
literature, they are certainly not exhaustive; it is possible that additional structural 
conditions of relevance to the MeCoDEM countries will be extracted from country-
specific literature and empirical research within work package 4 and MeCoDEM as a 
whole. 
Historical development 
This dimension refers to the political history and political stability of a country, 
i.e. the way and frequency with which the political system has fundamentally changed 
over time. It is obvious that this impacts on the media system, since stable media 
systems are unlikely to be developed in countries undergoing continuous fundamental 
changes to their political framework. In this sense, Blum (2014, pp.296-304) 
differentiates three patterns of historical political development: (1) countries which 
have been politically stable since 1900 and are marked by continuity, (2) countries 
FKDUDFWHULVHGE\D³EURNHQFRQWLQXLW\´DQGUHJLPHVFKDQJHGIXQGDPHQWDOO\XSWRWKUHH
times throughout last 100 years, (3) countries which show discontinuity as their political 
regimes have changed at least four times in last 100 years.  
Apart from political stability over time, history comes into play in other 
dimensions, as general legacies of a society and its collective memory impact on 
structural conditions of media and journalism: This applies first and foremost to 
transitional societies, since, as Voltmer states:  
Media are not newly created after regime change. Rather, they are 
transformations of existing institutions that carry with them the norms and power 
relations of the old UHJLPH«7KHUHVXOWLVDXQLTXHPL[RISHUVLVWLQJVWUXFWXUHV
inherited from the past alongside newly adopted elements from existing ± 
usually Western ± role models and, in addition, specific features born out of the 
desire to implement something different and better than the institutional 
predecessor (2012, p.235)  
While media systems are built on their institutional predecessors and have 
inherited some of their features, they are also the cognitive constructions of the policy 
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makers of the transition process, who shape them according to their own values, 
worldviews, and interests (ibid., p.238). 
Political system 
The IRUP RI JRYHUQPHQW LQIRUPV PHGLD IUHHGRP DQG ³SRZHU GLVWDQFH´
(Hanitzsch 2007, pp.373±374), journalism´s autonomy and independence from 
(political) sources of power ± this aspect of a political system is central to a couQWU\¶V
structural conditions of media and journalism. 
On a general level, political systems can be distinguished by the levels of 
freedom of people to vote and different degrees of division of power, i.e. the system of 
checks and balances among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of 
government (Blum 2014, pp.304-309). An additional indicator is the institutionalisation 
of the rule of law and civil liberties (Voltmer 2012, pp.241). 
Based on these factors, Blum extrapolates three general types of political 
system.  
7DNLQJDSUDJPDWLFDSSURDFKLQUHVSRQVHWR³WKHTXHVWLRQDVWRZKDWFDQEH
UHJDUGHG D GHPRFUDF\ DQG ZKDW QRW LV KLJKO\ GLVSXWHG´ 9ROWPHU  S a 
democracy is characterised by a multi-party system, in which the government is held 
accountable to citizens by free and fair elections, and changes if majorities change 
(Voltmer 2012, p.225, Blum 2014, p.309). Moreover, based on a system of checks and 
balances, both executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government are subject 
to mutual hindrances in holding too much power. These structures are complemented 
E\DQXPEHURI³QHFHVVDU\SUHFRQGLWLRQV´VXFKDVEDVLFOLEHUWLHVLQFOXGLQJIUHHGRPRI
association, expression and the press (Voltmer 2012, p.225). 
On the other hand, an authoritarian system is characterised by a controlled 
pluralism of parties and managed elections in which the political system has developed 
mechanisms to keep elites in power. As to the division of power, the elite in power 
execute control over the judiciary/courts. 
A totalitarian system is characterised by the permanent rule of one party or 
caste; the ruling ideology is not questioned by elections which have only a single list 
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of candidates and the character of plebiscitary consultation. Moreover, there is very 
little of or no division of power as the jurisdiction is based on the ruling ideology. 
Of course there is not always such a clear distinction between political systems 
in reality. Rather, many political systems, especially those of transitional countries, can 
be defined as hybrid regimes, incorporating logic from various political systems. These 
hybrid regimes are not a transitory state, immanent to transition processes, but persist 
in many cases. As Voltmer (2012, p.240) points out, hybrid regimes introduce 
FRPSHWLWLYHHOHFWLRQVRIVRPHNLQGEXWIDLOWRGHHSHQGHPRFUDWLFJRYHUQDQFH³EH\RQG
EDVLF IRUPDO UHTXLUHPHQWV´ DQG WKXV PDQLIHVW D ³SHFXOLDU PL[ RI GHPRFUDWLF DQG
aXWRFUDWLFSUDFWLFHV´ 
Hybrid systems have adopted democratic practices to varying degrees. Hence, 
there are many sub-types of hybrid regime, ranging from non-GHPRFUDWLF³FRPSHWLWLYH
DXWKRULWDULDQLVP´ WR GHPRFUDWLF K\EULG UHJLPHV FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ WKH ³H[LVWence of 
competitive and reasonably free elections, but a weak institutionalization of the rule of 
ODZDQGFLYLOOLEHUWLHV´9ROWPHU2  
It is important to take into consideration which type of political system was in 
place prior to the transformation process, especially with countries in transition. Given 
WKH ´FRQWLQXLW\ RI RUJDQL]DWLRQDO VWUXFWXUHV SHUVRQQHO DQG SUDFWLFHV´ WKH VSHFLILF
patterns of politics-media relations of the preceding authoritarian regime are likely to 
affect the outcome of the transformation process of political and media institutions after 
the demise of the old regime (Voltmer 2012, p.236). 
A political system is established by formal and informal rules. While formal rules 
are laid down in written constitutions, laws, and organisational directives, informal rules 
consist of unwritten norms that are enforced through often unspoken sanctions and 
rewards. Both, but particularly informal rules, tend to support the status quo and the 
                                                          
2
 Two hybrid regime types that Voltmer considers particularly relevant to understanding the specific constellation of 
SROLWLFVDQGWKHPHGLD LQK\EULGUHJLPHVDQGPDNHXSDVLJQLILFDQWQXPEHURIQHZGHPRFUDFLHVDUHµGHOHJDWLYH
GHPRFUDF\¶DQGµRQH-party predominance¶A delegative democracy which is characteristic for presidential systems 
RIJRYHUQPHQWLV³EDVHGRQWKHSUHPLVHWKDWµZKRHYHUZLQVHOHFWLRQWRWKHSUHVLGHQF\LVWKHUHE\HQWLWOHGWRJRYHUQ
DVKHRUVKHILW¶´9ROWPHUS,QWKLVVHQVHLncumbents claim to represent the nation as a whole and 
HPSOR\SUHVLGHQWLDO UXOH LQDZD\ WKDWZHDNHQVGHPRFUDWLF LQVWLWXWLRQVVXFKDVSDUOLDPHQWDQG MXGLFLDU\´  ibid.). 
One-party predominance DSSOLHVWRFRXQWULHVZKLFK³DUHGRPLQDWHGE\RQHSROLWLFDOSDUW\ even after the introduction 
RIIUHHDQGIDLUHOHFWLRQV´DQGDUHXVXDOO\FKDUDFWHULVHGE\D³KHJHPRQLFSXEOLFVSKHUHLQZKLFKWKHUXOLQJSDUW\
interpretation of the political situation prevails while oppositional views are marginalized and even delegitimizHG´
(ibid., pp.242±243). 
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interests of the actors which they serve (North 1994, pp.360-363; 366, see also Mueller 
2008, pp.194±195). This links to the political culture as an additional constitutive 
dimension for structural conditions of media and journalism.   
Political culture 
When we speak of political culture, we refer to concepts, ideas and structures 
that rule and are embedded within the functioning of institutions and the agency of 
political and societal actors, as well as citizens. Aspects of political culture are 
manifested in various ways, including the natXUHRIWKHVWDWH¶VLQWHUYHQWLRQLQVRFLHW\
(including media), the distribution or concentration of political power, the relationship 
between political institutions and the public, the level of political/ideological pluralism, 
adherence to and respect for rules and regulations by political actors and citizens, and 
lastly, the political culture of citizens -  how they understand the role of the state, and 
participate in community and political life.  
According to Hallin and Mancini (2004), an indicator of the nature of political 
culture is the centrality of the state within various aspects of society such as 
health, education and the media. They suggest two sub-dimensions or categories of 
definition, namely the liberal system ZKHUHWKHVWDWH¶VLQWHUYHQWLRQLV limited, and the 
welfare system where the involvement of the state in society and the media is high. 
This in turn dictates the extent to which political communication is regulated by 
monitoring paid political advertising, the length of a campaigning period and media 
time allocated to political parties. At the same time, these factors are affected by the 
way in which media is defined, whether as a social institution or a private business, 
and which orientation prevails. (Hallin and Mancini 2004, pp.49-50) 
The way in which political power is distributed can be seen as another point 
of influence on the expression of political culture, and how that is reflected in the 
structure and role of the media. Here, Hallin and Mancini (2004, pp.50-53) suggest two 
types of power models: majoritarian politics which is defined by majority rule or power 
concentrated in the ruling party within a two-party system consisting of the government 
and the opposition. The ruling party holds the concentration of power and maintains 
cabinet dominance; there is a clear distinction between them and the opposition. 
Because of this concentration of power, the majoritarian model is characterised by 
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µFDWFK-DOO¶SROLWLFDOSDUWLHVZKLFKVHHN WRDSSHDO WRDEURDGFROOHFWLYHRISHRSOHDQG
society as a whole (also evident in the media within such a system). The second model 
is consensus politics, defined by a multiparty system, proportional representation and 
power sharing, and compromise and cooperation between opposing forces. Here, the 
media are more likely to be externally pluralistic, and politically aligned to one of a 
multitude of political ideologies. In the former model, the media is characterised by 
internal pluralism. 
Political culture is also evident in the way political institutions relate and 
communicate to the public. In evaluating this relationship, two categories emerge, 
namely individual pluralism (or liberalism) and organised pluralism (corporatism). In 
countries where the relationship between the public and political bodies is governed 
by individual pluralism, individual citizens are likely to have access to mechanisms 
which allow them to represent their multiple individual interests independently and 
directly. Where organized pluralism is established, the relationship between the public 
and governing institutions is facilitated via organised social groups representing 
segments of the population around certain interests, such as education, culture, sport, 
trade unions and so on. Within organised pluralism systems, the media tend to be 
politically parallel and externally pluralised, to an extent reflecting the diversity of social 
groups and interests (we will come back to this when elaborating on the dimension of 
political and societal parallelism). 
The level of cleavage between political parties (and their ideologies) is also 
an indicative of the nature and degree of polarisation of political culture and political 
conflict (Voltmer 2012, p.229). Here, polarised pluralism describes a wide political 
spectrum with deep divisions between sharply defined political ideologies and 
disagreement about the basic shape and norms of the political order. In the same vein, 
media is likely to be ideologically aligned with political parties. Historically, this kind of 
pluralism is associated with regime changes where media are instrumentalised or used 
DV ³LQVWUXPHQWVRI VWUXJJOH´ E\ RSSRVLQJ SROLWLFDO SDUWLHV +DOOLQDQG 0DQFLQL 
p.61). In a political system characterised by moderate pluralism, the political spectrum 
is narrower and parties tend to gravitate ideologically towards the centre with fewer 
and less distinct differences between them, while also exhibiting stronger acceptance 
RI³WKHIXQGDPHQWDOVKDSHRIWKHSROLWLFDORUGHU´ibid., p.60). Consequently, media are 
less likely to be defined by parallelism and intrumentalisation. Voltmer (2012) suggests 
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that pluralism can be fragmented or hegemonic in nature. In fragmented pluralism the 
political spectrum is divided between numerous smaller political groups, none of which 
holds power or control of the political scene. In the absence of compromise or the 
IRUPDWLRQRIDFRDOLWLRQEHWZHHQWKHVHJURXSVRYHUDORQJHUSHULRGRIWLPH³WKLVW\SH
of fragmented pluralism can result in a permanent stalemate and the inability of 
governments to make bLQGLQJ GHFLVLRQV´ 9ROWPHU  SS±230). Hegemonic 
pluralismRQWKHRWKHUKDQGLVDQRXWFRPHRI³FRQWLQXRXVGRPLQDQFHRIRQHFDPSRU
party at the expense of all the other groups, so that elections rarely result in an 
DOWHUDWLRQRISRZHU´± and control of resources remains in the hands of the ruling party 
(ibid., p.230). 
The extent to which political actors and society adhere to and respect 
formal rules and procedures can also be indicative of the nature of a political culture. 
Hallin and Mancini suggest that the presence of the rational-legal authority system 
encourages autonomy of institutions and functions around established and universal 
procedures which serve the society as a whole. Characterising this system are two 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOGHYHORSPHQWV³D civil-service system that governs the hiring, promotion, 
DQGWHQXUHRIDGPLQLVWUDWLYHSHUVRQQHO´DQGVHFRQGO\³DQDXWRQRPRXVMXGLFLDOV\VWHP´
(Hallin and Mancini 2004, p.56). Media instrumentalisation for purposes of political 
influence is low in this type of system, and professionalism (autonomy and public 
service) is high. State involvement in public broadcasting and regulatory institutions is 
low. In contrast, clientelism characterises a system where adherence to formal rules 
and procedures is undermined and pursuit of particular interests dominates. Political 
FOLHQWHOLVPZKLFKLVFRPPRQO\SUHVHQWLQ6RXWKHUQ(XURSHDQFRXQWULHV³UHIHUVWRD
pattern of social organization in which access to social resources is controlled by 
patrons and delivered to clients in exchange for deference and various forms of 
VXSSRUW´ +DOOLQDQG0DQFLQLS3HUVRQDOFRQQHFWLRQVDUH IRUPHGWKURXJK
political parties or religious organisations, and the ethos of serving the common good, 
is overpowered by the pursuit of particular interests. Within such a system, there is 
strong political loyalty and parallelism of the media which guide the appointment of 
media professionals. At the same time, journalists tend to be particularistic and 
maintain relations with powerful networks and elites, because access to information is 
often dependent on the strength of such relations. For private media, this kind of 
relationship ensures that broadcast licences and contracts with the government can 
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be obtained easily and media has the ability to intervene in political processes ±
VRPHWLPHVWKLVLV³WKHSULPDU\SXUSRVHRIPHGLDRZQHUVKLS´+DOOLQDQG0DQFLQL
p.58).  
To a large extent, the political culture of citizens is influenced and dictated by 
the structures of the political and societal systems. Blum (2014, p.309) suggests that 
political actions of citizens are determined by unwritten ideas, basic values, knowledge 
and emotional commitment to a particular political culture. This is reflected in how 
people perceive the role of the state, how they treat different ethnicities, religious and 
linguistic groups, how they participate in the community and particularly in political life 
(including voter turnout), what kind of political debates people are engaged with, and 
the historical traditions to which they adhere. 
Taking these various components and dimensions into account, Blum (2014, 
pp.309-314) distinguishes three types of political culture: Polarised, where political 
parties differ strongly with regard to their underlying ideology, and are therefore deeply 
divided across two camps resembling principles of the majority rule model; Ambivalent, 
where political parties are in oppositional camps but also engage in compromise, 
therefore resembling elements of majority and proportional representation; and, 
Consensual political culture which manifests differently in democratic systems where 
representation is proportional, compromise high and minorities are included in 
democratic negotiations, or non-democratic systems where unity is maintained through 
forced consensus and rallying around an ideology of those in power.  
Media freedom 
The basic legal precondition of media freedom is the guarantee of freedom of 
H[SUHVVLRQPHGLDDQGLQIRUPDWLRQLQDFRXQWU\¶Vconstitution. However, the validity of 
this indicator of media freedom is limited, since media freedom is guaranteed in nearly 
all FRQVWLWXWLRQV LQ WKH ZRUOG LUUHVSHFWLYH RI WKH UHJLPH¶V FKDUDFWHU 0RUHRYHU D
constitution cannot provide for the level of detail needed to provide sufficient media 
regulations in a society (Blum 2014, pp.314-317). 
Therefore, in order to evaluate the factual degree of media freedom in a country, 
one has to investigate the concrete legislation governing media in a country as well as 
actual media policies.  
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Common media laws include, for example, media concentration and ownership 
laws, broadcast licensing laws and broadcast content regulation laws (Hallin and 
Mancini 2004, pp.43-44). Moreover, the existence and content of access to 
(government) information laws is crucial for media freedom.  
Both constitutional and the additional legal frameworks might restrict media 
freedom. One crucial curb to media freedom consists in the possibility of censorship: 
While in some countries, censorship is forbidden any time, in others it is allowed by 
law under certain circumstances, for example in time of war (under martial law) or when 
a state of emergency is declared. 
As for the status and protection of journalistic actors by law, it is important to 
look at whether the conduct of journalists is judged under criminal or penal law and 
existing regulations relating to the immunity of witnesses, libel, defamation, privacy and 
professional secrecy (protection of source). Also, the legal status and autonomy of 
regulatory bodies is a crucial indicator of media freedom 3 
Besides overall formal rules inscribed in a constitution and legal framework, the 
current state of media freedom is shaped by actual media policies. This links to the 
level of state control and regulation of media.  
Level of state control and regulation of media by the state 
As Blum points out, two divergent objectives inform control and regulation of 
media by the state: on the one hand, the state might intervene in order to secure 
freedom of information and expression, for example by enhancing media pluralism, 
protecting audiences against manipulation and limiting the media power of specific 
companies or individuals. On the other, control of the media by the state might aim at 
VHFXULQJ WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V FRQWURO RYHU WKH PHGLD in order to prevent them from 
GLVWULEXWLQJ LQIRUPDWLRQ WKDW PLJKW XQGHUPLQH WKH VWDWH¶V RU rather the ruling 
                                                          
3
 In this sense, Blum (2014: 321) distinguishes between countries with rare interventions in media freedom, slight 
interventions from time to time, both slight and strong interventions, frequently strong interventions, permanently 
strong interventions. 
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JRYHUQPHQW¶V LQWHUHVWV %OXP , pp.322-323, see also Voltmer 2012, p.228, 
Brüggemann et al. 2014).  
In this regard, analysis of media control by the state has to focus on whether 
state authorities control media politically or regulate PHGLDLQDIRUPDODQGµDSROLWLFDO¶
way. In this sense, there are different means of intervention which differ tremendously 
with regard to their coercive character: direct, excessive state control takes place 
through extensive interference into the running of media organisations in terms of 
organisation, personnel and content. Formal regulation of broadcast media is carried 
out, for example, by distributing frequencies and limiting the advertising of public 
service broadcasters. Other means of state influence might include special taxation 
applied to the media sector, subsidies, and privileges granted to certain media outlets 
and individual media practitioners (Voltmer 2012, p.228, Brüggemann et al. 2014, 
p.1041). Another possible instrument of state intervention refers to licensing of media 
outlets. In this sense, it is important to note the kind of media outlets which need to be 
licensed, whether a state body is responsible and the criteria on which licensing is 
based. Accordingly, requirements for entry to the journalistic profession require 
analysis; here again, the bodies authorised to accredit journalists, whether a state 
(controlled) body is responsible and the criteria on which accreditation is based are 
important. 
Moreover, analyses of media control should look at the types of media are being 
controlled or regulated by the state. While in authoritarian countries the state controls 
radio and TV as well as press and internet, in other (often democratic) countries, the 
state regulates (public-service) radio and TV only. 
In addition, the targets of media control must be analysed: is it media 
organisations and owners (e.g. through media concentration and media ownership 
laws), single media outlets (e.g. through licensing and content regulation) and/or rather 
individual journalists (e.g. through accreditation, libel laws, penal codes)? 
While analysing the level of media freedom and state intervention in the media 
sector it is important to keep in mind that the WHUP µLQWHUYHQWLRQ¶XVHGE\+DOOLQ and 
Mancini signifies that the state and media are separate entities, which is not always 
the case particularly in authoritarian countries where there is a mutually beneficial 
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synergy between the state and media. 0RUHRYHUµWKHVWDWH¶VKRXOGQRWEHFRQVLGHUHG
as a unified actorEXWLV³RIWHQFRPSOH[LQWHUQDOO\SOXUDOLVWLFDQGLQVRPHFDVHVXQDEOH
WRH[HUFLVHSRZHUHIIHFWLYHO\IRUJRRGRULOO´+DOOLQDQG0DQFLQLE, p.299). Against 
this backdrop, (coercive) interventions might not originate only from the state but could 
also stem from private actors, individual power holders and their allies, who succeed 
in instrumentalising factions of the state for their benefit (McCargo 2012, Hallin and 
Mancini 2012b, p.299). In this context, one has to look at the concrete actors of media 
control: while supervision bodies can be characterised as state institutions in some 
countries (as they are directly appointed and controlled by the government), in 
(democratic) countries they are rather independent public institutions, consisting of 
representatives from different societal groups.4 
Beyond the formal rules and legal framework, informal rules are crucial in order 
to evaluate the level of media freedom and state control. In this context, effective 
interventions against media outlets and the safety of journalists need to be 
investigated: do journalists fear prosecution and intervention by state actors and legal 
bodies and how often does this happen? What is the nature of intervention: is pressure 
from government officials, parliament, political parties and other political actors overt 
or subtle, do media outlets fear economic sanctions or withdrawal of licences, do 
individual (oppositional) journalists risk legal proceedings, psychological threats, 
physical attacks or even murder?5  
                                                          
4
 In this context, Hallin and Mancini distinguish four models of governance of public broadcasting systems and 
UHJXODWRU\ DJHQFLHV µ*RYHUQPHQW 0RGHO¶ VWDWH EURDGFDVWLQJ FRQWUROOHG E\ JRYHUQPHQW µ3URIHVVLRQDO 0RGHO¶
(broadcasting LV LQVXODWHG IURP SROLWLFDO FRQWURO DQG UXQ E\ EURDGFDVWLQJ SURIHVVLRQDOV µ3DUOLDPHQWDU\ RU
3URSRUWLRQDO5HSUHVHQWDWLRQ0RGHO¶UHJXODWLRQLVGLYLGHGDPRQJWKHSROLWLFDOSDUWLHVE\SURSRUWLRQDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ
µ&LYLFRU&RUSRUDWLVW0RGHO¶VLPLODUWRWKe Proportional Representation Model but representation is extended beyond 
SROLWLFDOSDUWLHV´WRRWKHUNLQGVRIJURXSVVXFKDVWUDGHXQLRQVDQGUHOLJLRXVRUJDQLVDWLRQV+DOOLQDQG0DQFLQL
pp.30±31). 
5
 Based on the characteristics of state intervention mentioned above, the following six patterns of media control 
have been listed by Blum (2014, p.329):  
(1) The State controls and regulates every kind of media (press, radio, TV and internet) and the media are 
legally and factually bodies of the state or the ruling elite. The legal framework manifests an influence of the state 
with regard to both organisation, personnel and content, since it controls who communicates and what is being 
communicated. As to the factual situation, oppositional journalists are consequently being prosecuted and 
punished. Blum (ibid., p.323) gives North Korea as an example for this pattern of media control. 
(2) The State regulates every kind of media (press, radio, TV and internet) but does not control everything in 
the media sector: While there is an extensive organisational influence by the state, who has the right to censor 
under certain circumstances and licenses all media, those media which received those licenses have to obey certain 
obligations but have a certain degree of liberty in this framework or legal proceedings. As to the factual situation, 
journalists have to regularly fear accusations, prosecutions and disorder. If state authorities do not approve reporting 
of certain media, they will react by withdrawing licenses and initiating legal proceedings. According to Blum (ibid., 
p.324), Egypt is an example of this pattern of media control. 
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Media ownership and financing  
When looking at media ownership and financing structures we are most likely 
to find that media institutions are either privately owned companies, public institutions 
or state-owned. Blum (2014, pp.329-331) suggests four basic structures of media 
ownership: (1) Media are owned by private companies founded and led by individual 
business men/women, or stock corporations; (2) Media institutions belong to both 
private companies and the public, where most media are in the private ownership 
camp, and public service broadcasting is a public institution with a public service 
mandate and is financed by fees established by the state; (3) Media belong to both 
private companies and the public, however, in this case the power of the state prevails 
by maintaining ownership of national news agencies, public broadcasters and even 
newspapers; and lastly, (4) all media belong to public institutions (state, parties, 
parliament, unions, army) and receive state subsidies, and the foundation or 
establishment of new media outlets requires approval by state authorities.  
Depending on the characteristics and structure of media ownership, different 
patterns of media financing can be distinguished: Market-driven media which is 
financed through advertising, sponsoring, sales revenue, and other forms of income 
generated by the institution; Mixed-source financing by both the market 
(advertisement) and contributions from the state, such as public broadcasting fees, 
and newspaper subsidies which may take the form of reduced rates for postal or 
telecommunications services, and be directed at the media organisation as a whole or 
at individual journalists; and lastly, media which are financed entirely by the state and 
                                                          
(3) The state does not regulate everything but does intervene massively into the media market on a regular 
basis. While the state controls many of the important media, criticism is allowed, however only to a degree. If this 
limit is crossed, the state will intervene economically, legally or administratively. Print media in general have more 
freedom than broadcast media. From time to time, journalists are threatened or even murdered. Russia is an 
example (ibid., p.324) 
(4) The state regulates radio, TV and press but not the internet and rarely intervenes additionally. State 
institutions provide licences and supervise content. Every media outlet needs to be licensed and there is a close 
relationship between state actors and journalists of state media. According to Blum (ibid., p.325), Ghana is an 
example of this pattern of media control. 
(5) In general, regulation by the state is limited. However, the state intervenes on an informal basis in order to 
enforce media compliance. The state regulates broadcasting media first and foremost through supervision bodies 
(by distributing frequencies, limiting adverts). Blum (ibid., p.326) gives Italy, France and Austria as examples of this 
pattern of media control. 
(6) TV and radio are regulated cautiously (and apolitically) through independent supervision bodies (which 
decide on distributing frequencies or limiting adverts). Thus, public broadcasters act independently based on own 
public-service mandate. Apart from this, the state intervenes only in order to protect the audience. According to 
Blum, Germany, Switzerland and the United States would serve as examples of this pattern of media control (ibid., 
p.328). 
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could not exist without them, making the cost of newspapers low. (Blum 2014, pp.332±
333) 
Structure of media markets and patterns of information distribution 
Ownership and financing structures can have an impact on the overall structure 
of the media market (share of private and public/state-owned media) and hence 
inform patterns of information distribution and the market shares of different 
media types, such as levels of newspaper circulation, the degree to which audiences 
rely on TV and radio, and internet penetration. These structures and patterns of usage 
can also dictate the level of distinction between tabloid/sensational and µquality¶ press 
and different types of media, and their relation to specific target audiences (elite, 
educated, politically active, broadly speaking ordinary citizens), how different types of 
media are consumed (individually or collectively), as well as the role these media 
perceive themselves to have in communicating social and political issues and debates 
(Hallin and Mancini 2004, pp.22-26 and Hallin and Mancini 2012, pp.288-290). 
According to Hallin and Mancini (2004, p.22), in Southern Europe, for example, the 
press is targeted at an elite, educated and politically active audience, enabling 
horizontal debate among elite groups, whereas in Northern America and Northern 
Europe, the press is targeted at a broad audience of ordinary citizens, with a more 
vertical communication process between elites and ordinary people. Further variances 
can be noted in the gender of media consumers.6 Some of these discrepancies can 
(historically) be tied to literacy rates and political engagement, both of which excluded 
or were limited for women (Hallin and Mancini 2004, p.23, Blum 2014, pp.359±360). 
Likewise, the level of access to the media is determined by class, whether an area is 
urban and rural and linguistic groups (Hallin and Mancini 2012b, p.288).  
Another set of factors to consider in evaluating the structure of media market 
and pattern of information distribution is the size of the market and the level of 
internationalisation, that is, whether the media market is large or small and 
autonomous or dependent on import of media outlets and content from a variety of 
countries (linguistically compatible or not) (Blum 2014, pp.375±377). According to 
9ROWPHU  WKH ³LQLWLDO UHVSRQVH RI WKH PHGLD LQGXVWU\ WR JOREDOL]DWLRQ Zas to 
                                                          
6
 Especially in countries of Southern Europe, the gender ratio is very big, compared to countries in Northern Europe, 
where the gender ratio is narrow 
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produce media products of high uniformity to make them saleable everywhere in the 
ZRUOG´ +RZHYHU PHGLD SURGXFWV DUH RIWHQ PRGLILHG WR UHIOHFW YLHZLQJ KDELWV DQG
cultural values of local audiences, making the media markets international and local 
simultaneously (Voltmer 2012, p.231).  
De-centralisation of the media market arguably increases the diversity of 
media outlets (local, national, regional, international) and consequently pluralism within 
a media system. It is therefore important to consider the level of state regulation of 
media, and how diverse and representative the media market is of the cultural, 
linguistic, ethnic and racial structure of a country or region (Blum 2014, pp.363-370, 
pp.373-375).  
Pluralism or concentration of media ownership also shapes the media 
market, that is, whether private media are owned by multiple competing companies or 
dominated by a small number of firms, whether ownership is in the hands of national 
companies or international media conglomerates, and whether media owners have a 
particular political stance or affiliation with political parties (see political parallelism) 
(Blum 2014, pp.378±381). In this context, it can be argued that news organisations 
financed primarily by "interest" sources are far less likely to place emphasis on 
impartiality and newsworthiness but are more likely be reflective of the psyche of the 
hegemony (Simiyu 2014, p.118). A common threshold for highly concentrated industry 
is identifying whether the four largest companies control 50 per cent or more of the 
LQGXVWU\¶VUHYHQXHibid., p.126). 
Orientation of media 
Both media ownership and financing possibly shape the orientation of media, 
i.e. the primary social focus that guides news production: This dimension of 
VWUXFWXUDO FRQGLWLRQV UHIHUV WR WKH ³LQWHJUDWHG VFKL]RSKUHQLD RI PHGLD´ 6FKROO DQG
Weischenberg 1998: 170), a term describing the fact that on the one hand media are 
obliged to attract big audience and prevail against competing outlets in order to be 
economically successful ± one the other, they pursue ideal goals of informing and 
educating the public, discovering misconduct, communicating values, serving society 
and promoting certain political causes.  
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According to Blum (2014: 342-346), one can distinguish between three types of 
media orientation: Market-oriented media strive first and foremost after economic 
success. Hence, for them, audience rate and circulation is paramount. 
A divergent orientation applies to media for which economic and journalistic or 
societal goals are more or less balanced. 
For society-oriented media, public service is paramount. The news is therefore 
produced primarily in the public interest and the audience is first and foremost 
addressed in its role as citizenry: However, this societal orientation may take different 
forms dependent on the overall (political) framework. While in democracies, society-
oriented media ± either voluntarily or based on a legal public service mandate ± commit 
themselves to public service and journalistic credibility, in authoritarian countries, 
societal orientation signifies a commitment to support state goals and interests of ruling 
elite: Here, societal orientation equates to educating people in accordance with the 
ruling party and support developing goals of the country. 
Political/societal activity and parallelism of media 
Political/societal activity refers to the general tendency of media to intervene 
in political debate, to engage in advocacy and to try to influence political events (Hallin 
and Mancini 2012b, p.295). The role of journalists and their positioning in relation to 
politics has evolved to varying degrees across different geographical regions. While in 
some countries, political journalism includes promoting particular political causes and 
LQIOXHQFLQJSXEOLFRSLQLRQLQRWKHUVLWLVXQGHUVWRRGWKDWMRXUQDOLVPDFWVDVD³QHXWUDO
DUELWHU´VKDULQJLQIRUPDWLRQDQGDQDO\VLV+DOOLQDQG0DQFLQL, p.26).  
The term political and societal parallelism or partisanship refers to the nature 
and degree of political conflict and its reflection in the media system (Voltmer 2012, 
p.229). 
Political parallelism describes the level of consonance of media and political 
factions, i.e. the degree to which the media system reflects major political divisions in 
society, and whether journalists or media institutions align themselves with a particular 
political party or identify more broadly with a certain political ideology or tendency 
(Hallin and Mancini 2004, pp.26-33, Blum 2014, pp.333-342).  
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As the idea of µpolitical parallelism¶ was conceptualised primarily in relation to 
Western Europe, and built on a framework of µdistinct political orientations¶ where 
certain media can be said to lean to the right or left on the political spectrum, there are 
several reasons why it needs to be reconceptualised before it is applied to other media 
systems. Firstly, not every country builds on a diverse political party system with the 
same levels of division and competition (Hallin and Mancini 2012b, p.293).7 Moreover, 
in most non-western countries the ideological distinction between left and right-wing is 
not as relevant as other political factions (Voltmer 2012, p.229) and in some cases 
³SROLWLFDOGLYHUVLW\LVRUJDQL]HGDURXQd factions of the state,more than around separate 
SROLWLFDOSDUWLHV´+DOOLQDQG0DQFLQLE, p.294).   
As in various (especially non-ZHVWHUQFRXQWULHV³UHOLJLRXVHWKQLFDQGUHJLRQDO
identities, but also clientelistic loyalties play a much more importDQW UROH´ 9ROWPHU
2012, p.229), it makes sense to introduce societal parallelism as an additional form 
of partisanship. This dimension refers to the nature and degree of alignment between 
media and societal actors such as religious institutions, groups representing the 
interests of language or ethnicity, clans, trade unions, business organisations, etc. 
(Hallin and Mancini 2012b, p.294). 
Both political and societal parallelism might not only be relevant on the (sub-) 
national level ± UDWKHU IRUH[DPSOH LQWKH0LGGOH(DVW ³WUDQVQDWLRQDOSDUDOOHOLVP´ is 
also germane, i.e. affiliations with transnational (political and societal) actors (Kraidy 
2012, Hallin and Mancini 2012b, p.294). 
The level of partisan tendencies is reflected in the following structural patterns 
of the media system (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 2012, Blum 2014):  
First, it is important to look at whether media are externally pluralised (external 
diversity of media institutions with varying political tendencies and societal factions) or 
internally pluralised (internal diversity of political/societal views within a single media 
organisation ± balanced content). While both internal and external diversity of media 
are considered a legitimate way of representing relevant viewpoints in the public 
                                                          
7
 This is not only the case in authoritarian and totalitarian states but also in some (emerging) democracies. For 
H[DPSOHLQ6RXWK$IULFDWKHUHKDVEHHQDµRQH-party dominant-V\VWHP¶VLQFHWKHHQGRI$SDUWKHLGWKH$1&EHLQJ
the only political party to win successive elections and defeat is unlikely for the foreseeable future (Hallin and 
Mancini 2012b, p.294). 
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sphere if media reflect the strength of the conflicting parties on a more or less equal 
basis, media allegiances become problematic if media disproportionally ally with a 
SDUWLFXODUJURXSUHVXOWLQJLQD³GLVWRUWHGSOXUDOLVPLQWKHV\VWHP«´DQGJHQHUDWLQJ
D ³VSLUDO RI VLOHQFH´ ³LQ ZKLFK WKH FRQWLQXRXV XQGHUUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ RI ODUJHSDUW\ RI
existing interest and identities on the media agenda lead to their marginalization in 
SROLWLFDO OLIH´ 9ROWPHU , p.230). For this reason, public broadcasting is often 
intended WRIXQFWLRQDVDNLQGRIµIRUXPPHGLXP¶ though attempts to establish public 
service broadcasting in recently emerging democracies have been largely 
unsuccessful (ibid., p.230).8  
As we have mentioned above, the financial and organisational connections of 
media are pertinent indicators of political and societal parallelism: the degree of 
partisanship is the increased if a political party or societal group finances a media outlet 
and appoints the senior personnel. It is the decreased if only one media outlet is 
sympathetic to a specific party or group but is not dependent on it (Blum 2014, p.33). 
Here again, the governance of public broadcasting comes into play: the level of political 
and societal parallelism is reflected in whether broadcasters are controlled by 
government, run by broadcasting professionals without political control, proportionally 
governed by multiple political parties, or more broadly by political and other 
organisations. 
Apart from the affiliations of media outlets, the political and societal affiliations 
and ties of individual journalists are also important. Hallin and Mancini point out that 
MRXUQDOLVWV¶ FDUHHUV FDQ EH ³VKDSHG E\ WKHLU SROLWLFDO DIILOLDWLRQV´, for example, by 
working for media groups that align with their political views, or by receiving 
assignments because of their political persuasion (Hallin and Mancini 2004, p.28). 
McCargo (2012) has identified a IXUWKHU SDWWHUQ DV ³SDUWLVDQ SRO\YDOHQFH´ ZKLFK
describes individual journalists¶ ties with a wide range of politicians and political groups, 
making it possible for them, as well as their employers, to adapt to shifting political 
alliances (see also Hallin and Mancini 2012b, p.293). 
                                                          
8
 External diversity might be of beneficial influence in transitional contexts of high electoral volatility and weak party 
alignment, but could also be dangerous where there are no mechanisms to moderate conflicts between antagonistic 
groups (often the case where ethnic or religious differences are salient markers for the definition of group 
membership and political interests). This might be risky especially in highly commercialised market conditions, 
where media partisanship often results in a journalistic culture of scandal and the hunt for sensational headlines 
tends to becomes more important than the scrupulous investigation of facts (Voltmer and Rawnsley 2009, p.244).  
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Parallelism of media outlets is interdependent with parallelism of audiences: On 
the one hand, the public might be polarised according to the political and societal 
orientation of the media which they consume. On the other, as consumers are more 
likely to support news media which speak to their political views, this may further 
strengthen the partisanship of media (Hallin and Mancini 2004). 
According to Blum, the following levels of political (and societal) parallelism can 
be distinguished: (1) all political media permanently support one specific (political) 
party or group, (2) the majority of media permanently supports one (political) 
party/group, (3) the majority of the press permanently supports one (political) 
party/group, (4) a minority of the press permanently supports one (political) 
party/group, (5) media decide from case to case whether to temporally support a 
(political) party/group.  
Journalism culture 
An overall journalism culture is also likely to inform structural conditions of 
journalism and media, as far as the general status of journalism and the role 
perceptions and mission statements of journalists are concerned: Is journalism 
considered to be an autonomous social system or part of another social system 
(politics, economics, and culture)? Are journalists in general critical of those in power 
or close to them? Are the journalistic functions of criticising and controlling paramount 
or rather the function of articulating information and reporting the opinions of others?  
In this context, Blum (2014, pp.346-350) identifies three types of journalism culture:  
In an investigative journalism culture, journalists are critical towards (those in) 
power and the functions of criticising and controlling dominate. Media act as a 
counterpoint to the political-administrative system. 
An ambivalent journalism culture is characterised by the fact that one group of 
journalists are close to power and wish to participate indirectly in governing, whereas 
the other group is critical of (those in) power and upholds investigative journalism. 
Hence, both proximity and distance dominate from time to time.  
 26 
 
In a concordant journalism culture, (nearly) all journalists are close to those in 
power. This might be either a consequence of a concordant political culture (such as 
in Japan) or a result of totalitarian or authoritarian political structure. 
Journalistic professionalism  
Whereas the dimensions discussed above GHVFULEH WKH ³PHGLD¶V UHODtionship 
ZLWKWKHLUHFRQRPLFVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOHQYLURQPHQWV´WKHGLPHQVLRQRI journalistic 
professionalism GHVFULEHVWKH³LQWHUQDOUXOHVDQGQRUPV´RIWKHSURIHVVLRQDOILHOGDQG
media institutions (Voltmer 2012, p.227). Blum (2014, pp.350-355) and Hallin and 
Mancini (2004) highlight several (structural) indicators which can be considered in 
evaluating the level of journalistic professionalisation, i.e. how far the profession has 
developed and what defines it: level of professional education obtained either through 
approved or formal training programs (university degrees in 
journalism/media/communications) or on-the-job newsroom training; presence of 
professional organisations such as journalism unions and associations; maintenance 
of prestige and competitiveness of the profession, measured through salary levels, 
reputation and employment security, in contrast to other professions; systems of self-
regulation of the professional field through press councils and other self-regulatory 
bodies, ombudsmen and codes of conduct; awareness of a professional culture and 
distinct professional norms and practices, such as ethical principles, protection of 
sources, newsworthiness criteria, autonomy and mitigation of advertising influence 
(Hallin and Mancini 2004, pp.33-37).  
In summary, Blum (2014, p.354) highlights criteria against different levels of 
professionalism. A high level of professionalism exists where obtaining a journalism 
degree is standard, journalists have a good awareness of their role and journalistic 
tasks, a strong ability to reflect and function ethically within wide-spread mechanisms 
of self-regulation. Medium level professionalism exists where a journalism degree is 
not standard and only a few masters programs in journalism are available, there is a 
medium level of role-awareness, limited discourse on journalistic ethics, and few self-
regulation mechanisms. A low level of professionalism is characterised by university 
degrees in journalism with content determined by state authorities, and journalists who 
have a weak awareness of their role and ethics, and an absence of self-regulation 
mechanisms. 
 27 
 
The table below lists and summarises the structural dimensions that have 
been introduced as constituting structural conditions of journalism.  
Table 1: Structural conditions of journalism: dimensions 
 
Dimension Description 
Historical 
development: Political 
stability of country  
x Changes of political systems / regimes over time and impact on the 
media system 
Political system / form 
of Government 
x Formal and informal rules regarding:  
o Freedom of people to vote  
o Degrees of division of power (system of checks and 
balances among the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches of government) 
o Institutionalisation of the rule of law and civil liberties  
Political culture x Concepts, ideas and structures ruling both the functioning of 
institutions (media) and agency of political and societal actors as 
well as citizens: 
o Centrality of the state in aspects of society (low state 
intervention of liberal system vs. high involvement in welfare 
system) 
o Distribution of political power (majoritarian vs. consensus 
politics) 
o Relationship between political institutions and the public 
(individualised vs. organised pluralism) 
o Level of cleavage of political parties and ideologies 
(polarised vs. moderate vs. fragmented vs. hegemonic 
pluralism) 
o Adherence to formal rules, procedures and political 
institutions (rational-legal authority vs. clientelism) 
o Political culture of citizens: How people see the role of the 
state, treat different ethnicities, religions, linguistic groups, 
participate in community / political life (voter turnout), the 
kind of political debates/historical traditions they support 
Media freedom x Level of media freedom in legal framework (constitution, media laws 
and regulation on censorship, information access and control, legal 
protection of journalistic actors, legal autonomy of regulation bodies)  
x Policies and actions by state actors or legal bodies 
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State control / regulation 
of media 
x Intention of state control (Political control through 
organisational, personnel and content-oriented intervention vs. 
apolitical regulation via distributing frequencies, limiting 
advertising) 
x Media types that are being controlled/regulated, addressees of 
media control 
x Procedures regarding licensing of media outlets, accreditation 
of journalists 
x Character of regulation bodies (state or independent public 
institutions) 
x Nature of prosecution of journalists by state actors  
Media ownership and 
financing 
x Whether media are owned by private companies and/or the 
public or state  
x Market driven media, mixed-source financing, and state 
financing 
Structure of media 
markets and patterns of 
information distribution 
x Audience and market share of different media types 
x Size of media market / Level of internationalisation 
x (De-)centralisation of media market / system 
x Pluralism / concentration of ownership 
x Patterns of media distribution and circulation of information 
Orientation of media x Primary social focus that guides news production: 
commerce/market oriented, divergent, society oriented 
Political / societal activity 
and parallelism of media 
x Tendency of media to intervene in political debate / engage in 
advocacy / influence political events 
x Alignment between media outlets/individual journalists and 
political parties and societal actors (religious institutions, trade 
unions, business) 
x Polarisation of the public/audiences according to the political 
orientation of media which they consume 
Journalism Culture x Overall status of journalism and role perception of journalists in 
relation to other social systems: investigative/critical, 
ambivalent, or rather concordant to those in power 
Journalistic 
Professionalism  
x Internal rules and norms of the professional field and media 
institutions:  
o Level of professional education/training 
o Level of professional organisation 
o System of self-regulation 
o Awareness of professional norms and practices 
o Prestige/competiveness of journalistic profession 
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Country reports: Current structural conditions in Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and 
South Africa 
Based on the scheme of dimensions we will now analyse the structural 
conditions of media and journalism in Egypt (3.1), Kenya (3.2), Serbia (3.3) and South 
Africa (3.4). The reports build on country-specific literature that touches on subjects 
raised within each of the dimensions, allowing for a comprehensive overview of the 
structural conditions of media and journalism within each of the countries. However, 
as the given state of research and the availability of current facts and figures vary from 
country to country, the country reports differ with regard to level of detail relating to 
certain dimensions.  
It should be noted that the editorial deadline of the working paper was April 2015 
and any subsequent developments and publications relating to structural conditions of 
journalism in the four countries are not reflected here.  
Egypt9 
From its emancipation from colonisation and the formation of a presidential 
republic in 1952 until the 2011 revolution (or uprising), a military-led, authoritarian 
regime ruled Egypt under the presidencies of Gamal Abdel Nasser (1954-1970), Anwar 
Al Sadat (1970-1981) and Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011). Sadat introduced a multi-party 
system in the years prior to his assassination, but multi-candidate presidential elections 
were not introduced until 2005, allegedly as part of a bid to institutionalise a succession 
mechanism for Mubarak's son, Gamal (Blaydes 2006, p.3).  
Each president shaped the media system differently: Nasser used the media as 
an instrument of political mobilisation to promote his radical ideology of socialism, anti-
imperialism, and Pan Arabism while Sadat adopted a form of liberalisation, reinstating 
political parties and returning to them the right to publish newspapers. When Sadat 
was assassinated in 1981, a State of Emergency was imposed, restricting press 
freedoms (Mabrouk 2010, p.3) with laws allowing censorship and the right to close 
down newspapers in the name of national security (Amin n.d., p.4).  
                                                          
9
 We thank our colleagues Gamal Soltan and Yosra El Gendi for their valuable contribution to the Egyptian report. 
Moreover, we thank Shorouk El Hariry for co-authoring the Egyptian report. 
 30 
 
+RVQL 0XEDUDN¶V  \HDU UXOH ZLWQHVVHG IHZ PRGLILFDWLRQV WR WKH UHVWULFWLYH
legislation governing the media (Richter 2008). In practice however, there were 
significant changes. During the 2000s, the Mubarak regime tolerated significant 
reforms to the Egyptian media landscape including the introduction of private satellite 
television channels, the spread of privately owned opposition newspapers (both in print 
and online), and growing Internet accessibility (El Shaer, 2015, p.2). While the regime 
continued to exercise extensive control over media operations and used intimidation 
to silence opposition (El Masry 2012, pp.3-4), the political cost of prosecuting the media 
increased, helping to extend media freedom though without the necessary legal 
safeguards. This situation allowed the media, particularly the private media, to 
contribute to shaping public attitudes towards the regime, leading to the fall of Mubarak 
early in 2011.  
In post-revolution Egypt, the Supreme Council for Armed Forces (SCAF) took 
power from February 2011, when Mubarak stepped down, until the beginning of Muslim 
Brotherhood-DIILOLDWHG 0XKDPPDG 0RUVL¶V WHUP DV SUHVLGHQW LQ -XQH 2. The 
Brotherhood led the government for a year until the military removed Morsi from power 
in July 2013 (El-Sherif 2014, pp.3-4). After the election of General Abdul Fattah El Sisi 
in June 2014, Egypt was effectively placed under military rule (El-Sherif 2014, p.26). 
(J\SW¶Vpolitical history can be summarised as experiencing relatively high political 
stability over several decades, marked by authoritarian and centralistic rule (Blum 
2014, p.103). As further elaborated below, the country has also witnessed political 
continuity since the revolution despite rule by different regimes over a short period of 
time since 2011. 
As for the political system, before the uprising, Egypt was an electoral 
authoritarian country (Blaydes 2006, p.1). Despite high hopes for democratic reform in 
2011, the uprising led to deep political and ideological polarisation between Islamists 
and secularists, allowing the re-emergence of military power that returned Egypt to 
authoritarianism, and underlining the failure of democratic alternatives to capitalise on 
opportunities presented by the uprising (El-Sherif 2014, p.5). The only truly open and 
free presidential elections took place in 2012, when Morsi narrowly defeated the 
0XEDUDNUHJLPH¶VFDQGLGDWH$KPDG6KDILN,Q*HQHUDOHl-Sisi won 93 per cent 
of the votes, with a turnout of 47 per cent, lower than the 52 per cent turnout in the 
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2012 presidential election runoff. This may be attributable to the ban imposed on the 
Muslim Brotherhood and their Freedom and Justice Party (Blum 2014, p.105).  
7KHH[HFXWLYHLQ(J\SW¶VFDVHWKHSUHVLGHQWWUDGLWLRQDOO\PRQRSROLVHVSRZHU
parliament, controlled by the governing party, plays a relatively insignificant role. The 
judiciary is prone to interference by the executive. Morsi, who as Blum points out, is 
FRQVLGHUHGDQ³DXWKRULWDULDQUHYROXWLRQDU\OHDGHULQWKHVHUYLFHRI0XVOLP%URWKHUKRRG´
maintained this division of power after his election as president in autumn 2012 (Blum 
2014, p.105).  
In many ways, Egypt has returned to its position pre- WKH ³ROG VWDWH´
persists and the authoritarian, clientelist and elitist politics of the Mubarak era have 
been reproduced (El Sherif 2014, p.4, Blum 2014, p.104). The military has significant 
control over the economy and holds power in every national political arena (Dunne 
2014, p.1). As Ahdaf Soueif (2014) writes in The Guardian ³WKHFRXQWU\KDVJRQH
EDFN LQWRDXWRFUDWLFPRGH´(O6LVL LVDQHOHFWHGDQGVR IDUSRSXODUSUHVLGHQWDQG
according to 6RXHLI  WKHXVXDOEDUJDLQKDVEHHQVWUXFN ³ZH¶OOJLYHXSRQRXU
IUHHGRPV LQ UHWXUQ IRU VHFXULW\´0HDQZKLOH WKHSURFHVVRI FUHDWLQJDQHZSROLWLFDO
system and an effective state has been plagued by power struggles between state 
institutions, a lacNRIDSROLWLFDOFODVVDQGWKHVWDWH¶VLQDELOLW\WRGHOLYHUVROXWLRQVWRWKH
socio-economic crisis (El-Sherif 2014, p.5). 
According to Hallin and Mancini (2004), indicators of political culture and the 
cleavage between political parties and ideologies poiQW WR (J\SW¶V SODFH LQ WKH
³SRODUL]HG SOXUDOLVW FDWHJRU\´ )ROORZLQJ WKH UHYROXWLRQ WKH SROLWLFDO VSHFWUXP KDV
broadened and there are distinct and sharply defined differences in ideologies between 
the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, secular movements and groups supporting the old, 
PLOLWDU\ UHJLPH 3RZHUV  S 0RUVL¶V GHSRVLWLRQ IURP SRZHU H[DFHUEDWHG
political polarisation in the country and deepened the divide between pro- and anti-
Morsi camps. Opposition forces (both Muslim Brotherhood and non-Islamist critics) 
were marginalised by the military in the following months (Freedom House 2014a, 
Freedom House 2015a). In December 2013, the Brotherhood was declared a terrorist 
organisation, allowing the authorities to charge anyone participating in a pro-Morsi 
GHPRQVWUDWLRQ ZLWK WHUURULVP DQG OD\LQJ WKH IRXQGDWLRQ IRU WKH ,VODPLVW RSSRVLWLRQ¶V
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total political isolation. The new constitution banned parties founded on religion 
(Freedom House 2015a). 
However, even today, competition both within and between national institutions 
such as the military, police, judiciary, religious institutions and civil society 
GHPRQVWUDWHVD ODFNRIFRQVHQVXVUHJDUGLQJWKHFRXQWU\¶VGLUHFWLRQ(O-Sherif 2014, 
p.25). 
Current literature indicates that the political corporatism of the old regime is 
likely to re-emerge (El-Sherif 2014, p.6; p.26). The state is central to all aspects of 
Egyptian society and any attempts to break genres and modes of representation 
HVWDEOLVKHG E\ WKH VWDWH DUH ³GHHPHG LOOHJLWLPDWH E\ DQ HOLWLVW FHQWUDOL]ed and 
VHFXULWL]HGDSSURDFKWRFXOWXUH´$O\S7KHPLOLWDU\LVGHHPHGDXWRQRPRXV
and unaccountable (El-Sherif 2014, p.25) and in practice, the spirit of law is not 
respected by authorities, particularly within bureaucratic institutions (Teti and Gervasio 
2012, p.107). This clientelist system reflects the relationship between voters and 
candidates in elections; while some voters cast their ballots based on ideological 
beliefs, many expect to receive direct benefits in the form of goods or services in 
exchange for their vote. In such cases voters, who tend to be members of lower 
classes, are clients of a regime of patronage (Blaydes 2006, p.2). 
This regime is connected to the FLWL]HQV¶SROLWLFDOFXOWXUH. Al-shakhsiyya al-
misriyya, (Arabic: the Egyptian character) constructed by the mass media industry, is 
seen as an instrument of power and governance. According to Aly (2014, p.104), 
Egyptian media spoon-IHHGV FLWL]HQV DQ LPDJH RI WKH µUHDO¶ (J\SWLDQ WKURXJK
pedagogic modes of production: a stereotype formed by fixed nodes of belonging, 
gender, class, religion and social stratification. These images, mainly broadcast on 
state-RZQHGWHOHYLVLRQDUHFUHDWHGWKURXJKVLPSOLVWLFVFULSWVZKHUH³ODUJHVZDWKHVRI
Egyptian society either remain invisible or are misrepresented within the national public 
VSKHUH´ibid., p.105). Even after the revolution, state media continued to reflect the 
PR needs of the SCAF and subsequent governments, leaving the role of public 
information campaigns around civic participation and responsibility to private satellite 
channels and social media (ibid., p.105). While many scholars focused on the role of 
social media in fuelling the uprising, little attention has been paid to traditional, face-
to-face communication outlets, such as Friday mosque sermons and coffee shop 
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gatherings, which are considered to play an important role in developing the Arabic 
public sphere (Dajani 2014, p.207). 
Government control also manifests in civil society. Egypt is often described as 
having one of the most vibrant civil society sectors in the developing world, with around 
40,000 locally registered NGOs (Mikhail 2014, p.1). However, these groups have 
struggled with laws overseeing non-governmental organisations, a conflict which has 
intensified in tKH ZDNH RI WKH ¶IRUHLJQ IXQGLQJµ GHEDWH 0LQLVWHU RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO
Cooperation Faiza Aboulnaga accused NGOs of receiving unauthorised foreign 
funding and operating without licenses, an accusation that was labelled duplicitous 
given that Aboulnaga was respoQVLEOHIRURYHUVHHLQJ1*2DFWLYLWLHVXQGHU0XEDUDN¶V
UXOHDQGWKDWWKHODUJHVWUHFLSLHQWRI¶IRUHLJQIXQGLQJµLVWKHVWDWHLWVHOIZLWKQHDUO\86'
EQJRLQJWRWKHPLOLWDU\7HWLDQG*HUYDVLRS7KH1*2¶IRUHLJQIXQGLQJµ
FDVH KDV ³ZUHDNHG KDYRF RQ GHPRFUDF\ SURPRWLRQ HIIRUWV LQ (J\SW´ DQG ZDV
GHVFULEHGDVD³WDFWLFDOPDQHXYHULQWKHJUDQGVFKHPHRI(J\SWLDQSROLWLFV´'XQQH
2014). As a result, prominent foundations such as Freedom House have been banned. 
The organisation was forced to cancel its grants to several Egyptian NGOs, and four 
of its employees fled the country in fear of jail sentences (ibid. 2014).  
Media freedom is heavily controlled by a severely complex web of legislation 
such as the constitutional framework, Press Law, Penal Code and Intelligence Law, 
which prevent journalists from operating freely and limits their room for manoeuvre (El 
Issawi 2014, p.8; Mabrouk 2010, p.3). Egypt currently ranks 159th of 180 in the 
5HSRUWHUV:LWKRXW%RUGHUV:RUOG3UHVV)UHHGRP,QGH[GXHWRWKH³Geliberate chilling 
of media freedom and free speech through arrests and criminalization of legitimate 
MRXUQDOLVP´ 5HSRUWHUV :LWKRXW %RUGHUV a) and according to Alison McKenzie, 
Executive Director of International Press Institute, the continual scapegoating of 
MRXUQDOLVWVDQGWKHLUQHZVRUJDQLVDWLRQV,QWHUQDWLRQDO3UHVV ,QVWLWXWH(J\SW¶V
VWDWXVLQWKH)UHHGRP+RXVH)UHHGRPRIWKH3UHVVUDQNLQJGHFOLQHGIURPµ3DUWO\)UHH¶
LQ  WR µ1RW )UHH¶ LQ  DQG  GXH WR RIILFLDOO\ WROHUDWHG LQWLPLGDtion of 
journalists, increased efforts to prosecute reporters and commentators for insulting the 
political leadership, violent crackdowns on Islamist political groups and civil society, 
and state surveillance of electronic communications (Freedom House 2012, 2013, 
2014a, 2015a). 
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According to the constitutional framework, freedom of expression and the 
press is guaranteed and censorship forbidden by the provisional constitution adopted 
E\6&$)LQWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDGRSWHGXQGHU0RUVL¶VSUHVLGHQF\DQGWKH current 
constitution approved by referendum in 2014 (Freedom House 2012, 2013, 2014a). 
+RZHYHUWKLVIUHHGRPFDQRQO\EHH[HUFLVHGµZLWKLQWKHODZ¶DQGWKHUHLVQRIXUWKHU
clarification of its limitations. Despite the political and constitutional changes since 
2011, the Mubarak-era press laws and Penal Code have remained in place and include 
an array of articles that allow journalists to be prosecuted for their reporting (Freedom 
House 2014a). As El Issawi reports there are around 35 articles in various laws that 
prescribe penalties for the media, ranging from fines to prison sentences, which are 
LPSRVHG IRU RIIHQFHV VXFK DV ³LQVXOWLQJ WKH SUHVLGHQW´ ³LQVXOWLQJ UHOLJLRQV´ RU ³WKH
publication of material that constitutes an attack against the dignity and honor of 
LQGLYLGXDOV´(O,VVDZLSS-23). 
While the current constitution bans censorship of media outlets and repressive 
sanctions against journalists, this protection does not apply in times of war or when a 
state of emergency has been declared (Freedom House 2014a, El Issawi 2014, pp.24-
26). To avoid legal confrontation with the government, it is reported that journalists 
resort to self-censorship, drawing lines around areas deemed too sensitive to tackle 
(Mabrouk 2010, p.4; Abdulla 2014, p.4), and thus avoiding direct government 
intervention. El Issawi suggests that another common way to impose self-censorship 
in newsrooms is by offering journalists the potential to earn additional income by 
appointing them to higher positions in government bodies or within media outlets 
owned by wealthy businessmen compliant with the regime (El Issawi 2014, p.33). 
However, in some situations direct state intervention has been visible: after the ousting 
RI 0RUVL VHYHUDO IDPRXV MRXUQDOLVWV¶ DUWLFOHV WKDW ZHUH FULWLFal of the situation were 
banned from publication in their respective media outlets (Abdulla 2014, p.25). Another 
H[DPSOHRIGLUHFWFHQVRUVKLS LV³$O-%HUQDPHJ´$UDELF7KH3URJUDPPHDSRSXODU
show presented by political satirist Bassem Youssef on the CBC channel, which was 
WDNHQRIIDLU IRU µYLRODWLQJ WKHHGLWRULDOSROLF\RI WKHFKDQQHO¶DIWHUPRFNLQJ WKHSRVW-
0RUVLUHJLPHDQGUHIHUULQJWRWKHRXVWLQJDVDµFRXS¶$EGXOODS 
There is no right to information or access to information law in Egypt. Article 
8 of the Press Law states that journalists have the right to access information from 
SXEOLFDQGJRYHUQPHQWVRXUFHVEXWLWDOVRVWLSXODWHVWKDWWKLVLVVXEMHFWWRµDSSOLFDEOH
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ODZV¶ZLWKQRFODULILFDWLRQDVWRZKDWWKHVHPD\EH0HQGHOS. As only 6,000 
of around 15,000 of the journalists working in Egypt are members of the Egyptian 
-RXUQDOLVW 6\QGLFDWH (-6 WKH SURIHVVLRQ¶V RIILFLDO JRYHUQLQJ ERG\ DQG (-6
membership is the sole source of professional accreditation, the situation leaves 
thousands of media professionals without an official press card or access to 
professional sources (Berger 2014, pp.244-245). 
In practice, the protection of journalists is weak. Article 7 of the Press Law 
protects the right of journalists not to reveal their confidential sources, and prohibits 
WKHFRHUFLRQRI MRXUQDOLVWV WRUHYHDO WKRVHVRXUFHV+RZHYHU ³WKHVHSURWHFWLRQVDUH
VXEMHFW WR UHOHYDQW ODZV´ PHDQLQJ WKDW DQ\ ODZ PD\ RYHUULGH WKH ULJKW WR SURWHFW
confidential sources. The Press Code of Ethics (1988) restricts journalists from causing 
harm and seeks to establish their right to protect their sources and not be subjected to 
blackmail; however, it is not clear how the Code is applied; it is only binding for 
journalists while the usual expectation would be adherence by other actors such as the 
police or security forces (Mendel 2011, p.19). 
Consequently, the opaque media framework in Egypt has been used to 
intimidate journalists, bloggers and broadcasters (Abdulla 2014, p.4).The military-
backed governmenW¶V UXOH LV ZLWQHVVLQJ ³DQ XQSUHFHGHQWHG FDPSDLJQ RI PHGLD
UHSUHVVLRQ ZLWK IUHTXHQW LQWLPLGDWLRQ DQG MRXUQDOLVWV¶ DUUHVWV GHVFULEHG E\ PHGLD
ZDWFKGRJV´(O,VVDZLS)UHHGRP+RXVHa).  
Private TV stations are subjected to pressure when their programming content 
LVGHHPHGWREHµFDXVLQJWURXEOH¶(O,VVDZLSIRUH[DPSOHZLWKLQKRXUVRI
0RUVL¶VRXVWLQJWKHDUP\VKXWGRZQ,VODPLVW79FKDQQHOVMisr 25, Al Nas and Al Hafez 
(Abdulla, 2014, p.21). According to Reporters without Borders, five journalists were 
killed and at least 80 detained by police in the second half of 2013 (Reporters without 
Borders 2014a). A large number of these journalists are not accredited by EJS, which 
causes some confusion concerning their professional identity.  
Although the government has never censored blogs, bloggers are subjected to 
offline harassment and several have been detained or questioned by security agents 
(Abdulla 2014, p.8). The Arab Network for Human Rights and Information reported that 
24 cases werHILOHGDJDLQVWMRXUQDOLVWVLQWKHILUVWGD\VRI0RUVL¶VUXOHZLWKFKDUJHV
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relating to defamation of the president, the judiciary or Islam, and broadcasting content 
inciting hatred (ibid., p. 17). Private TV channel Al Faraeen was shut down, and its 
owner, Tawfik Okasha, faced over 30 court cases accused of defaming Morsi and 
inciting others to kill him. Journalist Al Husseiny Abou Deif, who was critical of Morsi 
and the Brotherhood, was shot dead with rubber bullets outside the Presidential Palace 
during a protest (ibid., p.18). 
After Morsi was ousted by the military in July 2013, the government launched a 
systematic crackdown on Islamist media, shutting down television and print outlets and 
targeting and arresting both local and foreign journalists attempting to cover pro-Morsi 
protests. Five journalists were killed at the hands of the security forces in July and 
August of that year, for example in August, Sky News cameraman Mick Deane was 
shot and killed during a bloody crackdown on pro-Morsi sit-ins. In July, the BBC¶V
Jeremy Bowen was injured by birdshot pellets fired by security forces during a pro-
Morsi protest (Freedom House 2014a). 
In August 2013, several journalists, among whom were freelance photographer 
Mahmoud Abu-Zeid (professionally known as Shawkan) and Al-Jazeera journalist 
Abdullah Al-Sham, were arrested while covering violent clashes between supporters 
of ousted President Morsi and security forces. While Al-Shami was released on 
medical grounds in June 2014 following a 130 day hunger strike in protest over this 
deteQWLRQ 6KDZNDQ¶V LQFDUFHUDWLRQ KDV EHHQ H[WHQGHG UHSHDWHGO\ $PQHVW\
International 2015). Since December 2013, three Al-Jazeera journalists (Peter Greste, 
Mohammad Fahmy and Baher Mohammad) have been jailed following allegations of 
conspiring with the Muslim Brotherhood to destabilise the country and reporting false 
news, belonging to a terrorist organisation and working without a permit. In June 2014, 
%DKHU0RKDPHGZDVVHQWHQFHGWRWHQ\HDUV¶LPSULVRQPHQWDUXOLQJWKDWZDVODEHOOHG
³DFOHDUPHVVDJHWRMRXUQDOLVWVDGKHUHWRRIILFLDOQDUUDWLYHVRUULVNVHYHUHSXQLVKPHQW´
by Index on Censorship (Index on Censorship 2014). Despite the international outcry 
over the sentencing of the three Al-Jazeera journalists, the then newly elected 
president Al Sisi initially said he would not interfere in the judicial ruling (Reuters 2014). 
However, Al Sisi ultimately criticised the detention of Al-Jazeera journalists, not 
because of concerns about freedom of expression but as a result of pressure from the 
MRXUQDOLVWV¶ UHVSective countries and the embarrassment their detention caused. He 
issued a presidential decree allowing deportation of convicted prisoners who are 
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citizens of other nations. Greste was therefore released and deported to Australia and 
Egyptian-Canadian Fahmy renounced his Egyptian citizenship and was deported to 
&DQDGD LQ )HEUXDU\  $IWHU %DKHU 0RKDPHG¶V FRQYLFWLRQ ZDV RYHUWXUQHG RQ
appeal in January 2015, he was released in February of that year (International 
Federation of Journalists 2015, Freedom House 2014a, Kirkpatrick 2015).10 
With regards to media regulation and level of state control, Abdulla 
summarises that media narratives have been controlled by successive regimes 
through a state media apparatus that supports whichever regime is in power, and 
private media outlets whose owners are linked to that regime (Abdulla 2014, p.1). 
Generally, the media apparatus, especially state media, is still firmly linked to 
the political regime (El Issawi 2014, p.29), resulting in continuous state interference 
that serves as a tight constraint on Egyptian journalism (Rayman 2014, p.110, Blum 
2014, p.106). Historically the Minister of Information oversaw the management and 
appointments of senior officials to the government controlled public broadcaster 
Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU) (El Issawi 2014, p.16, Freedom House 
2013). However, even after the position of the Minister of Information was abolished 
with the passing of the 2014 constitution, the state continues to wield power over public 
broadcasting and television through the appointment of managerial staff. There are 
some 18 managers and senior personnel with military backgrounds in ERTU, all of 
whom have been appointed by direct presidential orders (El Shaer 2015, p.4). Not only 
does the state hold a monopoly on terrestrial broadcasting through ERTU (Mendel 
2011, p.7), but the channel is also prohibited by its own Code of Ethics, to broadcast 
any material critical of the state or the national system (El Shaer 2015, p.4). Under 
0RUVL¶VSUHVLGHQF\WKHJRvernment²through the Ministry of Information, ERTU, and 
WKH6KXUD&RXQFLO(J\SW¶VXSSHUKRXVHRISDUOLDPHQW²were authorised to oversee 
OLFHQVLQJ DQG GHWHUPLQH ZKDW LV DSSURSULDWH IRU EURDGFDVW 8QGHU WKH µ0RUVL¶
constitution, the government and the judiciary were entitled to withdraw the licences of 
                                                          
10
 But the important geopolitical issue here is that this incident was part of the political rivalry between Egypt and 
the government of Qatar who owns Al-Jazeera and influences its editorial policy. This is a very important case for 
the role of state owned pan Arab media on the media landscape and politics in the Arab World. 
 
 38 
 
stations that violated a wide range of social, cultural, religious, and political sanctities 
(Freedom House 2014a, Abdulla 2014). 
Print media are also controlled by the state, which owns the most important 
national newspapers Al-Ahram, Al-Akhbar and Al-Gomhuria. While there is a long 
tradition of politically appointing the administrative and editorial leadership, Morsi 
handed control of editorial and executive appointments to state publications to the 
Shura Council. Responsibility has now been passed to the Supreme Press Council 
established by the interim government in 2013 (Blum 2014, p.106, Freedom House 
2014a). All private media outlets need a licence from the Press Council, whose 
members were initially appoinWHGE\WKH6KXUD&RXQFLOXQWLOLWZDVDEROLVKHGLQ(J\SW¶V
2014 constitution and subsequently by the Prime Minister.  
Recently state control has extended to internet communications despite online 
media traditionally enjoying greater freedom than its offline counterparts (although the 
0XEDUDNUHJLPHGLGEULHIO\VKXWGRZQWKHFRXQWU\¶VLQWHUQHWDQGPRELOHSKRQHQHWZRUN
during the 2011 protests). On June 1st, 2014, El Watan newspaper published a leaked 
proposal by the Ministry of Interior that recommended monitoring online social 
networks such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter, as well as private messaging 
applications like WhatsApp and Viber. The Minister of Interior responded through state-
owned Al AhramFODLPLQJWKDWWKHPRQLWRULQJVRIWZDUHZDV³QRWKUHDWWR OLEHUW\´$O-
Ahram 2014). 
As to the media landscape, in numbers, Egypt enjoys a great diversity of media 
outlets with more than 500 newspapers, magazines, journals, and other periodicals. 
:KLOHGXULQJ0XEDUDN¶VUXOHWKHYDVWPDMRULW\RIRXWOHWVZHUHLQVWate hands, including 
all newspaper distribution networks, there have been significant changes in the media 
sector since the 2011 uprising as new outlets have proliferated (Freedom House 
2014a). Today, the national state-owned dailies such as Al-Ahram, Al-Akhbar and Al-
Gomhuria still dominate circulation, while party press only achieves only a small 
circulation. Among independent press, Al-Masry-al-Youm, Al-Watan, and Al-Shorouk 
belong to the most successful (Blum 2014, p.106). Under Mubarak, all terrestrial 
television broadcasters²two national and six regional²were owned and operated by 
the government through ERTU. However, there were four privately owned, 
independent satellite channels and several pan-Arab stations that attracted wide 
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viewership. At least 25 new privately owned channels have emerged in the post-
Mubarak era. (Freedom House 2014a). 
In terms of ownership, Egyptian media are currently a blend of state-owned 
and private newspapers and broadcast stations (Mendel 2011, p.3). Television channel 
ownership was monopolised by the state until the rise of satellite broadcasting in 2001. 
The emergence of private satellite television channels was celebrated as the 
³HPDQFLSDWLRQRIWKHPHGLDIURPVWDWHFRQWURO´$WDOODKDQG5L]NS7KHUHZDV
an initiative to open up the ownership scheme of the media sector to the Egyptian 
people through a shareholding system managed by independent bodies (El Issawi 
2014, p.31), prohibiting individuals from owning a stake of more than 10 per cent in 
any outlet. However, the lack of transparency of media ownership makes monitoring 
this impossible (Abdulla 2013, p.9). Attallah and Rizk (2011, p.8) argued that in the 
DIWHUPDWKRIWKHUHYROXWLRQWKHROGUHJLPHFRQWLQXHGWRKROG(J\SW¶VZHDOWKDVZHOODV
controlling large shares of the media market. Webb suggests that the assumed limited 
range of ownership was insufficient to produce diversification of political views and 
information (Webb 2014, p.15). 
As with ownership, funding sources are not truly transparent (El Issawi 2014, 
S :LWK WKH PDLQVWUHDP PHGLD DFWLQJ DV ³SVHXGR-HPSLUHV´ IXQGDPHQWDOO\
LQIOXHQFLQJ SXEOLF RSLQLRQ ³WKH DPRXQW RI PRQH\ LQYROYHG LQ RSHUDWLQJ D PHGLD
EXVLQHVVLVDOVRGHHPHGWREHDEDUULHUWRGLYHUVLW\´$WWDOODKDQG5L]NS,QD
market driven by advertising, competition between the private sector and the state 
media resulted in poor programming unable to stir the appetites of advertising agents 
on state television (El Issawi 2014, p.46), leaving the sector indebted to the 
government by around EGP 13.5 billion (ibid., p.30). The government supports state 
media both directly and through advertising subsidies, although the nature of these is 
unclear. It also has the potential to influence advertisers leaving independent media at 
risk of financial pressure, as was the case for media critical of the Morsi government 
and the Muslim Brotherhood in late 2012 (Freedom House 2013). 
In terms of the structure of media markets regarding use and reach of the 
different types of media, in a traditionally oral society with a literacy rate of 71 percent 
(out of 82,06 million inhabitants), satellite television has much better penetration than 
newspapers (Mabrouk 2010, p.v; Abdulla 2014, p.4). Broadcast remains the most 
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powerful medium in terms of reach: almost all households own a television set (94 per 
cent in 2010) while the percentage of radio set ownership has declined (Abdulla 2013, 
p.15). Satellite reception grew from 32.5 per cent in 2005 to almost 60 per cent in 2009 
(ibid., p.16). Recently, newspaper circulation has decreased dramatically after a 
sudden circulation surge that accompanied the revolutionary developments of 2011; 
33 per cent of Egyptians, mostly members of the younger generation, read the news 
online (ibid., pp.19-20). According to the Ministry of Communications and Information 
7HFKQRORJ\¶V,&7LQGLFDWRUVUHSRUWWKHQXPEHURI,QWHUQHWXVHUVDPRXQWHGWR
million in November 2014, with an annual growth rate of 24.26 per cent; the most 
frequently visited website being Facebook (some 13.83 million users). This growth is 
constrained by high rates of illiteracy and inequalities in income, gender and 
demographics (Abdulla 2013, p.6; p.22). 
International media played a crucial role in the uprisings, particularly Al-
Jazeera, which offered an alternative to state media. The channel provided news 
unfiltered by the Ministry of Information, and offered live, continuous coverage of the 
protests in Tahrir (Peterson 2014, p.89). However, Al--D]HHUD¶s reputation for 
professional news reporting among its Egyptian viewers has suffered since it was 
accused of allying itself with the Brotherhood, making factual errors and giving false 
representations of the situation (Abdulla 2014, p.23). Cairo-based Al-Jazeera affiliate, 
Al-Jazeera Mubashir Misr, was shut down by a judicial ruling when it was accused of 
operating illegally and threatening national security. Its offices were raided and some 
staff were detained (El Issawi 2014, p.61). The detention of the three Al-Jazeera 
journalists mentioned previously was viewed as part of the political rivalry between 
Egypt and the government of Qatar which owns Al-Jazeera and influences its editorial 
policy (Kirkpatrick 2015). This case might be seen as an example of the strong role of 
state owned pan Arab media on the media landscape and politics in the Arab World. 
In terms of media orientation, Egyptian private media are profit and 
advertising-driven within a market-oriented economy (Aly 2014, p. 107; Amin n.d., 
p.3).There is no obligation for private, commercially-funded media to disseminate 
public service content, and no incentives for them to do so (Abdulla 2013, pp.31-32). 
State-owned ERTU, is paralysed by institutional problems that resulted in it missing 
the opportunity to act as public media rather than state media (Abdulla 2014, p.27). 
:KLOHLW³KDVEHHQWU\LQJWRDFWDVDFRPPHUFLDOEURDGFDVWHU´E\DLPLQJWR³SURYLGH
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FRQWHQW WR DWWUDFW DGYHUWLVHUV´ ibid., pp.29-30), ERTU clearly represents the 
government and portrays messages supporting the regime. The Egyptian state media, 
therefore, has been described as a mobilisation press; the purpose of state media 
SHUVRQQHO LV WR UDOO\ WKH DXGLHQFH WR QDWLRQDOLVW FDXVH DQG GHIHQG WKH FRXQWU\¶V
leadership and current power structure (Chammah 2014, p.279).  
In terms of political activity and parallelism, Egyptian media have always 
been deeply involved in political discourse. The introduction of satellite television and 
WKHHPHUJHQFHRIRSSRVLWLRQSDSHUVGXULQJ0XEDUDN¶VHUDLQFUHDVHGPHGLDSOXUDOLVP
The media were thought to be acting as safety valves that allowed the public, unable 
to exercise its political rights, the chance to vent frustration at socio-political problems 
(Khamis 2011, p.1162). Partisan papers offered a quasi-alternative voice, though they 
ZHUHFRQWUROOHGE\WKHVWDWHDQGWKHLUFRYHUDJHZDV³ODUJHO\GLFWDWHGE\WKHLQWHUHVWV
of thHLU UHVSHFWLYH DIILOLDWHG SDUWLHV´ $WWDOODK DQG 5L]N  S )ROORZLQJ WKH
UHYROXWLRQ WKH ³UDPSDQWSROLWLFNLQJ´ (O ,VVDZLSRIPHGLDSURGXFWLRQZDV
H[SODLQHG³WKHUHZDVQRUHDOSROLWLFDOOLIHDQGPHGLDZDVUHSODFLQJWKHODFNLQJSROLWLFDO 
SDUWLHV VR LW ZDV RYHUZKHOPHG E\ SROLWLFV´ ibid., p.30). Rather than becoming 
pluralised, the media was polarised, and there was a large gap between state and 
independent coverage (Chammah 2014, p.282).  
'XULQJ 0RUVL¶V UXOH WKH SRODULVDWLRQ EHWZHHQ ,VODPLVW FKDQQHOVDQG ¶VHFXODUµ
private media outlets increased. This polarisation intensified for a period after the 
ousting of Morsi, though currently most media is supportive of the military. State 
television and most private channels ran banners with the Egyptian flag that stated 
³(J\SWILJKWVWHUURULVP´LQUHIHUHQFHWRWKHFRQIOLFWZLWKWKH%URWKHUKRRG$EGXOOD
p.23). Although it is also polarised, social media provided a platform for pursuit of the 
middle ground where activists could voice their opinions (Abdulla 2014, p.1). Following 
the ousting of Morsi, it became increasingly difficult to publish voices that are not pro-
regime. The military started considering and approaching private media as a 
distribution channel for their own information as their trust in state press decreased 
ZKHQVWDWHPHGLDHGLWRUVVLGHGZLWKWKH0XVOLP%URWKHUKRRGGXULQJ0RUVL¶VUXOH(O
Issawi 2014, p.49; Abdulla 2014, p.25). As Freedom House states in its report, at the 
HQGRIWKH³PRVWQHZVRXWOHWVZHUHV\PSDWKHWLF to the military government and 
IDLOHG WR SURYLGH REMHFWLYH UHSRUWLQJ RU GLYHUVH YLHZSRLQWV RQ WKH FULVLV´ )UHHGRP
House 2014a). In this context, both state and private media were accused of embracing 
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propagandist tabloid-style narratives and demonising oppositional voices (El Issawi 
2014, p.48). 
Political activity and partisanship are directly linked to journalism culture. As a 
result of the changing political landscape in post revolution Egypt, a state of confusion 
as to how to define journalistic roles in both private and state media has arisen (El 
Issawi 2014, p.70). However, there is a common understanding that ideals of 
impartiality are incompatible with the nature of the Egyptian audience (ibid., p.77). 
Existing literature suggests that state media journalists in particular do not perceive 
their role as independent of the political sphere, showing a quite concordant culture 
(Powers 2012, p.76, El Issawi 2014, p.12, Webb 2014, p.72). Similarly, most private 
PHGLDMRXUQDOLVWVIHHODµSDWULRWLFGXW\¶JXLding their practices, which suggests to some 
extent, allegiance to the regime (El Issawi 2014, p.77; Chammah 2014, Blum 2014). A 
community of independent journalists advocates on behalf of narratives favoured by 
activists (Chammah 2014 , pp.277-288). The development of activism in the name of 
the revolution, however, has also been seen as hindering the development of 
independent, critical reporting, and aggravating the political instrumentalisation of the 
media (El Issawi 2014, p.12). 
As to media professionalism, professional education and training are 
considered to be important structural indicators. In the immediate pre-revolutionary 
SHULRGLQ6DOHKUHIHUUHGWRMRXUQDOLVWLFHGXFDWLRQLQ(J\SWDV³SROLWLFDOO\KD]HG
DQGVRFLDOO\FRQIXVHG´p.132). He also stated that not a single media entity was 
satisfied with the quality of journalism education in Egyptian universities (ibid., 
p.116).This deterioration in journalism education has been linked to nepotism, and lack 
of career guidance and media ethics (ibid., p.126). While students attend ethics 
courses, they understand they will work with people who do not necessarily apply these 
standards (Webb 2014, p.87). Furthermore, most journalism departments do not adapt 
the Western curricula they import leading to a lack of balance between theory and 
practice (Saleh 2010, p.126).  
Given the massive state interference in the media sector, self-regulation of the 
profession is undeveloped in Egypt. The press syndicate ± WKH MRXUQDOLVWV¶ XQLRQ ± 
faces interference by the state as a statutory body and is dominated by the state-owned 
press, despite an increasing diversity of private and alternative media (Berger 2014, 
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p.245). When the revolution broke out, the EJS released no calls for the protection of 
journalists in the field, and failed to provide legal or professional support for journalists 
(ibid., p.238). Members may be removed from the Syndicate on various grounds, 
including disciplinary sanctions (Mendel 2011, p.16) ± however, the fact that these 
sanctions have not been imposed in the last four decades could be indicative of 
VROLGDULW\DPRQJMRXUQDOLVWVDJDLQVWPDMRUYLRODWLRQRIMRXUQDOLVWV¶ULJKWVWKRXJKWKHUH
is very little agreement regarding less serious violations. The Press Code of Ethics 
does nRW IXQFWLRQ DV D SXEOLF FRPSODLQWV V\VWHP ³LQVWHDG LW LV PRUH RI DQ
DGPLQLVWUDWLYHUXOH´0HQGHOS 
Another factor impacting professionalism and journalistic standards is 
professional security,QSULQWMRXUQDOLVWV¶VDODULHVZHUHDVORZDs USD 90 per 
month (Saleh 2010, p.131). Members of the EJS receive stipends and monthly 
allowances paid by the government ± a practice that has been identified as an indirect 
way of buying off journalists, as the stipends of between USD 140 and USD190 a 
month (Al Arab 2015), exceed the salaries many journalists receive from their 
employers. Presumably the financial burden caused by receipt of stipend is among the 
reasons for denying membership in EJS to many practicing journalists. The poor 
salaries of journalists are a further reflection of the financial burdens facing Egyptian 
media institutions, and lead to claims of corruption and illicit gains through business 
and government buy-offs. As Berger reports, some members of the syndicate are 
accused of being FRUUXSWWDNLQJ³ERQXVHV´WKDWVRPHWLPHVHTXDOWKHLUVDODULHV%HUJHU
2014, p.247). These accusations go largely unchecked because ethical violations and 
corruption in the press are never discussed in the EJS (ibid., p.247). 
In conclusion, existing research suggests that although there were temporary 
tendencies towards media liberalisation in Egypt in the aftermath of the 2011 
revolution, structural conditions of media and journalism remain characterised by an 
oppressive legal and regulatory framework, significant state control and interference, 
a climate of fear, prosecution of journalists, limited professional training, self-
regulation, professional insecurity and a weak consensus on professional roles and 
ethical standards amongst journalists. 
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Kenya11  
Kenya is a country situated in the Eastern part of Sub-Saharan Africa with 45 
million inhabitants belonging to a range of ethnic groups such as Kikuyu, Luhja, Luo, 
Kalenjin and Kamba. 
Since its independence from British colonial rule in 1963, Kenya has faced 
VHYHUDOIXQGDPHQWDOFKDQJHVWRLWVSROLWLFDOV\VWHP$FFRUGLQJWR%OXP¶VW\SRORJ\LWV
SROLWLFDOKLVWRU\FDQEHVHHQDVDQH[DPSOHRI³EURNHQFRQWLQXLW\´%OXP2JROD
SRLQWVRXWWKDW.HQ\D¶VQHZVPHGLDV\VWHPKDVGHYHORSHGDQGSURJUHVVLYHO\UHGHIined 
LWVHOIDJDLQVWWKHFRPSOH[SROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLFVWUXFWXUHVFKDUDFWHULVLQJWKHFRXQWU\¶V
distinct political phases between the 1960s and the present day (Ogola 2011). 
:KLOHWKHILUVW\HDUVRI-RPR.HQ\DWWD¶VUXOHDVWKHILUVWSUHVLGHQWRILQGHSHQGHQW 
.HQ\DEHWZHHQDQGZHUH³EULHIO\EXWEURDGO\DWWHQGHGE\QDWLRQDOSROLWLFDO
JRRGZLOO´2JRODSXQGHUKLVSUHVLGHQF\.HQ\DVRRQHYROYHGLQWRDFRHUFLYH
DQG UHSUHVVLYHVWDWH7KHSROLWLFDOJRDORI ³QDWLRQ-EXLOGLQJ´ZDVSXUVXHGWKURXJKDQ 
³LGHRORJ\ RI RUGHU´ $WLHQR-Odhiambo 1987) and opposition was systematically 
contained and delegitimised on the grounds that competing (political, ethnic and 
UHOLJLRXV LQWHUHVWVZRXOG LPSHGH WKHFRXQWU\¶VGHYHORSPHQW ,Q WKLV FRQWH[WPHGLD
were modelled on the developmental journalism paradigm and seen by the state as 
partners and a central instrument to promote the narrative of national unity in the 
nation-building project (Ogola 2011, p.80). This project gradually led to the co-option 
of the mainstream media by the state. The print market was monopolised leaving only 
two mainstream newspapers, The Daily Nation and the East African Standard. While 
these newspapers were privately owned, they were directly and indirectly controlled by 
the state, particularly through their advertising revenue as the government was the 
largest advertiser at that time (ibid., p.81).  
8QGHU .HQ\DWWD¶V VXFFHVVRU 'DQLHO $UDS 0RL ZKR VHUYHG DV 3UHVLGHQW IURP
1978 to 2002, Kenya evolved from a de facto to a de jure one party state, a situation 
formalised by law in 1982 (Mueller 2008, p.189). Moi was a member of the Kalenjin 
                                                          
11
 We thank our colleagues Nicole Stremlau, Nic Cheeseman and Toussaint Nothias for their valuable contribution 
to the Kenyan report. 
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ethnic group and disempowered the Kikuyu elite. Governing in an authoritarian and 
corrupt manner, Moi quickly consolidated his position and concentrated all political and 
economic power in the hands of his Kenya African National Union (KANU), dominated 
E\WKH.DOHQMLQWULEHDQGDKDQGIXORIDOOLHVIURPPLQRULW\JURXSV7KH³0RLHUDZDV
LQILQLWHO\PRUHUHSUHVVLYHWKDQWKDWRI.HQ\DWWD¶VUXOH´0XHOOHUS and has 
EHHQ GHVFULEHG DV ³LPSHULDO SUHVLGHQF\´ LELG S 7KH ILUVW SKDVH RI 0RL¶V
authoritarian presidency was marked by an increase of government involvement in the 
media sector. The government continued to use state mechanisms to intimidate 
political opposition and alternative media.  
In the absence of a press law, intimidation of media workers and organisations, 
and the detention of newspaper editors was commonplace. Between 1988 and 1990, 
nearly twenty publications were banned. Moi also tried to increase state control over 
the two major newspapers. While connections with KANU members enabled him to 
buy a majority share in the Standard, he did not gain direct control of the Nation, but 
asserted his influence through business relations with the groXS¶V SULQFLSDO
shareholder, the Aga Khan (Ogola 2011, pp.82±83). This interdependence allowed 
both newspapers to grow economically under the Moi regime, with only occasional 
state intimidation. Additionally a national party newspaper, Kenya Times, was 
estaEOLVKHG DV D ³JRYHUQPHQW PRXWKSLHFH´ ibid., p.83) acting alongside the state 
broadcaster, the Voice of Kenya (the name was changed to Kenya Broadcasting 
Cooperation in 1989).   
,QFUHDVHG HFRQRPLF GHFOLQH DQG ³LQIRUPDOL]DWLRQ RI WKH VWDWH´ 2JROD 
p.83), with executive power almost exclusively assigned to the president and KANU 
SDUW\VHULRXVO\HURGHGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VOHJLWLPDF\LQWKHODWHVDQGHDUO\V
7KLV ³RSSRVLWLRQ FXOWXUH´ +DXJHUXG  S DOVR DSSOLHG WR WKH PHGLD VHFWRU
Opposition politicians funded a number of press outlets and alternative voices were 
now heard within mainstream newspapers. Due to increasing political pressure exerted 
by opposition groups, civil society, sections of the church, and the international 
community, the government was forced to readopt multipartism in 1992. The 
reintroduction of political pluralism allowed for the liberalisation of the media: several 
new media outlets emerged and existing mainstream news media switched from their 
traditional developmental focus to the market model. The Nation Media Group saw 
massive growth in its portfolio because of new private capital, making it gradually less 
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reliant on state patronage and allowing more adversarial reporting, although criticism 
was limited so as not to endanger good business relationships between the Aga Khan 
DQG WKH 0RL DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ 2JROD  S %\ FRQWUDVW GXH WR WKH .$18¶V
shareholding in the company and governmental involvement in editorial decisions, The 
Standard remained loyal to the regime, campaigning for Moi in the 1997 presidential 
elections. 
Although the Nation and Standard continued to dominate the print sector despite 
liberalisation of the media, the broadcast sector experienced fundamental change with 
the introduction of the first private broadcast media such as the FM radio station, 
Capital FM and the TV station, Kenya Television Network. However, the fact that these 
two stations were both owned by the Standard Group (through a subsidiary, Baraza 
Limited) and another new entrant Royal Media Group, belonged to Samuel Kamau 
Macharia, a prominent Nairobi businessman with strong government links, 
GHPRQVWUDWHG WKDW EURDGFDVW OLFHQFH DFTXLVLWLRQ ³ZDV EDVHG PDLQO\ RQ SROLWLFDO
FRQQHFWLRQVDQGVWDWHSDWURQDJH´2JRODS 
Hence, DOWKRXJKWKHHDUO\¶VZHUHPDUNHGE\OLEHUDOLVDWLRQ.HQ\D³EHFDPH
a case study of the problematic relationship between multi-party elections and genuine 
SROLWLFDOUHIRUP´&KHHVHPDQHWDOS3UHVLGHQW0RLDQG.$18PDLQWDLQHG
their hold on pRZHUDQGQDWLRQDOHOHFWLRQVLQDQG³ZHUHHDFKSUHFHGHGE\
the explicit mobilization of ethnic constituencies and substantial violence, which 
sought, at least in part, to drive Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya and Kisii voters ± then associated 
with the opposition ± RXWRISDUWLFXODUDUHDV´ibid., p.5). 
A two-term limit forced Moi from power in 2002 and his misjudgement of 
VXFFHVVLRQSROLWLFVIDFLOLWDWHGDQHZHUDLQ.HQ\D¶VSROLWLFDOGHYHORSPHQW0RLEDFNHG
Uhuru Kenyatta, the son of his predecessor Jomo Kenyatta, as the KANU presidential 
candidate, and so unwittingly aided an alliance of major politicians and ethnic 
constituencies in the National Rainbow Coalition (NaRC) (Cheeseman et al. 2014, p.5). 
In December 2002, voters overwhelmingly elected members of the NaRC to parliament 
and NaRC candidate Mwai Kibaki to the presidency. The largely peaceful elections 
³LQ ZKLFK PXOWLSOH PLQRU LUUHJXODULWLHV ZHUH PDGH LUUHOHYDQW E\ WKH VL]H RI .LEDNL¶V
RYHUDOO YLFWRU\´ ibid., p.5) marked an important turning point in KHQ\D¶VGHPRFUDWLF
evolution. There were high expectations of the new government, with some calling the 
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ODQGVOLGHZLQD³VHFRQGOLEHUDWLRQ´RUHYHQ³UHYROXWLRQ´6FKPLGWDQG'HVHODHUV
p.12).  
However, the ³DSSHDUDQFHRISROLWLFDOWUDQVLWLRQZDVSDUWO\ LOOXVRU\´ (Cheeseman 
et al. 2014, p.5). The new government came to power with a commitment to create a 
new constitution, but debate over its terms soon created a rift in the NaRC. Raila 
Odinga, who had supported Kibaki in the 2002 elections, switched his allegiance on 
the grounds that the party did not offer sufficient reform and failed to create the position 
of Prime Minister that he had been promised in return for his electoral support. 
Subsequently, 0ZDL.LEDNL¶VJRYHUQPHQWGLGQRWVXFFHHGLQWKH&onstitutional 
5HIHUHQGXP.HQ\D¶VSROLWLFDOVWDELOLW\³FUXPEOHGIRUDZKLOH´ (Schmidt and Deselaers 
2015, p.12), and finally collapsed in December 2007; at the presidential elections, 
Kibaki and Odinga ran against each other. Kibaki was declared the winner by the 
Kenyan Elections Commission amidst widespread accusation of malpractice and 
multiple failings of the electoral process triggering unprecedented violence between 
WKH FRXQWU\¶V GLIIHUHQW HWKQLF JURXSV The Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election 
Violence and the government confirmed that the outbursts resulted in 1133 deaths, 
and up to 700,000 more were people displaced (Cheeseman et al. 2014, p.5). 
The post-electoral violence 2007/2008 FDPHDVD³VKRFNIRU.HQ\DQVDQGWRDQ
international community that assumed that 2002 had marked a stable political 
WUDQVLWLRQ´&KHHVHPDQHWDOS7KHYLROHQFHoffered terrifying evidence both 
of the need for real political reform and the value of peace and stability.  
A diplomatic deal mediated by international negotiators appointed by the African 
Union ended the violence. Following the agreement, power was shared between the 
two rivals, President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga; Kenya was governed in a grand 
coalition between 2008 and 2013 (Cheeseman et al. 2014, pp.5±6). Considered as a 
³QHFHVVDU\ VWHS WKDW PXVW SUHFHGH PRUH DPELWLRXV UHIRUPV´ &KHHVHPDQ 
p.180), the µXQLW\JRYHUQPHQW¶ managed to pass a long awaited new constitution (also 
offering a changing framework for media as will be elaborated below).  
,QWKHXQLW\JRYHUQPHQWµH[SHULPHQW¶HQGHGZKHQWKHJubilee Alliance 
of Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto won both the presidential contest and a 
parliamentary majority in contested but mostly peaceful elections, opening the current 
 48 
 
FKDSWHURI.HQ\D¶VSROLWLFDOKLVWRU\(Cheeseman et al. 2014). In the meantime, Kenya 
was confronted with a new threat to national security. From 2011 the country faced 
several major terrorist attacks by Al-Shabaab, characterised as retribution for the 
Kenyan military's deployment in the group's home country of Somalia.  
To summarise, the legacy of different political phases, political volatility due to 
ethnic divisions and the threat of terrorism from Al-Shabaab impact on the current 
VWUXFWXUDOFRQGLWLRQVRI.HQ\D¶VSROLWLFDODQGPHGLDV\VWHPLQPDQ\ZD\V 
One of the hallmarks of a democratic political system is the structure of checks 
and balances established by formal as well as informal rules among the executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches of the state.  
Cheeseman (2008, pp.180±181) noted that between 2002 and 2007, Kenyan 
politics had failed to implement comprehensive political reform and establish adequate 
formal rules to ensure elections with democratic outcomes: 
Democratic elections do not sit well with an authoritarian constitution, and 
coalition building and elite compromise are undermined by the dominant nature 
of the presidency and the lack of institutions that operate independently of the 
executive. The potential for conflict in Kenya would have been significantly 
diffused if the government had not deliberately manipulated the process of 
constitutional reform to prevent the decentralization of power away from the 
executive. 
As Mueller (2008, pp.197±198) argues, conditions favouring institutional change did 
not apply in Kenya after the election of the NaRC government in 2002. Rather, 
politicians feared institutional innovation which might have led to the loss of political 
power. According to Mueller (ibid., pp.194±195), it was informal norms which 
increasingly undermined formal rules by trumping the autonomy of independent 
branches of government in favour of a highly personalised presidency. This 
phenomenon of deliberately weak autonomous institutions outside the presidency was 
FRQVLGHUHG D SUHFLSLWDWLQJ IDFWRU LQ .HQ\D¶V LPSORVLRQ IROORZLQJ WKH  HOHFWLRQ
institutions such as the Electoral Commission and the courts, which in theory could 
have dealt with the challenges, were viewed as partisan and as being tied to the 
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executive rather than independent from it (Cheeseman et al. 2014, p.3, Mueller 2008, 
pp.197±199). 
With the new constitution of 2010, Kenya seems to better meet the standards 
of a democratic system (listed in chapter 2: pluralism of parties, governmental change 
following a change in majority, the division of powers). According to the constitution, 
the politics of Kenya take place in a framework of a presidential representative 
democratic republic: the President is both head of state and head of government. 
Executive power is exercised by the executive branch of government led by the 
President, who chairs a cabinet composed of people chosen from outside parliament. 
Whereas this presidential strength seems conform to the long-lasting tradition of a 
strong executive, the new constitution grants the National Assembly relatively high 
levels of independence from the executive and introduces new procedures for the 
conduct of elections, new judicial safeguards to ensure integrity, and a new regulatory 
framework for political parties (Cheeseman et al. 2014, p.6). It also promotes 
decentralisation, establishing 47 new county governments (ibid., pp. 3±4). Thus, the 
FRQVWLWXWLRQLVFRQVLGHUHGWRIHDWXUH³VWURQJHUFKHFNVDQGEDODQFHVDQGLVSRWHQWLDOO\
IDUPRUHHIIHFWLYHDW LQWHJUDWLQJPDUJLQDOL]HGFRPPXQLWLHV LQWR WKHSROLWLFDOV\VWHP´
(ibid., pp.17±18). 
Elections are the central test case for newly introduced rules and institutions 
and the polls of 2013 were intended to be a major step in Kenyan political 
transformation. Indeed, Kenya experienced a very high official voter turnout (86 per 
cent) and, while the Jubilee Alliance of Kenyatta and Ruto won both the presidential 
contest and secured a parliamentary majority, elections for the newly devolved 
structures of government left many county governments in the hands of other parties. 
Though there have been numerous legal appeals over the outcome of many of the 
FRQWHVWVWKHGHFLVLRQVRIWKHFRXUWVKDYHEHHQDFFHSWHG³DOEHLWRIWHQJUXGJLQJO\E\
WKH ORVHUV³ &KHHVHPDQ HW DO  S +RZHYHU DOWKRXJK WKH  HOHFWLRQV
passed off largely peacefully, according to Cheeseman et al. (ibid., pp.3-4) they did not 
confirm a process of democratic consolidation or herald the end of inter-ethnic tension 
and mistrust. Rather, they argue that the course of the elections might have been made 
possible by specific circumstances which can be evaluated rather ambivalently in 
WHUPVRIWKHLUµGHPRFUDWLFYDOXH¶ 
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First, the decision of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to prosecute 
Kenyatta and William Ruto for crimes against humanity for their alleged role in 
the postelection violence of 2007/08 had the unexpected effect of bringing these 
former rivals together in the Jubilee Alliance, which reduced the prospect for 
violence between their respective Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities. Second, a 
SHUYDVLYH µSHDFH QDUUDWLYH¶ HPHUJHG WKDW ZDV DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK D SOHWKRUD of 
monitoring and early-warning mechanisms, but which also delegitimized 
election protests and political activity seen to challenge the status quo and 
encourage instability. Combined with the heavy deployment of security forces 
LQSRWHQWLDOµKRWVSRWV¶Whis significantly constrained the options available to the 
losing candidate: civil disobedience was both less popular, and more risky, than 
in 2007/08. 
FRU DOO RI WKH OLPLWDWLRQV LQ .HQ\D¶V GHPRFUDWLF V\VWHP WKH FRXQWU\ PD\ EH
undergoing a gradual process of democratisation: although incumbents have 
constantly sought to block reform, remarkable progress has been made over the last 
 \HDUV 2YHU ILYH VXFFHVVLYH HOHFWLRQV ³.HQ\DQ YRWHUV DQG RSSRVLWLRQ SDUWLHV
converted political openings into political FKDQJH´&KHHVHPDQHWDOS(YHQ
dramatic setbacks such as the breakdown of the political system around the 2007 
elections did not bring an end to the slow process of institutional change; rather, they 
FUHDWHGD³QHZZLQGRZRIRSSRUWXQLW\´ZLWKLn which long awaited institutional reforms 
were initiated and Kenya finally received a constitution that features stronger checks 
and balances (ibid., p.17). 
In summary, present day Kenya can be described as a hybrid regime, 
incorporating the characteristics of both a democracy and an authoritarian system 
(Levitsky and Way 2010). This is even more evident when one takes a closer look at 
the political culture and current developments in the media regulations shaping 
structural conditions of journalism in Kenya.  
Basic characteristics of the political culture in Kenya have already been 
indicated above. 
Given its authoritarian history, the state has traditionally played a central role in 
regulating many aspects of Kenyan society. This regulatory power of the state 
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declined when market-oriented reforms began in the latter half of the 1980s and the 
onset of economic, and later, political liberalisation extending to other aspects of 
society (Barrett et al. 2006, p.250). However, the state remains an important regulator, 
granting licences, permitting and, to an extent, controlling credit. This political culture 
RI D µVWURQJ VWDWH¶ DOVR KDV DQ LPSDFW RQ PHGLD UHJXODWLRQ ,W LV LPSRUWDQW WR QRWH
however, that Kenyan society traditionally builds on authorities other than the central 
VWDWHLQFOXGLQJHWKQLFJURXSVDQGFODQVUHIOHFWLQJD³WUDGLWLRQDORUGHULQJRIUHODWLRQV
EDVHGRQKLHUDUFK\DQGDXWKRULW\´)UHGHULNVHQS 
In terms of preferred modes of distribution of political power, Kenyan elites 
traditionally favour majoritarian politics. The former authoritarian regimes clearly 
VXSSRUWHG WKH SULQFLSOH RI µZLQQHU WDNHV LW DOO¶ DQG WKH FXUUHQW SUHVLGHQWLDO V\VWHP
continues to place the concentration of power in the hands of the dominant political 
force. However, since 2002, several coalition governments have been elected, 
weakening the two-party model and demanding a certain degree of consensus and 
FRRSHUDWLRQ:KHUHDV XQGHU DXWKRULWDULDQ UHJLPHV µQDWLRQDO XQLW\¶ ZDV D SUHWH[W WR
cumulate power to one political DQGHWKQLFJURXS LQ UHFHQW WLPHVD µSRZHU-sharing 
PRGHO¶KDVFRPH WRSURPLQHQFH OHDGLQJ WR WKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIDJHQHUDOO\ LQFOXVLYH
JRYHUQPHQWUHSUHVHQWLQJDEURDGUDQJHRISDUWLHV+RZHYHUWKH³XQLW\JRYHUQPHQW´
(Cheeseman and Tendi 2010, p.203) of the grand coalition between 2008 and 2013 
was not guided by a democratic quest for compromise ± rather, as Cheeseman and 
Tendi suggest, government members overcame their mutual animosity and managed 
to find common ground mainly for the purpose of defending the system through which 
they had secured access to resources (ibid., p.223). Accordingly, the combination of 
opportunity and incentive (access to state resources in order to form a union against 
prosecution by national or international tribunals) explains the alliance formed between 
Kenyatta and Ruto since the run-up to the 2013 elections; a connection which, at first 
glance, is remarkable, as the communities of these leaders, Kikuyu (Kenyatta) and 
Kalenjin (Ruto), fought against each other in the postelection violence of early 2008 
(ibid., pp.223-224).12 
                                                          
12
 0XHOOHUDUJXHVWKDWIRU,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO&RXUW,&&LQGLFWHHV8KXUX.HQ\DWWDDQG:LOOLDP5XWR³ZLQQLQJ
the election was part of a key defence strategy in order to undercut the ICC by seizing political power, flexing it to 
GHIOHFWWKH,&&DQGRSHQLQJXSWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIQRWVKRZLQJXSIRUWULDOLIDOOHOVHIDLOHG´0XHOOHUS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This is directly linked to the level of cleavage of ideologies and the role 
political parties. Traditionally, political mobilisation has evolved from ethnicity rather 
than distinct political ideologies: Kenyan politicians mostly obtain power by employing 
ethnic arithmetic and clientage as mobilising factors, whether openly articulated or 
otherwise. Since political change and continuity has revolved around the 
manoeuvrings of prominent personalities often creating parties specifically for the 
purpose of elections, loyalties have shifted from party to party and in this process, a 
VDOLHQWIHDWXUHRI.HQ\DQPXOWLSDUW\LVPKDVEHHQWKHZHDNQHVVDQG³HSKHPHUDOQDWXUH
RI SROLWLFDO SDUWLHV´ &KHHVHPDQHWDO  S. As their ideologies, policies, and 
programmes are largely indistinguishable, Kenyan political parties can be seen as non-
SURJUDPPDWLF³HWKQLFDOO\GULYHQFOLHQWLVWSDUWLHV´0XHOOHUS 
Against this backdrop, there is limited adherence to a rational-legal authority 
and respect for formal rules, procedures and political institutions. Rather, Kenya´s 
political culture is marked by a Clientelism which is routed in ethnic divisions as well 
as colonial and authoritarian legacy. While under colonial rule tribalism was 
instrumentalised for political means, all presidents since independence have been 
accused of favouring their own ethnic group both politically and economically (Schmidt 
and Deselaers 2015, p.12). As Mueller (2008, p.200) argues, politics is viewed 
SULPDULO\DVD³ZLQQHU-takes-all zero-VXPHWKQLFJDPH´ZLWKWKHQDWLRQDOHFRQRPLFFDNH
EHLQJWKHSUL]HDQGYDULRXVHWKQLFJURXSVDUJXLQJRSHQO\´WKDWLWLVWKHLUWXUQWRµHDW¶´13 
This system results in poor governance and corruption. In 2014, the Corruption 
Perceptions Index of Transparency International which measures perceived levels of 
corruption in public sectors around the world, ranked Kenya 145 out of 174 countries, 
with a score of 25 (on a scale from 0 =highly corrupt to 100 = very clean) (Transparency 
International 2014). As the rule of law is still weak and politicised in Kenya, varying 
degrees of non-compliance and attempts to ignore or undermine the law and other 
formal rules still seem to be business as usual (Mueller 2014, p.26). 
                                                          
13
 'XULQJ-RPR.HQ\DWWD¶VUXOHRWKHUHWKQLFJURXSVFRPSODLQHGWKDWWKH.LNX\XEHQHILWHGREWDLQLQJODQGDQGcivil 
VHUYLFHMREVDWWKHLUH[SHQVH0RLLQWXUQXVHGKLVSRZHUWRZHDNHQWKH.LNX\X¶VHFRQRPLFEDVHZKLOHUHZDUGLQJ
his own ethnic Kalenjin and other marginal groups with jobs and appointments in government. Since assuming 
power, Kibaki also has been criticised for favouring the Kikuyu from his area, and ignoring high-level corruption in 
his inner circle (Mueller 2008, p.201, Otieno 2005) ± a system that has not been stopped either under the Unity 
government of the Grand Coalition or under the Jubilee government. 
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To summarise, ethnicity plays a central role in Kenyan society, impacting 
significantly on political culture as well as everyday life, both as a resource and form of 
social capital, as well as a potential challenge to a peaceful and fair community life. As 
will be further elaborated below, ethnicity and ethnic/patron-client ties are also very 
important in understanding how the media in Kenya operates.  
In evaluating media freedom, it is important to distinguish between formal rules 
inscribed in constitutions, media laws, and the actual media policies in the country. 
In terms of the constitutional framework, the new constitution passed in 2010 
did not only comprise a generally improved system of checks and balances but was 
considered a turning point for Kenyan media, granting freedom of the media, 
H[SUHVVLRQDQGLQIRUPDWLRQ³LQDZD\WKHFRXQWU\KDVQRWVHHQEHIRUH´6FKPLGWDQG
Deselaers 2015, p.15). In fact, it was considered one of the strongest guarantees of its 
kind in sub-Saharan Africa (Maina 2015, p.29). Articles 33 and 35 of the constitution 
guarantee freedom of expression and access to information respectively, while Article 
34 assures independence and freedom of all types of media, and protects individual 
journalists and media organisations from state control and interference. The regulation 
DOVREDUVWKHVWDWHIURPLPSRVLQJSHQDOWLHVIRU³DQ\RSLQLRQRUYLHZRUWKHFRQWHQWRI
DQ\EURDGFDVWSXEOLFDWLRQRUGLVVHPLQDWLRQ´ibid., p.29). Although the comprehensive 
restrictions of Article 33 regarding incitement to violence, hate speech and war 
propaganda also apply to freedom of the media, these potential curbs on media 
freedom are not considered as severe as those in the preceding constitution (Schmidt 
and Deselaers 2015, p.15). Unlike its predecessors, which were easily amended 
according to the whims of political expediency, the 2010 constitution is considered 
PRUHRID³KDUGODZ´0DLQDSE\H[SHUWVDVQRDPHQGPHQWVFDQEHHIIHFWHG
without a very high approval threshold in a popular referendum.  
However, a constitution cannot provide the level of detail needed to offer 
sufficient regulations at national level. The Fifth Schedule of the Constitution therefore 
stipulated a three-year (2010-2013) timetable for implementing specific aspects of the 
document through concrete legislation pertaining media freedom (Article 19 
Eastern Africa 2014, p.9). Maina (2015, p.29) states that, although there have been 
VRPHVLJQLILFDQWFRQVWLWXWLRQDOGHYHORSPHQWVLPSOHPHQWDWLRQLVKDPSHUHGE\³GHHS-
seated interesWVWKDWJUDVSHYHU\RSSRUWXQLW\WRWKUHDWHQLW´ 
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Against this backdrop, the guarantees of the constitution still compete with 
anachronistic government legislation, documents and policy instruments containing 
SURYLVLRQVZKLFKDUH³DQDQWLWKHVLV WRIUHHGRPRIPHGLD³6LPL\XS7KH
%RRNVDQG1HZVSDSHUV$FWREOLJHV³DQ\SHUVRQZKRZDQWVWRVWDUWDQHZVSDSHU
to be registered with the Registrar of Books and Newspapers and pay a bond of KES 
PLOOLRQ´DSURYLVLRQWKDWKDVWHQGHGWRORFNVPDOOSODyers out of the media market 
(Open Society Foundations 2011, p.26). The 1967 Preservation of Public Security Act 
gives the president sweeping powers to censor, control or prohibit information that is 
deemed a security risk (ibid., p.29). Although the majority of libel and defamation cases 
are tried under civil law, defamation is a criminal offence under the penal code of 1930 
(ibid., p.27). It is argued that the mere possibility of charges such as criminal 
defamation is often used to intimidate journalists (Freedom House 2014c, see also 
Article 19 Eastern Africa 2014, pp.9±10).14  
The reluctance of governments to implement media reform is particularly 
evident in access to information rights. The Access to Information Bill 2013 is the 
product of years of campaigning; previous versions were published in 2005, 2008 and 
2012. After public consultations led by the Constitutional Implementation Committee, 
the 2012 bill became the Access to Information Bill 2013, which was still awaiting 
parliamentary debate at the end of 2014 (Article 19 Eastern Africa 2014, p.10).15 
An even greater risk than persisting archaic media laws and missing regulations 
relating to access to information appears to be the new media laws enacted under the 
new Jubilee government: The Kenya Information and Communications (Amendment) 
Act 2013 (KICA) and Kenya Media Council Act (MCA) 2013. As these pieces of 
legislation grant the executive more power to regulate the media and impose heavy 
fines, they de facto repeal a considerable number of the guarantees granted by the 
&RQVWLWXWLRQDQGKDYHEHHQFDOOHGVRPHRI³PRVWUHSUHVVLYHPHGLDOHJLVODWLRQLQ
WKHFRXQWU\¶V-\HDUKLVWRU\´)UHHGRP+RXVHF,WLVWKLVIDLOXUHWRLPSOHPHQW
constitutional reform by constantly trying to maintain the status quo of archaic media 
                                                          
14
 According to the Freedom House Report 2014, In May 2013, newly elected deputy president William Ruto 
threatened to sue the Sunday Nation for defamation over a story about his use of a luxury private jet to visit several 
African countries (Freedom House 2014c). As Maina points out, the law has been used to censor films, publications 
and artistic expressions unfairly in the past (Maina 2015, p.34).  
15
 +RZHYHU LW LVZRUWKQRWLQJ WKDW WKH.HQ\DQJRYHUQPHQW ODXQFKHG WKH ³.HQ\D2SHQ'DWD ,QLWLDWLYH´ LQ
making key government data freely available to the public through a single online portal: opendata.go.ke. 
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laws or reversing the reforms with repressive new regulations that Maina (2015) calls 
³FRQVWLWXWLFLGH´ 
Indeed, the recent laws have essentially modified the system of media 
regulation and control, as well as the role of the state in regulating media, by 
establishing new regulatory bodies and changing mandates as well as structures of 
existing institutions. 
The Media Council Act 2013 created a new legal framework for the Media 
Council of Kenya (MCK), ³WKHOHDGLQJLQVWLWXWLRQLQWKHUegulation of media and in the 
FRQGXFWDQGGLVFLSOLQHRIMRXUQDOLVWV´0HGLD&RXQFLORI.HQ\DE7KH0&.ZDV
established in 2004 as a self-regulating body overseeing the Kenyan media industry 
but was transformed into a statutory, independent public institution under the Media 
Act 2007.  
7KH0HGLD&RXQFLO$FWKDVUHWDLQHGVRPHHOHPHQWVRIWKH³FR-regulation 
PHGLDUHJXODWLRQDSSURDFK´0HGLD&RXQFLORI.HQ\DEZKLFKZDVLQWURGXFHGE\
the Media Act in 2007 to regulate appointment procedures of the MCK members. As 
opposed to provisions in previous versions of the bill giving the executive ultimate 
decision making powers for selecting members of the Council, according to the final 
draft of the 2013 Act, members of the MCK are appointed independently and the role 
of the executive is limited to merely formalising appointments (Article 19 2013).16 
However, the Act does allow some state interference in the selection of council 
PHPEHUV DV WKH µVHOHFWLRQ SDQHO¶ LQFOXGHV QRW RQO\ UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV RI PHGLD
stakeholders such as the Media Owners Association, the Kenya Union of Journalists 
RUWKH.HQ\D&RUUHVSRQGHQWV$VVRFLDWLRQEXWDOVRWKH³0LQLVWU\UHVSRQVLEOHIRUPDWWHUV
UHODWLQJWRPHGLD´0RUHRYHUWKH&RXQFLOUHFHLYHVIXQGLQJIURPWKHJRYHUQPHQWDQGLV
obOLJHG WR WDEOH ³WKURXJK WKH &DELQHW 6HFUHWDU\ EHIRUH 3DUOLDPHQW UHSRUWV RQ LWV
IXQFWLRQV´± factors that could undermine section 12 of the Act, which states that the 
³&RXQFLO VKDOO EH LQGHSHQGHQW RI FRQWURO E\ JRYHUQPHQW SROLWLFDO RU FRPPHUFLDO
interests´5HSXEOLFRI.HQ\DE 
                                                          
16
 The draft version of the Act, which was introduced into the National Assembly in July 2013, stipulated in section 
DQGWKDWWKHFDELQHWVHFUHWDU\ZRXOGDSSRLQWDFKDLUSHUVRQDQGVL[PHPEHUVRIWKH&RXQFLORXWRI³WKUHH
persons qualified to be aSSRLQWHG DV FKDLUSHUVRQ DQG WZHOYH SHUVRQV TXDOLILHG WREHPHPEHUVRI WKH &RXQFLO´
(Republic of Kenya 2013a: 596). 
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8QGHU WKHRIILFLDOYLVLRQRI ³DSURIHVVLRQDODQGIUHHPHGLDDFFRXQWDEOHWR WKH
SXEOLF´0HGLD&RXQFLORI.HQ\DEWKH0&.LVPDQGDWHGWRUHJLVWHUDQGDFFUHGLW
journalists, register media establishments, handle complaints from the public, and 
create and publish an annual audit of the Media Freedom in Kenya (Republic of Kenya 
2013b). Several mandates and procedures have been criticised by analysts and media 
1*2V7KH0&.¶VIXQFWLRQWR³DFFUHGLWMRXUQDOLVWVDQGIRUHLJQMRXUQDOists by certifying 
their competence, authority or credibility against official standards based on the quality 
DQGWUDLQLQJRIMRXUQDOLVWVLQ.HQ\D´LVSUREOHPDWLFIRUVHYHUDOUHDVRQV)LUVWO\LWZDV
found that the regulation created unjustifiable restrictions on entry to, and practice of 
journalism by prescribing minimal educational standards as entry qualifications (Maina 
2015, p.32, Article 19 2013). Secondly, the regulation was criticised for 
inconsistencies: it is difficult to see how the MCK can accredit journalists based on 
³FRPSHWHQFHDXWKRULW\RUFUHGLELOLW\DJDLQVWRIILFLDOVWDQGDUGVEDVHGRQWKHTXDOLW\DQG
WUDLQLQJRI MRXUQDOLVWV LQ.HQ\D´ DVVWDWHG LQ WKH$FWDQGVLPXOWDQHRXVO\DSSO\ WKH
Code of Conduct for the Practice of Journalism in Kenya ZKLFKGHILQHVµMRXUQDOLVW¶DV
DQ\RQHZKR³FROOHFWVZULWHVHGLWVDQGSUHVHQWVQHZVRUQHZVDUWLFOHVLQQHZVSDSHUV
and magazines, radio and television broadcasts, in the internet or any other manner 
DVPD\EHSUHVFULEHG´$UWLFOH(DVWHUQ$IULFDS27).17  
:LWKUHJDUGWRWKH0&.¶VPDQGDWHWR³IDFLOLWDWHUHVROXWLRQRIGLVSXWHVEHWZHHQ
the government and the media and between the public and the media DQGLQWUDPHGLD´
the Act established the Complaints Commission of the Media Council (CC) as an 
independent arm of the Media Council of Kenya (Media Council of Kenya 2015a). 
The Kenya Information and Communications (Amendment) Act (KICA) grants 
direct power to the State to control broadcast media regulation through the creation of 
the Communications and Multimedia Appeals Tribunal and the Communications 
Authority of Kenya (Schmidt and Deselaers 2015, p.16). The Communications 
Authority of Kenya (CA) replaced the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK) 
as the regulatory body governing the communications sector, including broadcast and 
RQOLQH PHGLD ,WV PDLQ WDVNV LQFOXGH OLFHQVLQJ ³DOO V\VWHPV DQG VHUYLFHV LQ WKH
communications industry, including; telecommunications, postal, courier and 
                                                          
17
 In this context, it has been also deemed problematic that a Code of Conduct which was created by media 
practitioners and stakeholders in 2001, has been included as part of the legal text in the Media Council Act, as the 
code can now legally be revised by legislators at their discretion (Maina 2015, p.32). 
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EURDGFDVWLQJ´DQG IUHTXHQF\DOORFDWLRQ WKURXJK ³PDQDJLQJ WKHFRXQWU\¶V IUHTXHQF\
VSHFWUXPDQGQXPEHULQJUHVRXUFHV´&RPPXQLFDWLRQV$XWKRULW\RI.HQ\D7KH
.,&$ ZDV ZLGHO\ FULWLFLVHG DOORZLQJ WKH H[HFXWLYH SRZHU WR DSSRLQW WKH DXWKRULW\¶V
board and chairperson (without stakeholder input); the Cabinet Secretary is given a 
choice of candidates from which to select the final appointees (Article 19 2013, 
Freedom House 2014c, Maina 2015, p.31). 
The Communications and Multimedia Appeals Tribunal, which falls under the 
Communication Authority, is authorised to hear appeals on complaints. This provision 
KDVEHHQ FULWLFLVHG DV XQGHUPLQLQJ WKH LQGHSHQGHQFHDQG OHJLWLPDF\ RI WKH 0&.¶V
Complaints Commission by giving the state controlled tribunal jurisdiction to hear 
DSSHDOVIURPWKH&&³ZLWKRXWSUHVFULELQJZKHQVXFKDSSeals may be entertained in 
PDWWHUV RI ODZ DV RSSRVHG WR IDFWV´ 0DLQD  SS±32, Article 19 2013). The 
WULEXQDOLVDOVRDXWKRULVHGWRUHYRNHMRXUQDOLVWV¶SUHVVFUHGHQWLDOVDQGUHFRPPHQGGH-
UHJLVWUDWLRQDJDLQXQGHUPLQLQJWKH0&.¶VDFFUHGLWDWLRQFRPSHWences.  
Contrary to recognised regional and international standards, KICA created 
punitive penalties for media outlets and journalists. The tribunal can impose fines of up 
to KES 500,000 (EUR 4,160) on individual journalists and a maximum of KES 20 million 
(EUR 167,000) on media companies found to be in breach of the journalistic code of 
conduct. The tribunal is authorised to seize property or other assets to cover these 
fiscal penalties (Schmidt and Deselaers 2015, p.16, Maina 2015, p.31, International 
Press Institute 2014b). 
To summarise the characteristics of supervision and regulation bodies 
under the framework of KICA and MCA 2013, it can be stated that both individual 
journalists and media outlets in all sectors, are regulated E\ ³RYHUVLJKW LQVWLWXWLRQs 
favouring the government as opposed to non-JRYHUQPHQW VWDNHKROGHUV´ $UWLFOH 
Eastern Africa 2014, p.29); the state is given a significant measure of control over their 
establishment and conduct. Thus, although co-regulation is in force, the Kenyan state 
has (re-)gained a very strong position with regard to media supervision.18 
                                                          
18
 Both laws have been condemned in the strongest terms by Kenyan journalists as well as by international media 
NGOs such as International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), the Federation of African Journalists (FAJ) or Freedom 
House, as the new statutory power over journalists seems to conflict with the 2010 constitution (Freedom House 
2014c, Reporters without Borders 2013, International Federation of Journalists 2013). Two constitutional challenges 
were filed against both laws through the High Court, one by a number of Kenyan media houses, the second by 
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$QRWKHU LQGLFDWRU IRU HYDOXDWLQJ WKH VWDWH¶V UROH LQ PHGLD UHJXODWLRQ LV WKH
governance of public broadcasting. The Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) is 
an enterprise wholly owned by the state. According to the Kenya Broadcasting 
Corporation Act 1989 (amended in 2009), the KBC ZDVHVWDEOLVKHG³WRDVVXPHWKH
Government functions of producing and broadcasting programmes or parts of 
SURJUDPPHVE\VRXQGRU WHOHYLVLRQ´ ,Q OLQHZLWK WKLVGHILQLWLRQRI WKHEURDGFDVWHU¶V
function, the KBC is a largely government-controlled entity. The government appointed 
Board of Directors consists of government officials, and the Managing Director is 
appointed by the Minister for Information and Communication and as such is 
answerable to the Minister rather than the Board (Open Society Foundations 2011, 
pp.69±70). Notwithstanding its character as a government-controlled entity, the KBC 
has a public mission and shall ± according to the Act ± ³SURYLGH LQdependent and 
LPSDUWLDOEURDGFDVWLQJVHUYLFHVRILQIRUPDWLRQHGXFDWLRQDQGHQWHUWDLQPHQW´³FRQGXFW
the broadcasting services with impartial attention to the interests and susceptibilities of 
WKH GLIIHUHQW FRPPXQLWLHV LQ .HQ\D´ DQG ³NHHS D IDLU EDODQFH LQ all respects in the 
DOORFDWLRQ RI EURDGFDVWLQJ KRXUV DV EHWZHHQ GLIIHUHQW SROLWLFDO YLHZSRLQWV´ 2SHQ
Society Foundations 2011, pp.70±71). 
In the context of digitisation, another instrument of broadcasting regulation 
refers to distribution of digital broadcasting signals. The government has licensed 
WZR VLJQDO GLVWULEXWRUV µ6LJQHW¶ D VXEVLGLDU\ RI KBC DQG WKH µ3DQ $IULFD 1HWZRUN
*URXS¶D&KLQHVHFRPSDQ\WKDWDOOHJHGO\KDVOLQNVWRWKHJRYHUQPHQW7KLVKDVOHGWR
accusations that the government is seeking greater control over the broadcast media, 
and that the Chinese company may be willing to block certain signals in the future if 
                                                          
Kenyan media professional associations (Kenya Editors Guild, Kenya Union of journalists, Kenya Correspondents 
Association) (Maina 2015, p.32). Although the High Court decided to temporarily stop the Minister of ICT from 
implementing the laws as petitions were still pending, the ruling was ignored by the government on two occasions 
(Maina 2015, p.32). 
Despite criticism of the 2013 laws, President Uhuru Kenyatta signed another controversial bill into law in 
December 2014: The Security Laws Amendment Act (SLAA) was adopted in response to the increase in Al-
6KDEDDEWHUURULVWDWWDFNVLQ.HQ\D6HFWLRQSHQDOLVHGPHGLDFRYHUDJH³OLNHO\WRFDXVHSXEOLFDODUPLQFLWHPHQW
WRYLROHQFHRUGLVWXUESXEOLFSHDFH´RUWKDW³XQGHUPLQHVLQYHVWLJDWLRQVRUVHFXULW\RSHUDWLRQVE\WKH1DWLRQDO3ROLFH
Service or the .HQ\D'HIHQVH)RUFHV´8QGHUWKHQHZODZ MRXUQDOLVWVKDYHWRVHHNSHUPLVVLRQIURPWKHSROLFH
before reporting on anti-terrorism investigations and operations. The maximum sentence for violators is three years 
in prison and a fine of KES 5 million (USD 55,000) (Reporters without Borders 2015b). Thus, under the pretext of 
improving national security, the bill contains provisions carrying the potential to severely restrict freedom of 
information and media when covering terrorist acts and issues related to national security (International Press 
Institute 2014a, Committee to Protect Journalists 2014a). In February 2015, the Kenyan high court struck out the 
media-related sections of the law; the government reacted by stating its intention to appeal against the high court 
UXOLQJ DQG WKDW SHQGLQJ WKH RXWFRPH RI WKH DSSHDO DOO RI WKH ODZ¶V GLVSXWHG VHFWLRQV ZRXOG UHPDLQ LQ HIIHFW
(Reporters without Borders 2015b) ± an announcement that underlines the government´s determination to establish 
media regulations at its discretion.  
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requested to do by the government. After a two-year court battle, the Supreme Court 
granted the four TV stations NTV, KTN, Citizen and QTV a joint licence to distribute 
digital signals in January 2015. However, the analogue signal was turned off in 
February 2015 by CA before the four media houses had been able to establish their 
own digital distribution platform, resulting in widespread "blackouts" in parts of the 
country (Magango 2015). 
Apart from the legal background, media freedom and state control is to be 
measured by the actual safety of journalists. According to Media NGOs and 
academic papers, Kenyan reporters regularly face threats and attacks. Although 
homicides are rare,19 ³WKHVDIHW\RISUDFWLFLQJMRXUQDOLVWVLQ.HQ\DRQFHDJDLQEHFDPH
PRUHYRODWLOHODWHO\´6FKPLGWDQG'HVHODHUVS 
Throughout 2013, journalists faced increased pressure and threats when 
attempting to cover sensitive or controversial events, such as the March elections, 
corruption, the impending International Criminal Court trial of President Uhuru Kenyatta 
and other top officials, and issues related to the security forces and the terrorist attack 
on the Westgate shopping centre (Freedom House 2014d). A 2013 national baseline 
survey of 282 Kenyan journalists showed that 91 per cent faced threats in the course 
of their work. Only 23 per cent reported that they had never been threatened, with the 
rest having received threats at least once and 19 per cent more than five times (Hivos 
Kenya 2013). Freedom House reports 21 incidents across the country in 2013, ranging 
from harassment, warnings and intimidation such as death threats 20 to temporary 
detention21  and physical assaults (Freedom House 2014c). 22  It is stated that the 
                                                          
19
 In 2009, a reporter for the Weekly Citizen, was brutally murdered in western Kenya while investigating suspected 
corruption in a police construction project. Investigations did not lead to any arrests (Committee to Protect 
Journalists 2013b). 
20
 According to Freedom House, investigative journalists for the private KTN television station received death 
threats from suspected security agents shortly after airing a program that suggested foul play in a helicopter crash 
that killed former interior minister George Saitoti (Freedom House 2014c). 
21
 The Committee to Protect Journalists reported that Kenyan police in Kisumu city, threatened and briefly detained 
a reporter for the privately owned daily The Star, in connection with a story he wrote alleging criminal activity by 
police officers in the region (Committee to Protect Journalists 2014b). According to Freedom House, the government 
relied heavily on hate speech laws to monitor and curtail inflammatory reporting ahead of the elections in 2013. In 
January, a National Steering Committee on Media Monitoring was set up to monitor hate speech, particularly on 
blogs and social media, and several people were arrested (Freedom House 2014c)  
22
 According to Freedom House, in January 2013, residents in the Tana River Delta area attacked several journalists 
with machetes and other weapons when they went to cover a peace meeting organized organised by a local human 
rights group; the reporters were forced to flee (Freedom House 2014c). During the 2013 elections, in Homa Bay, a 
town in western Kenya, paramilitary police attacked newspaper reporters when they tried to take pictures of a 
dispute that broke out between supporters of two rival candidates (Freedom House 2014c). As the Committee to 
Protect Journalists reports, a correspondent for The Star who was found dead in his house in Mombasa had 
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threats and attacks on journalists are perpetrated mainly by the police and (both 
national and local) government officials (Freedom House 2014c). This is in line with 
the Hivos study which states that the polled journalists link the biggest portion of threats 
to politicians and political goons (Hivos Kenya 2013, p.ix). As the International Press 
Institute reported in 2014, threats have severe consequences: Kenyan journalists are 
prompted to go underground or even leave the country (International Press Institute 
2014c).23  
It is not only individual journalists who face threats. The Hivos study states that 
³PHGLD KRXVHV KDYHEHHQ LQWLPLGDWHG DJDLQVW FRYHULQJ VRPH SDUWLFXODU LQGLYLGXDOV´
(Hivos Kenya 2013, p.1). Under the Jubilee Alliance, there is also a practice of 
WHOHSKRQLQJHGLWRUVWRµSHUVXDGH¶WKHPQRWWRUXQFHUWDLQVWRULHV7KUHDWVWRZLWKGUDZ
government advertising and acting against the business interests of media owners 
were key strategies. Critical coverage of the September 2013 terrorist attack on the 
Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi was met with one of the most blatant and significant 
examples of government media intimidation in recent times: in October 2013, Inspector 
General of Police David Kimaiyo singled out two journalists during a press conference, 
DFFXVLQJWKHPRI³SURYRNLQJSURSDJDQGD´DQGWKUHDWHQLQJWR³GHDOZLWK>WKHP@ILUPO\´
for their investigative reports on security operations at the mall (Freedom House 2014d, 
see also Schmidt and Deselaers 2015, p.19). As Freedom House reports, the foreign 
press also is targeted. In March 2013, information ministry official Joseph Owiti 
threatened to deport foreign journalists who did not have proper accreditation, despite 
the fact that authority for accreditation rests with the Media Council (Freedom House 
2014c).24  
                                                          
received anonymous threats via text message in connection with a story that described allegations of unlawful 
shipment and sale off fertiliser that had passed its expiry date (Committee to Protect Journalists 2013b). 
23
 According to Freedom House one journalist covering the ongoing International Criminal Court (ICC) felt 
compelled to flee the country after being routinely followed and monitored by unknown individuals (Freedom House 
2014c). 
24
 In this context, the Committee to Protect Journalists reports that the tougher government stance towards the 
press appears to be reflected in its response to the documentary "Inside Kenya's Death Squads," produced by Al-
Jazeera in Qatar and broadcast on December 7, 2014. The documentary implicated the Kenyan security forces and 
foreign governments in extrajudicial killings. It included interviews with people that Al-Jazeera alleged were officers 
from special units who claimed the killings were part of anti-terrorism efforts and had backing from the British and 
Israeli governments. Although the documentary was not aired in the country, Kenyans were able to watch it via 
satellite TV and online. The government denied the claims and, in a press release, said it had instructed the relevant 
authorities to begin investigations on whether charges could be brought against the network (Committee to Protect 
Journalists 2014a). 
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This situation has led to media practitioners and organisations calling for 
measures to provide better protection for journalists. The Media Council of Kenya has 
launched WKH ³Enhancing and Up-scaling Media Safety and Journalistic 
3URIHVVLRQDOLVPLQ.HQ\DSURMHFW´ which includes the creation of safety and protection 
mechanisms (Protocols), a safety fund, trauma counselling, safety training, and 
promotes dialogue between media and security institutions. It also runs a web-based 
alert system for journalists in distress and carries out a rapid response operation for 
journalists based in Kenya (Media Council of Kenya 2015c, Schmidt and Deselaers 
2015, see also Hivos Kenya 2013).25 
The legal framework relating to actual and developing media freedom and the 
safety of journalists is reflected in the latest media freedom rankings of media NGOs. 
In the 2015 Reporters Without Borders world press freedom index, Kenya is ranked 
100 out of 180 countries. Since 2010 (when it was placed 70th in the ranking), Kenya 
has continuously lost ground; it has not been positioned so far down the index since 
2006 (Reporters Without Borders 2015a). The latest Freedom House Global Press 
Freedom Ranking caWHJRULVHGWKHSUHVVVWDWXVDVEHLQJµ3DUWO\IUHH¶DQGLQWHUQHWDV
EHLQJ µ)UHH¶ WKXV MXGJLQJ .HQ\DQ PHGLD DV RYHUDOO µ3DUWO\ IUHH¶ LQ  Having 
improved consistently between 2009 and 2012, the score declined as a result of MCA 
and KICA passed in December 2013$OWKRXJK.HQ\D¶VSRVLWLRQKDVGHFOLQHGWR
of 180 globally and the country is outperformed by 24 other African states, one should 
QRWHWKDWLQ.HQ\DQPHGLDKDGWKHVWDWXVRIµ1RWIUHH¶)UHHGRP+RXVHF
Freedom House 2014b, Article 19 Eastern Africa 2014).26 
There is a great diversity of outlets in the Kenyan media landscape. Kenya 
currently has about 100 radio stations, around 20 TV channels and approximately 20 
regularly published print products (Schmidt and Deselaers 2015, p.13). There are four 
daily newspapers, one business daily, and several regional weekly newspapers in 
Kenya. The Daily Nation has the largest circulation, followed by the Standard, Taifa 
                                                          
25
 Despite the frightening developments on journalistic safety, it is worth noting that Kenya continued to be the main 
regional country of refuge for journalists fleeing their home countries in fear of attack or imprisonment. Since 2007, 
at least 52 journalists have resettled in Kenya, but often under extreme hardship (Committee to Protect Journalists 
2013a). 
26
 It is of course important to note that these media freedom rankings can be criticised for focusing on structural 
factors based on western norms. The rankings do not measure diversity of different points of view in the media, 
with a lot of stories criticising the president, ministers, and corruption. We will come back to this later. 
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Leo, The Star, Business Daily, and The People. Weekly newspapers like Saturday 
Nation, Sunday Nation, the Standard on Saturday, the Standard on Sunday, The East 
African, as well as Citizen Express all have a wide readership (Simiyu 2014, p.126). In 
addition, a number of independent tabloids are published irregularly. Six private 
television broadcasters and one state broadcaster operate alongside a myriad of 
private and community radio stations (Freedom House 2014c). 
When considering media ownership and financing, it should be noted that 
media liberalisation in Kenya was initially a gradual process. While private newspapers 
existed under the authoritarian regimes of Yomo Kenyatta and Moi, the liberalisation 
RIWKHDLUZDYHVDQGLQWURGXFWLRQRISULYDWHEURDGFDVWLQJPHGLDRFFXUUHGLQWKH¶V
and reflected the parallel liberalisation of the political system. The first private (English 
language) FM station, Capital FM, was licensed in 1996 and was followed by a steady 
increase in numbers of other English and then Swahili language stations (Ismail and 
Deane 2008, p.322). A notable trend in media liberalisation was the introduction of 
vernacular media (Nyanjom 2012, p.26). In 2000, Kameme FM, a Kikuyu language 
station, broke the state monopoly on local language broadcasting (Ismail and Deane 
2008, p.322) and in 2004, a new law liberalised the media further, opening the way for 
a wave of new local language radio stations targeting listeners from the largest ethnic 
communities (ibid.). 
Today, there are three types of media in Kenya: state-owned media, private 
media and community media. State Ownership centres on the KBC. It operates the 
national free to air public service TV station Channel One and MW radio services (in 
both Kiswahili and English and three regional services broadcasting in a total of 17 
languages), as well as three commercial FM radio stations (Metro FM, Coro FM, Pwani 
FM), Pay TV and the movie entertainment channel Metro TV (Open Society 
Foundations 2011, pp.72±75, Nyanjom 2012, p.48). With regard to funding, the Kenya 
Broadcasting Corporation Act 1989 (as amended in 2009) states that the government 
PD\ ³PDNH JUDQWV WR WKH &RUSRUDWLRQ DV DUH QHFHVVDU\ IRU WKH SXUSRVHV of the 
&RUSRUDWLRQ´ $OWKRXJK WKH JRYHUQPHQW FXW IXQGLQJ WR WKH KBC in the 1990s, the 
Ministry of Information and Communications has granted more than KES 400 million 
(USD 4.9 million) for various purposes and projects over the past few years (Open 
Society Foundations 2011, pp.81±82). However, the Act requires the corporation to 
operate as a commercial enterprise with prescribed annual returns: addition to state 
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funding, the KBC therefore creates revenue through its commercial services by selling 
airtime through advertising, casual announcements and greetings, and renting out 
space on its masts for private broadcast transmitters. Of a total KES 31.4 billion (USD 
387 million) spent on radio, television, print and outdoor media advertising in 2009, the 
KBC¶VVhare came to around KES 800 million (USD 9.9 million).27 The Open Society 
Foundation (2011, p.83) states the KBC LV³WHFKQLFDOO\LQVROYHQW´PDNLQJORVVHVHYHU\
year and facing substantial debts.  
Private media dominate the print sector. There are also six private television 
networks. In addition to various mainstream FM stations, private enterprise has been 
the driving force of the development of vernacular radio (Schmidt and Deselaers 2015, 
p.13). Today, Kenya has about 30 vernacular broadcasting stations, providing at least 
one local language radio station for each of Kenya´s largest ethnic groups (Nyanjom 
2012, p.26, Schmidt and Deselaers 2015, pp.13±14). 
The vernacular radio is the only non-commercial community media. With only a 
handful of community radio stations, they are still an emerging element of the 
broadcasting sector and differ fundamentally from commercial FM stations in that they 
are non-profit-making, local and participatory (Schmidt and Deselaers 2015). In order 
to qualify as non-profit makiQJFRPPXQLW\EURDGFDVWHUV¶ IXQGLQJVKRXOGFRPHIURP
PHPEHUVKLS IHHV JUDQWV DQG GRQDWLRQV 6WDWLRQV DUH ³SURKLELWHG IURP FDUU\LQJ
advertising, but may broadcast sponsorship announcements and limited adverts 
VSHFLILFDOO\UHOHYDQWWRWKHFRPPXQLW\´± a clause, which has been broadly interpreted 
(Kimani 2015, p.53). 
In terms of the structure of media markets and patterns of information 
distribution in Kenya, structural conditions of journalism are influenced by the usage of 
the different types of media.  
Radio is by far the most popular medium in Kenya. Although the rapidly growing 
and changing media sector means there is little reliable data on newspaper circulation 
                                                          
27
 According to the Broadcasting Regulations 2009, however, KBC is not allowed to carry advertisements or accept 
sponsorship for programming on its public service stations such as the national English and Swahili channels, 
regional radio services or television Channel One. These services should be funded mainly by the government and 
cross-subsidisation from its commercial services (Open Society Foundations 2011, p.82). 
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and readership or radio and TV audiences, it is safe to say that almost every Kenyan 
has access to a radio and most listen to it regularly. The average listening time is high 
at 37 hours per week (Schmidt and Deselaers 2015, p.13) often occurring in a 
community setting as one radio usually serves multiple ears in a matatu or village 
(Nyanjom 2012, p.22).  
TV is the second most popular medium in Kenya and has reached 39 per cent 
of the population in the last years (Nyanjom 2012, p.24, Schmidt and Deselaers 2015, 
p.14). Both the reach of TV and the quantity of channels is likely to increase in future 
years due to the introduction and extension of the digital broadcasting signal (Schmidt 
and Deselaers 2015, p.14).  
Newspapers are not a common source of information for Kenyans when 
compared to television and radio. Figures for 2010 show that only 320,000 newspapers 
were bought daily (Simiyu 2014, p.126). While this low circulation reflects both literacy 
DQGFRVWFRQVWUDLQWV1\DQMRPSLWLVLPSRUWDQWWRQRWHWKDWDµOLEUDU\V\VWHP¶
is quite common and readers can borrow newspapers for a limited period of time in 
return for a small fee. Consequently, it is estimated that each newspaper in Kenya is 
typically read by 10 to 14 people considerably strengthening the reach of this media 
type (Schmidt and Deselaers 2015, p.14, Simiyu 2014, p.126). According to findings 
by Ipsos-6\QRYDWH.HQ\D¶VGDLO\SULQWUHDGHUVKLSVWDQGVDWVOLJKWO\RYHUWKUHHPLOOLRQ
while the weekend figure exceeds six million (Simiyu 2014, p.126).  
While offline media still predominate in Kenya, there has been a remarkable 
increase in internet access and mobile phone usage during the last few years. About 
39 per cent of Kenyans accessed the internet in 2013 making Kenya the leader in 
usage in East Africa, boasting a thriving online community including a series of critical 
blogs (Freedom House 2014c, Nyanjom 2012, p.33). The rise of internet usage is 
largely due to recent developments such as a drop in the cost of mobile phone services 
and equipment. Twenty-nine million Kenyans (70 per cent of the population) have a 
cellular service subscription and about 93 per cent of households own a mobile phone 
± compared to only 7.9 per cent able to access a computer (Committee to Protect 
Journalists 2013a, Schmidt and Deselaers 2015, p.13). However, due to the lack of 
infrastructure and poor electricity supply, distribution of internet services is still limited 
to certain areas and social groups in the country (Schmidt and Deselaers 2015, p.15). 
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The geographic structure of the Kenyan media market is, in part, 
characterised by centralisation. National newspapers and TV programmes are mainly 
based in Nairobi, though they have regional branch offices (Open Society Foundations 
2011, p.36). Of approximately 100 licensed FM radio stations that were on air in June 
2011, almost half are based in Nairobi (Schmidt and Deselaers 2015, p.13). On the 
other hand, ethnic and linguistic diversity has an impact on the media market, attaching 
target audiences to different media outlets. 28  While print publications mainly use 
English as their primary language of communication, with some media houses 
employing Swahili (thus reaching highly educated parts of Kenyan society), 
broadcasting media offer more linguistically diverse programmes. Both the KBC and 
the largest private national broadcaster Royal Media Services offer programmes in 
both English and Swahili, plus various local languages (Nyanjom 2012, p.32). Apart 
from this, vernacular radio stations attract large audiences and by 2007 held a 27 per 
cent share of the radio market (Ismail and Deane 2008, p.322, Open Society 
Foundations 2011).  
Despite the large amount of national outlets, the influence of international news 
media on the Kenyan media market is significant. International broadcasting stations 
like BBC, Voice of America, Radio France Internationale, Radio Netherlands, and 
Deutsche Welle Radio, all of which have a Kiswahili service, are widely available in 
Kenya (Schmidt and Deselaers 2015, p.14). It is likely that international influence will 
become even more important in future years due to digitisation, even more so as a 
result of the recent entry of newer, international media players such as the Chinese 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V&KLQD&HQWUDO7HOHYLVLRQ&&79WRWKH.HQ\DQPHGLDPDUNHW6FKPLGW
and Deselaers 2015, p.14, Freedom House 2014c). 
However, the pluralism of media outlets is confronted with a high concentration 
of media ownership. As Schmidt and Deselaers (2015, p.17) summarise, despite 
continuous growth in the number of media outlets, media ownership concentration and 
especially cross-media ownership continue to pose a threat to the plurality of Kenyan 
media. In fact, a handful of major players dominate the industry: Nation Media Group, 
                                                          
28
 Whereas Kenya has two official languages, English and Swahili, a large minority of people in the country rarely 
speak either and for a majority of Kenyans, these are secondary languages used as lingua franca, but not the 
preferred languages of communication. For most, the preferred language is that of their community. More than one 
hundred unofficial languages and dialects are spoken in Kenya (Ismail and Deane 2008, p.321). 
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the state-run Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, Royal Media Service, Standard Media 
Group, Radio Africa Group and MediaMax Communication Group (Schmidt and 
Deselaers 2015, p.17, Open Society Foundations 2011, pp.33±38). 
Media Concentration differs by sector, with the newspaper and TV market being 
more concentrated than radio.29 More alarming in terms of media pluralism is extensive 
cross-media ownership (Nyanjom 2012, p.31). The most striking example of this is the 
Nation Media Group which is not only the largest private media house in East and 
Central Africa with offices in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania but owns both important 
print outlets, TV channels and radio stations in Kenya.  The NMG´s flagship product 
Daily Nation accounts for a daily newspaper market presence twice that of its nearest 
ULYDOWKH6WDQGDUG*URXS¶VStandard (Nyanjom 2012, p.31). In total NMG owns seven 
newspapers, and several magazines (Simiyu 2014, p.125). Within the broadcasting 
sector, the company owns Nation TV, the second largest news channel in Kenya, QTV 
and the radio stations Easy FM and QFM. Likewise, Standard Media Group, as well as 
Media Max own both print titles and broadcasting channels. While Royal Media 
Services is not a significant player in print media RMS-operated radio stations and TV 
channels dominate the market (Nyanjom 2012, p.27; p.48). In a recent survey by 
Simiyu, over 69 per cent of polled journalists believe that media diversity is at risk due 
to trends in private media ownership (Simiyu 2014, p.139). Seventy-one per cent of 
those surveyed do not believe that Kenya has adequate media diversity in broadcast 
media and agree that legislation is needed to promote this (Simiyu 2014, p.139).  
It is true that concentrated private media can act as a check on the government, 
lying outside of direct state control. However, threats to media pluralism and diversity 
are also rooted in WKHIDFW ³WKDWPHGLDDQGSROLWLFVDUHFORVHO\ OLQNHG LQ.HQ\D´ZLWK
regard to ownership (Schmidt and Deselaers 2015, p.17), with political patronage 
being an obvious example. Political ownership in Kenya, however, has to be 
GHVFULEHG DV ³IDFWXDOO\ WUXH OHJDOO\ XQWUXH´ 1\DQMRP  DOWKRXJK WKHUH LV QR
                                                          
29
 In 2011, approximately 20 print products (daily, weekly and monthly newspapers) were regularly available in 
Kenya; the share of the biggest two dailies (Nation and Standard) and four newspapers was 81.2 per cent and 96.7 
per cent respectively (Simiyu 2014, pp.126±127, Schmidt and Deselaers 2015, p.13). The (free to air TV) market is 
concentrated most notably in terms of viewership as, in a market with around 20 TV channels in total, the four most 
popular TV stations have acquired 90 per cent of the viewers (Citizen TV: 39 per cent; Nation TV: 20 per cent; 
Kenya Broadcasting Cooperation: 19 per cent; and, Kenya Television Network: 12 per cent) (Simiyu 2014, p.127, 
6FKPLGW DQG 'HVHODHUV  S ,Q FRQWUDVW WKH UDGLR VHFWRU ZLWK DERXW  VWDWLRQV IDFHV ³PRGHUDWH
FRQFHQWUDWLRQDWWKH*URXSOHYHO³DVWKHUHDUHILYHPDLQUDGLRJURXSV, with no player having a market share above 
35-40 per cent (Simiyu 2014, p.127, Schmidt and Deselaers 2015, p.13). 
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gainsaying that the political class in the country has invested heavily in the media 
LQGXVWU\PHGLDRZQHUVKLSVWUXFWXUHV ODFNWUDQVSDUHQF\DQGSROLWLFLDQV¶QDPHVRIWHQ 
do not appear in the legal documents of the companies (Nyanjom 2012, p.36, Schmidt 
and Deselaers 2015, p.17, Simiyu 2014, pp.124±125). Documentary evidence is 
unavailable, particularly in cases where media groups have multiple shareholders, 
rather political affiliations have been assumed based on historical and current political 
alliances. This is the case for the Nation Media Group which was thought to be against 
the Moi regime and in favour of Kibaki, supporting his re-election bid in 2007 ± hence 
the assumed control of Nation Media Group by a Kikuyu elite (Nyanjom 2012, Simiyu 
2014, p.125). The Standard Group, whose largest shareholder is Baraza Limited 
(owned by the family of former President Daniel Moi), endorsed Uhuru Kenyatta in his 
race to the presidency in 2002 (Simiyu 2014, p.125, Nyanjom 2012, p.42). As Nyanjom 
(2012, p.44) summarised the situation in 2012, various politicians own FM stations, 
directly or by direct (e.g. spouses, kin) or remote proxy. In his report, he lists at least 
six declared political candidates for the 2013 elections with direct or proximate 
ownership links to media houses (Nyanjom 2012, p.46). Interestingly, the Media Max 
group, which owns the People Daily as well as K24 TV, Kamene FM, Meru FM and 
Milele FM has been associated with current president Uhuru Kenyatta although his 
ownership status cannot be confirmed (Nyanjom 2012, pp.45±46). At the time of 
6LPL\X¶VUHVHDUFKKass FM had allegedly sold a 49 per cent stake to deputy president 
William Ruto (Simiyu 2014, p.125). Ruto is also associated with Chamge FM, a radio 
station that broadcasts to a largely Kalenjin audience in the Rift Valley region. Simiyu 
(ibid., p.125) notes that four other allies of Uhuru Kenyatta have recently invested in 
the media industry in Kenya.  
These structures of media ownership impact on the orientation of media and 
its societal and political parallelism. Studies state that market-orientation seems to 
have become the paramount social focus that guides news production in recent 
years, potentially conflicting with journalistic normative ideals and reporting for public 
LQWHUHVW:DVVHUPDQDQG0DZHXREVHUYHWKDW.HQ\D¶V³HFRQRPLFOLEHUDOL]DWLRQ´KDV
DOVR OHG WR D ³FRUSRUDWLVDWLRQ DQG ILQDOLVDWLRQ´ RI WKH PHGLD GULYHQ ³E\ FDSLWDOLVW
imperativHV RI PD[LPL]LQJ SURILWV IRU LQYHVWRUV VWRFNKROGHUV DQG DGYHUWLVHUV´
(Wasserman and Maweu 2014, p.1, see also Helander 2010, p.522)  
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On the other hand, studies have confirmed a high level of political/societal 
activity and parallelism of media in Kenya reflecting ethical and political divisions in 
Kenyan society, and the political ownership of media. This tendency became most 
visible in the context of the elections held in 2007 and 2013, when it led to oppositional 
forms and outcomes in reporting.  
In coverage of the 2007 elections and post-electoral violence, Kenyan media 
clearly showed a high level of political and societal activity, engaging in political debate 
and societal developments. Several studies have pointed out that, for many journalists, 
covering the post-HOHFWLRQFRQIOLFWVLQDQGZDVQRWRQO\³SHUVRQDOO\GLIILFXOW´
EXW ³WKUHDWHQHG LPSDUWLDOLW\ LQ WKH QHZVURRP´ FDXVLQJ GLYLVLRQV DORQJ HWKQLF DQG
political lines (Bunce 2010, pp.522±523). While the majority of journalists working at 
major newspapers did an average job, some media organisations, particularly local 
ODQJXDJH UDGLR VWDWLRQV ZHUH DFFXVHG RI ³IDQQLQJ WKH IODPHV RI HWKQLF KDWUHG RI
having become politically co-opted, of marginalizing voices of reason at a time of 
ethnically polarized politics, and failing to uphold its function as a source of 
LQYHVWLJDWLRQ RI DEXVH RI SRZHU´ ,VPDLO DQG 'HDQH  SS±321, see also 
Wachanga 2011, Ireri 2013). The media was indicted as a contributor to the escalation 
of violence. One should note however, that while these accusations have been made 
by those within the media itself, the criticism of the media was also partly fuelled by 
politicians looking for a scapegoat. 
In contrast, coverage of the 2013 elections was characterised by the paradigm 
WRUHPDLQ³QHXWUDO´DQGDGRSWD³µ'R1R+DUP¶IUDPHZRUN´2OXRFKDQG2KDJD
p.120). Given the experience of postelection violence in 2007±08, many journalists 
FRYHUHGWKHHOHFWLRQV³ZLWKH[WUHPHFDXWLRQRIWHQDYRLGLQJVHQVLWLYHLVVXHVVXFKDV
eOHFWLRQLUUHJXODULWLHVDQGHYHQLQFLGHQWVRIYLROHQFH´)UHHGRP+RXVHF Many 
journalists admitted to self-regulating their reporting content in the interest of peace 
preservation ± thus committing self-censorship under the paradigm of peace 
journalism (Oluoch and Ohaga 2015). This behaviour can be considered as societal 
SDUDOOHOLVPDV LWFRQIRUPVZLWK WKH ³SHUYDVLYH µSHDFHQDUUDWLYH¶´ &KHHVHPDQHWDO
2014, p.4) mentioned above, which dominated Kenyan society at that time. 
In addition, studies reveal that partisan reporting once again guided journalists 
in 2013. In the run-up to the elections, the alignment of media owners to certain 
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politicians was very apparent. Many journalists found themselves facing a conflict of 
interest, admitting that self-censorship was necessary in order to accommodate the 
interests of their respective media houses in the election coverage (Schmidt and 
Deselaers 2015, p.17, Freedom House 2014c).  
In summary, vernacular media function is particularly partisan in Kenya. Due to 
obvious ethnic and/or political alignments, these media outlets are externally rather 
WKDQLQWHUQDOO\SOXUDOLVHG0RUHRYHUWKHVWDWH¶VQRWDEOHLQIOXHQFHLQSXEOLFEURDGFDVWLQJ
JRYHUQDQFHDQG LWV ³HPSKDVLVRQ WKHVWDWH UDWKHU WKDQ WKHSXEOLF´ 1\DQMRP2, 
S UHQGHU WKH VWDWH EURDGFDVWLQJ PHGLD ³DPHQDEOH WR JRYHUQPHQWPDQLSXODWLRQ´
(ibid., p.48). On the other hand, journalists working for (mainstream) private media face 
market pressures and the political alignments of their respective media houses, a 
particular challenge if the two fall together due to political ownership.   
Consequently, aFFRUGLQJWR%OXP¶VW\SRORJ\%OXP journalism culture 
in Kenya can most accurately be described as ambivalent, switching between critical 
and concordant, clientelist reporting. This is also reflected in the Freedom House 
UHSRUW³.HQ\D¶VOHDGLQJPHGLa outlets, especially in the print sector, are often critical 
of politicians and government actions. They remain pluralistic, rigorous, and bold in 
WKHLU UHSRUWLQJ´ ± KRZHYHU WKH\ DOVR IUHTXHQWO\ ³SDQGHU WR WKH LQWHUHVWV RI PDMRU
advertisers and influentiaOSROLWLFLDQV´)UHHGRP+RXVHF 
In fact, investigative journalism is hindered by political intimidation and the 
financial structure of the media as well as ambivalent structures relating to journalistic 
professionalism. One of the structural factors indicating the level of 
professionalisation and development of journalism as a profession in its own right is 
the condition of professional education and training.  
Scholars and Kenyan media practitioners have blamed the perceived lack of 
professionalism on the absence of professional training and orientation (Schmidt and 
Deselaers 2015, pp.18±19, Nyanjom 2012, p.34, p.58). Indeed, as Nyanjom points out, 
very many prominent members of the media sector practice without any paper 
qualifications (Nyanjom 2012, p.34, p.58). However, the first programmes of study 
were launched under the authoritarian regime of Jomo Kenyatta and the number of 
institutions offering courses in media studies has grown extensively in recent times. 
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Today, numerous schools and colleges offer both academic and vocational journalism 
education and training (Schmidt 2015, p.7). 
According to Nyanjom, in 2012 all eight public universities in Kenya offered 
degree-level media studies courses; full degrees in media and journalism are offered 
by DERXWVL[XQLYHUVLWLHV7KH8QLYHUVLW\RI1DLUREL¶V6FKRRORI-RXUQDOLVPDQG0DVV
Communications established in 1971 and Daystar University which pioneered private 
sector media studies in 1973 are both UNESCO Centres of Excellence in the field 
(Nyanjom 2012, p.34, p.60). A raft of other qualifications is offered by a vast number 
of private institutions (Schmidt and Deselaers 2015, p.18±19).  
The real challenge appears to be that the media training environment remains 
unregulated and the standard of journalism education varies considerably. Although 
the UNESCO Model Curricula for Journalism Education is taken into consideration by 
VHYHUDOLQVWLWXWLRQVDQGWKH0&.LVPDQGDWHGWR³VHWVWDQGDUGVLQFRQVXOWDWLRQZLWKWKH
UHOHYDQW WUDLQLQJ LQVWLWXWLRQV´ 0HGLD&RXncil of Kenya 2015b), various schools offer 
seemingly self-structured courses where training needs are identified in an ad hoc 
manner sometimes by unqualified lecturers, undermining sustainability (Nyanjom 
2012, p.61). Most schools and colleges offer courses that are general in nature and 
experts have claimed a need for a more specialised journalism training in order to 
mainstream topical issues and concerns such as gender, development and media 
reporting in conflict contexts (Schmidt and Deselaers 2015, p.19, Nyanjom 2012, p.61, 
Egybujor 2015).  
In terms of the level of professional organisation, several professional unions 
and media associations exist, though their role in the development of the profession 
has to be considered ambivalent as it is undermined by business interests. The Kenya 
Union of Journalists (KUJ), a statutory trade union, originally championed media 
reforms and has pioneered the search for media self-regulation; however, the 
RUJDQLVDWLRQKDVUHFHQWO\³IDGHGIURPWKHOLPHOLJKW´1\DQMRP012, p.59). As Nyanjom 
(2012) points out, ironically, this loss of influence may be due to the growth of the 
private media sector, in which competition for employment enables media owners to 
prohibit union activity. A primary non-statutory media organisation is the Media Owners 
Association (MOA), whose membership includes the most financially and politically 
powerful media houses. While the MOA has successfully campaigned for media 
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reforms (such as the Media Council Bill of 2007) and prevented some repressive 
UHJXODWLRQVLWVSULPDU\FRQFHUQLVVDLGWREHLWVPHPEHUV¶SULYDWHEXVLQHVVLQWHUHVWV
7KLVSURILWPRWLYHKDVRYHUUXQVRFLDOVHQVLWLYLWLHVDQGH[SODLQVWKH02$¶VIDLOXUHWRXVH
LWVSROLWLFDODQGILQDQFLDOSRZHUIRU³VWUHQJWKHQLQJWKHZHDNPHGLDSURIHVVional bodies, 
LQVWHDGXQGHUPLQLQJ WKHPE\ LQGXFLQJSURIHVVLRQDOFRQIOLFW´ 1\DQMRPSS±
60).  
Due to the media laws recently introduced, systems of self-control and self-
regulation have declined in the last few years. Although the introduction of the Media 
Council of Kenya by media stakeholders in 2004 was intended to prevent government 
from creating a regulatory body, in 2007 media stakeholders agreed to convert the 
MCK from a self-regulatory to a statutory body under the Media Council Bill. The Code 
of Conduct and Practice of Journalism in Kenya, which was created by media 
practitioners and stakeholders in 2001 to enhance professionalism, demands that 
.HQ\DQ MRXUQDOLVWV DQG PHGLD RXWOHWV ³RSHQO\ DFFRXQW IRU WKHLU FRQGXFW´ KRZHYHU
since it was included in the Media Council Act, the code can now be revised at the 
discretion of legislators (Maina 2015, p.32). A further example of self-regulation came 
ahead of the 2013 general election when the MCK together with the MOA and editors 
developed and signed a code of conduct to guard against their journalists fanning 
violence, as was the case in 2007 (Simiyu 2014, p.120). However, the system of self-
regulation has been undermined by the state and 59 per cent of the journalists 
SDUWLFLSDWLQJLQ6LPL\X¶VVWXG\ rate the performance of MCK as low, which can be seen 
DV ³LQGLFDWLYH RI 0&.V LQDELOLW\ DV DPHGLD UHJXODWRU WR DFW LQGHSHQGHQWO\´ 6LPL\X
2014, p.141).  
Another structural factor of professionalism is the prestige and 
competitiveness of the journalistic profession. Kenyan citizens had become 
increasingly reliant on the media following the liberalization process, investing it with 
greater credibility than almost any other source of information (Ismail and Deane 2008, 
p.320, Nyanjom 2012, p.24). The reputation of journalists, however, has been 
challenged after coverage of the postelection violence 2007/2008 was criticised (Ismail 
and Deane 2008, pp.320±321). Studies suggest that public confidence in media was 
also low at the time of the 2013 elections (Simiyu 2014).  
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Apart from their damaged reputation and the pressures from media owners to 
adhere to certain lines of reporting as well as threats from third parties mentioned 
earlier, a major challenge for journalists is low professional security, as many have 
little job security and receive low salaries. While working conditions for journalists vary 
significantly depending on the size of the media house they work for, about 80 per cent 
RI MRXUQDOLVWVDUHHPSOR\HGDV µFRUUHVSRQGHQWV¶PHDQLQJ WKDW WKH\GRQRW UHFHive a 
regular salary and depend on short term contracts. As stringers, many only get paid 
IRUSLHFHVWKDWDUHSXEOLVKHG)UHHODQFHUVRIWHQHDUQ³DVOLWWOHDV86'SHUPRQWK´
(Schmidt and Deselaers 2015, p.20, Helander 2010). This low level of security makes 
it very difficult for journalists not to respond to pressures or incentives (brown 
envelopes) and many find themselves forced to request bribes to write a story because 
they are not paid enough to survive otherwise. The economic vulnerability of journalists 
facilitates intimidation by third parties and encourages a form of self-censorship, with 
journalists only submitting pieces that they know will be published and thus will be paid 
for.  
In summary, media and journalism in Kenya face highly complex and changing 
VWUXFWXUDOFRQGLWLRQVVKDSHGE\WKHFRXQWU\¶VFRORQLDODQGDXWKRULWDULDQOHJDF\FXOWXUDO
and ethnic diversity, hybrid forms of current political governance, an ambivalent 
political culture, a complex, inconsistent legal, economic and political framework 
marked by political interference and intimidation as well as economic pressures and 
ambivalent structures regarding journalistic professionalism. 
Serbia30 
.H\WRXQGHUVWDQGLQJ6HUELD¶V31 GHPRFUDWLFWUDQVLWLRQLVWKHFRXQWU\¶Vhistorical 
development, marked by a series of wars of independence against the Ottoman 
Empire in the 1800s and 1900s, followed by unification of Serbia and other republics 
into a communist Yugoslav state in 1945 after World War Two, a development that 
stemmed out of a communist OHG OLEHUDWLRQ PRYHPHQW 6HUELD¶V WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ
therefore also needs to be understood in the context of a socially, economically and 
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 We thank our colleagues Nebojsa Vladisavljevic, Filip Ejdus, Aleksandra Krstic and Ana Stojiljkovic for their 
valuable contribution to the Serbian report. 
31
 An important point about the ethno-national composition of Serbia (population around 7.2 million) is that it is 
comprised of many minority groups and 37 ethnic groups, primarily Hungarians, Bosniaks and Roma (Marko 2013, 
.UVWLüDQG6XUüXOLMDHWDO7KHODUJHVWPLQRULW\JURXSLQ6HUELDLV+XQJDULDQDWSHUFHQWZKLOHWKH
largest portion of the population is Serb at 83.3 per cent (CIA 2015). 
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institutionally communist historical set up. With its leader, Josip Broz Tito, at the helm, 
<XJRVODYLD¶V SROLWLFDO V\VWHP ZDV ³DQ DXWKRULWDULDQ UHJLPH ZLWK OLPLWHG VRFLHWDO
pluralism, in which power was divided between the constituent republics and federal 
JRYHUQPHQW´ =DNRãHNS$IWHU7LWR¶VGHDWK LQ FRPPXQLVW OHDGHUV
considered it critical to preserve the political status quo, and in so delayed imminent 
UHIRUP<XJRVODYLD¶VVRFLDOLVWPDUNHWHFRQRP\KDGEHHQVXIIHULQJHFRQRPLFGHILFLWV
UHVXOWLQJ LQGLIIHUHQFHVDPRQJWKH UHSXEOLFV¶ OHYHOVRIGHYHORSPHQWDQG LQFRQIOLFWV
over access to investment capital. Growing dissatisfaction made it clear that reform 
needed to happen. Three different reform paths were proposed (by various republics 
and at a federal level), one of which was advocated by Milosevic and the Serbian 
Communist leadership and characterised by populist, nationalist mobilisation, which 
DFFRUGLQJWR=DNRãHNVHWWKHFRXQWU\¶VVXEVHTXHQWGHPRFUDWLFWUDQVIRUPDWLRQ
apart from that of the other republics (for further information on various reform 
SURSRVDOVUHIHUWR=DNRãHNSS±592).  
Yugoslavia began to disintegrate against the backdrop of the fall of communism 
and a slow brewing of nationalist conflicts between 1989 and 1990. Multiparty 
elections took place within the different republics and new party systems were 
established, facilitatinJ WKH EUHDNXS RI <XJRVODYLD 6HUELD¶V HOHFWLRQV DOWKRXJK
FRQVLGHUHGXQIDLUSURGXFHGWKHFRXQWU\¶VQHZOHDGHUDQGKHDGRIWKHSocialist Party 
of Serbia (SPS), Slobodan Milosevic. By 1991, the SPS had a membership of 
350,000, in contrast to 60,000 loyal to the opposition party, the Serbian Renewal 
0RYHPHQW632:LWKDFFHVVWRWKHROGUHJLPH¶VRUJDQLVDWLRQDOUHVRXUFHVDQGFRQWURO
over print and electronic media, the ruling party was able to maintain power by 
SRUWUD\LQJ WKH RSSRVLWLRQ DV ³FRUUXSW DQG TXDUUHOOLQJ WUDLWRUV RI WKH QDWLRQ´
9ODGLVDYOMHYLü  S DQG H[FOXGLQJ WKHP IURP DFFHVVLQJ PHGLD ZKLOH
VLPXOWDQHRXVO\GHSLFWLQJ WKHPVHOYHVDV ³SDWULRWLFPRGHUDWHDQGH[SHULHQFHG´ ibid. 
S 6HH DOVR *RUG\  RQ 0LORVHYLF¶V VXFFHVV LQ VXVWDLQLQJ D UHgime on the 
H[FOXVLRQ RI DOWHUQDWLYH SROLWLFV PHGLD DQG FXOWXUH 9ODGLVDYOMHYLü ibid. 2014) 
chronicles the numerous protests and demonstrations throughout the 1990s, 
ZKLFKHYHQWXDOO\OHGWR0LORVHYLF¶VRXVWLQJ 
The first of many mobilisations happened in March 1991, when thousands 
protested against the anti-opposition media propaganda, to which Milosevic reacted 
by jailing the opposition leader and banning the broadcasting of two independent TV 
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and radio stations (a ban that was lifted in 2000, following another four-day student 
march). A second set of demonstrations and protests took place in 1992 with the 
creation of a federal constitution without consulting opposition parties and the 
announcement of federal party elections. At this point a coalition of various opposition 
parties (albeit otherwise fragmented and hostile) was formed (the Democratic 
Movement of Serbia), calling for resistance and a boycott of the elections, which 
resulted in a week-long demonstration by 100,000 participant. Although these protests 
GLGQRW UHVXOW LQ WKHRYHUWKURZLQJRI0LORVHYLF¶VUXOH WKHVHFDPSDLJQVGLGKDYHWKH
effect of dividing the country into two strong political forces ± the regime, and a 
democratic opposition, now united and with a broader focus on the anti-authoritarian 
struggle (ibid,QWKHRSSRVLWLRQFRDOLWLRQµ=DMHGQR¶µ7RJHWKHU¶ZRQWKH
local elections ± a victory which the regime tried to annul through election fraud, 
resulting in further demonstrations and the eventual reinstatement of the opSRVLWLRQ¶V
victory and its control over Belgrade and other cities. It was at this time that privately-
owned media outlet BK TV moved their support from the regime to the opposition. Over 
WKH QH[W IHZ \HDUV 0LORVHYLF¶V RULJLQDO HOHFWRUDO SRSXODULW\ RI WKH early 1990s 
WUDQVIRUPHGLQWRDOHDGHUVKLSPDLQWDLQHGWKURXJK³SHUVRQDOLVWDQGDUELWUDU\UXOH´ZLWK
D ZHDNHQLQJ FRQQHFWLRQ WR VRFLHW\ FRQWULEXWLQJ WR WKLV ZDV LQGHSHQGHQW PHGLD¶V
H[SRVXUH RI KLV IDPLO\¶V H[FHVVLYH OLIHVW\OH ZKLOH 6HUELD¶V FLWL]HQV ZHUH VWUuggling) 
(ibid. p.9). Another set of protests with over 100,000 participants occurred in 1999, but 
RQFHDJDLQIDLOHGLQRYHUWKURZLQJ0LORVHYLF¶VUHJLPHSULPDULO\EHFDXVHWKHSURWHVWV
KDSSHQHG VR VRRQ DIWHU WKH FRQIOLFW RYHU .RVRYR¶V LQGHSHQGHQFH 32  and NATO¶V
ERPELQJ D VHULHV RI HYHQWV ZKLFK FRQVROLGDWHG 0LORVHYLF¶V SRZHU DW WKH WLPH
0LORVHYLF¶V UHJLPH FROODSVHG IROORZLQJ WKH 6HSWHPEHU  SUHVLGHQWLDO HOHFWLRQV
which were won by the opposition candidate Vojislav Kostunica. This time the 
opposition coalition was supported by international funding, NGOs and opposition 
PHGLDLQGHSHQGHQWIURP0LORVHYLF¶VUHJLPHZKRPRELOLVHGWKHSXEOLFWRYRWHDORQJ
with peaceful student resistance. Milosevic refused to leave office, resulting in a march 
on the Federal AssHPEO\EXLOGLQJLQ2FWREHUZKLFKOHGWRWKH³FROODSVHRIWKHUHJLPH¶V
SRZHUVWUXFWXUH´ ibidS )RU IXUWKHU LQVLJKW LQWR6HUELD¶V UHFHQWSROLWLFDOKLVWRU\
VHH9ODGLVDYOMHYLü/HQDUG&RKHQ2EVHUYLQJ WKHpost-Milosevic 
political period, during which President Vojislav Kostunica was in power, and the 
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 )RUIXUWKHUKLVWRULFDOFRQWH[WVHH=DNRãHNSS-591). 
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Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic was assassinated, Gordy (2004) highlights some of the 
dimensions and opportunities these events presented for democratic transition, and 
reasons why they were unsuccessful. During the early 2000s calls for democratic 
WUDQVLWLRQZHUHIRVWHUHGZLWK.RVWXQLFDDGYRFDWLQJDµVRIW¶RUJUDGXDOWUDQVLWLRQDQG
'MLQGMLF SURSRVLQJ D µKDUG¶ RU UDSLG DSSURDFK WR GHPRFUDWLVDWLRQ ± a disagreement 
which reflected those between VXSSRUWHUVRI0LORVHYLF¶V UHJLPHDQG WKHRSSRVLWLRQ
'MLQGMLF¶VDVVDVVLQDWLRQ*RUG\DUJXHVPRELOLVHGDUHDOLJQPHQWLQWKHSXEOLF¶V
VXSSRUWIRUDµKDUG¶WUDQVLWLRQEDVHGRQDJURZLQJSHUFHSWLRQWKDWDGYRFDWHVRIDµVRIW¶
transition were merely following in the footsteps of the old regime and purposely 
slowing down transformation. Despite this momentary shift in popular orientation, 
Gordy (ibid. p.16) suggests that its failure to become an ongoing and solid transition 
can be put down to an unwillinJQHVVRIWKH³6HUELDQSROLWLFDOHOLWHWRGHPROLVKLWVRZQ
RSSRUWXQLWLHVDQGGHYDOXHLWVRZQSROLWLFDOFDSLWDO´ 
%RWK =DNRãHN  DQG 5DPHW  H[SORUH VRPH RI WKH IDFWRUV DQG
GLPHQVLRQVZKLFKFRXOGH[SODLQ6HUELD¶VSRVW-Yugoslav transformation in contrast to 
RWKHU UHSXEOLFV QDPHO\&URDWLD=DNRãHN  ORRNVDW WKH UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ
state-building, democratisation and war, and whether or how these processes played 
DQ LQWHUFRQQHFWHG UROH LQ 6HUELD¶V DQG DOVR &URDWLD¶V URDG WR GHPRFUDWLF
consolidation, and suggests that even though both countries were affected by war, in 
6HUELD¶V FDVH VWDWH-building was attempted through nationalist mobilisation, which 
resulted in the development of authoritarian rule and slowed down the process of 
democratisatLRQ$GGLWLRQDO IDFWRUVZHUH6HUELD¶VSRODULVHGSDUW\ V\VWHPDQGD ORZ
OHYHORILQVWLWXWLRQDOLVDWLRQ$FFRUGLQJWR=DNRãHNIRXUVSHFLILFIDFWRUVGHILQHG
6HUELD¶V UHJLPHFKDQJH WKHFRPPXQLVWHOLWHFDSWXUHGE\0LORVHYLF¶VSROLWLFDOSDUW\
(the SPS which was communist in ideology in terms of wanting to retain state 
ownership while incorporating nationalist ideology); the nationalist movement; the 
centrist opposition (a coalition of parties which in essence were also proponents of 
nationalism but pro-democratic, and a set of marginal parties that fundamentally 
RSSRVHGWKHUHJLPHDQGWKHZDUDQGODVWO\WKHDUP\RI<XJRVODYLDXQGHU0LORVHYLF¶V
control (ibid. pp.595±596)33. Ramet (2011) contributes a further three dimensions to 
consider when analysing SeUELD¶VDQG&URDWLD¶VGLYHUJHQWSDWKVWRGHPRFUDWLVDWLRQ± 
                                                          
33
 For further perspHFWLYHVHH9XMDþLü ZKRH[DPLQHVDQG LOOXVWUDWHVVRPHRI WKHSROLWLFDO-cultural factors 
which defined the conflict-GULYHQQDWXUHRI6HUELD¶VVHSDUDWLRQIURP<XJRVODYLDLQFRQWUDVWWRWKHVLPXOWDQHRXVDQG
relatively conflict-free breakup of other multinational states such as USSR and Czechoslovakia. 
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WKH FRXQWULHV¶ SROLWLFDO FRUUXSWLRQ DQG FULPLQDOLVDWLRQ VWUXFWXUDO DQG LQVWLWXWLRQDO
composition, and political culture manifested through history books and media 
(propaganda) - stressing that the biggest differences between the two countries 
RFFXUUHG ZLWKLQ WKH VHFRQG DQG WKLUG GLPHQVLRQV 2I SDUWLFXODU LQWHUHVW LV 5DPHW¶V
FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI WKH FRXQWULHV¶ WH[WERRN DFFRXQWV RI KLVWRU\ DQG WKH FRQWLQXHG
LQDFFXUDFLHV QRWHG LQ WKH SRUWUD\DO RI 6HUELD¶V KLVWRU\ VWUHVVLQJ WKDW ³KLVWRULFDO
UHYLVLRQLVPLVGDQJHURXVIRUWKHGHPRFUDWLFSRWHQWLDORI6HUELDQVRFLHW\´5DPHW
S5DPHWDGGV³3ROLWLFDOFXOWXUHVHWVWKHOLPLWVRIZKDWWKHFLWL]HQVRIDFRXQWU\
can imagine for their future, and the limits of imagination have much to do with the 
OLPLWVRISROLWLFDOHYROXWLRQ´ibid. p.283). 
6WRMLOMNRYLüSURYLGHVIXUWKHUDQDO\VLVRIWKHH[WHQWRI6HUELD¶VVXFFHVVLQ
the process of democratic transition over the past two decades. Reflecting on 
HuntingWRQ¶V  FRQFHSW RI FRQVROLGDWLRQ DQG /LQ] DQG 6WHSDQ¶V  ILYH
LQGLFDWRUVRIGHPRFUDWLFGHYHORSPHQW6WRMLOMNRYLüVXJJHVWVWKUHHFULWHULDIRUPHDVXULQJ
democratic development and a further three for evaluating the democratic health in 
Serbia. The first development criterion should be the presence of a multi-party political 
V\VWHPZKLFK6WRMLOMNRYLüSDUJXHVLVSUHVHQWLQ6HUELDFODVVLI\LQJLWDVDQ
³HOHFWRUDO GHPRFUDF\´ DQG ZKLFK DOWKRXJK QRW SHUIHFW GXH WR ZHDN HOHFWRUDO
administration) is free of post-HOHFWLRQFRQIOLFWVVHHDOVR3DYORYLüDQG$QWRQLü
for discussion on electoral processes in Serbia). The second criterion measures 
JRYHUQPHQWV¶OHYHOVRIUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRWKHLUFLWL]HQVDQGYRWHUVNHSWLQFKHFNE\WKH
risk of lRVLQJSRZHULQVXEVHTXHQWHOHFWLRQVDQGKHUH6WRMLOMNRYLüREVHUYHVD
GLVFRQQHFWLQHIIHFWLYHFRPPXQLFDWLRQEHWZHHQ6HUELD¶VFLYLOVRFLHW\DQGJRYHUQPHQW
The third indicator refers to political culture ± a strong citizen participation defined by 
an active civil society as well as politically engaged and literate citizenry, which 
6WRMLOMNRYLü DUJXHV FRQWLQXHV WR EH ZHDN EHFDXVH RI DQ DEVHQFH RI D FXOWXUH RI
GHPRFUDF\VHHDOVR.LUELãRQSROLWLFDOSDrticipation and political culture in post-
communist countries, including ex-Yugoslav states). Citing Zoran Djindjic346WRMLOMNRYLü
says: 
If in addition to the project and institutions, the third part does not occur, if 
democracy does not become culture, if in the value system of a society there is 
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 Prime Minister of Serbia from 2001 until his assassination in 2003. 
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not the norm that democracy is lived as a form of everyday life, then institutions 
are worth very little and democracy will depend on the balance between political 
powers, and not the will and consensus in the society itself (2012, p.10). 
The development of this final indicator, it seems, most closely informs the evaluation 
RI WKH ³KHDOWK´ RI GHPRFracy across the further three indicators as argued by 
6WRMLOMNRYLüWKHILUVWRIWKHVHVSHDNVWR³GHPRFUDWLFVHQWLPHQW´RUWKHDWWLWXGHDQGOHYHO
RI FLWL]HQV¶ WUXVW LQ WKH YDOXHV DQG HIIHFWV RI GHPRFUDF\ WKH VHFRQG UHIHUV WR D
³GRPLQDQWOHJLWLPDF\IRUPXOD´RIDpolitical system or regime demonstrating a clear 
VWUDWHJ\ IRU WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI WKH FRXQWU\ LQ 6HUELD¶V FDVH LPSRUWDQWO\ WKDW RI
democratisation; the third indicator evaluates the legitimacy of electing people to power 
6WRMLOMNRYLü  S %DVHG RQ WKH DERYH LQGLFDWRUV 6WRMLOMNRYLü FRQFOXGHV WKDW
6HUELD UHPDLQV D ³VHPL-FRQVROLGDWHG µODFNLQJ¶ RU µGHIHFWLYH¶ GHPRFUDF\´ ± an 
assessment also observed in European Commission reports (ibid. p.13; for an 
RYHUYLHZRI6HUELD¶VGHPRFUDWLFGHYHORSPHQWLQUHODWLRQWR(8VWDQGDUGVVHH2UORYLü
 ,W LVZRUWKQRWLQJDW WKLVSRLQW9ODGLVDYOMHYLü¶VDVVHVVPHQWRI6HUELD¶V
democratic development and his argument that the concept of consolidated 
democracies creates unrealistic expectations and may not be the best concept against 
which to measure democratic progress or success. Instead, he calls for typologies 
which would allow for the analysis of democratic development to take into 
consideration its different stages and progressions (as a process of transition from one 
type of democracy to another) by focusing on the positive traits which a transition has 
achieved (and therefore avoiding perpetual disappointment). Within broader 
SURFHGXUDOGHILQLWLRQVRIGHPRFUDF\9ODGLVDYOMHYLüVXJJHVWVWKDWSerbia could 
be considered a democratic country, in so far that elections are free (of election fraud 
and threats to voters, there are no limits to political campaigning, or repression of 
access to media); freedom of speech and media has been significantly improved, and 
is equal to that in neighbouring countries (Croatia or Bulgaria) which are EU member 
countries; and lastly, despite suggestions that the Milosevic era security apparatus has 
managed to maintain its power, this does not necessarily support the argument that 
Serbia is undemocratic, but rather that this particular domain has remained unreformed 
and that subsequent democratic elites have continued to rely on these structures in 
the same way as previous socialist elites. 
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In these terms, Serbia has met several key principles of democracy, though 
further improvement is necessary, such as ensuring that political powers respect 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDODQGOHJDOSURFHGXUHV3UHVVXUHVLPSRVHGRQ6HUELD¶VSROLWLFDOOHDGHUVWR
conform to EU standards of democratic transition are often misaligned with those that 
are most immediately relevant to Serbia and reflective of standards outlined in 
democracy literature, while on the other hand, changes most pressing to Serbia are 
often not prioritised by the EU (VladisavljevLü 
,WLVZLWKWKLVRYHUYLHZRI6HUELD¶VSROLWLFDOKLVWRU\LQPLQGWKDWZHQRZPRYHRQ
WRGLVFXVV WKHFRXQWU\¶Vmedia$VPHQWLRQHGDERYH0LORVHYLF¶V UHJLPHFRQWUROOHG
much of the media space in the 1990s. The rise of nationalism empowered a regime, 
allowing the ruling political party to misuse and control the media by appointing editors 
and directors loyal to the party, adopting undemocratic media laws and using the media 
space for propaganda. The media was divided into state-owned and controlled media 
(supportive of the regime) and independent (or opposition) media which tended to align 
with the political and anti-regime opposition (and were mainly supported and funded 
by international donors). The state broadcaster RTS, and the newspaper called Politika 
were under the control of the regime. It was during this time that international donors 
started supporting the development of independent media, to counteract the regime-
aligned media. Even within the independent media camp, there were divisions between 
those who were oppositional to the extent that they aligned with the political opposition, 
and those who were independent in the sense that they claimed to practice 
professional and unbiased journalism. It was the opposition media with international 
assistance35 that sustained the revolution which led to the downfall of Milosevic and 
the regime, and with this political change the division between the media camps 
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 Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, international media assistance organizations have played a significant role in 
WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI WKH 6HUELDQ PHGLD V\VWHP LQFOXGLQJ DVVLVWDQFH LQ ³WKH DGRSWLRQ RI DQ DGHTXDWH OHJDO
framework, the establishment of regulatory bodies and practices, the transformation of the state TV into a public 
VHUYLFHEURDGFDVWHUDQGWKHHPSRZHUPHQWRIMRXUQDOLVWVDQGPHGLDPDQDJHUVWRFRSHZLWKLQWKHPDUNHWFRQGLWLRQV´
(Marko 2013, p.10). Based on his analysis of foreign donor assistance to the Serbian media (focusing on the 
Republic Broadcasting Agency, public broadcaster RTS and private TV station B92), Marko (2013) concludes that 
three forms of assistance efforts characterized the development of media during the 1990s and 2000s: vital support, 
which was concerned with helping independent media survive, support for political change, and lastly, support for 
building a long-term sustainable media. The problem with the first two approaches was that they lacked long-term 
vision for a sustainable media environment, and instead created dependency of media on external support for 
survival, and once the political changes of the late 1990s occurred, funding was often withdrawn and some of the 
media dwindled or disappeared. Following democratic changes, support received from the EU through technical or 
financial assistance, as well as expertise and consultancy, or training of journalists in professional and journalistic 
skills, was characterised by a long-term strategy. Foreign assistance failed largely because the enormous 
LPSRUWDQFHRI³HFRQRPLFVXVWDLQDELOLW\´WRWKHPHGLDZDVQRWUHFRJQLVHGGXULQJWKHV0DUNRSIRU
details on how each of the three analysed media were supported and the outcomes of that support see Marko 2013, 
p.20). 
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narrowed too. Nevertheless, by slowing down the transition process, creating media 
laws that lacked long term vision and strategy for change, or preventing the adoption 
of some laws, media development and freedom continued (and still continues) to be 
suppressed and misused by politicians, the business elite and the judiciary (Marko 
2013). 
According to the IREX (2013) Media Sustainability Index, discussions with 
Serbian media professionals36 reveal that media freedom and freedom of speech has 
stagnated, and although levels of media freedom increased between 2000 and 2012, 
the 2013 report notes a decline in 2012. Journalists are influenced by political pressure, 
which leads to high self-censorship and editors reluctant to criticise political figures and 
RIILFLDOVPHGLDSURIHVVLRQDOVDQGSDUWLFLSDQWV LQ WKHVWXG\DJUHHG WKDW ³ZLGHVSUHDG
self-censorship is obviously returning the media sector to conditions similar to the 
V´,5(;S$OWKRXJKPHGLDIUHHGRPLVFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\HQVKULQHGDQG
protected, and laws such as the Broadcasting Act and the Public Information Act are 
in line with European standards and provide a foundation for media development, 
0LOLYRMHYLü  REVHUYHV WKDW WKH SUHVHQFH RI LQDGHTXDWH ODZV DQG D VDWXUDWHG
media market continues to pose challenges for media practitioners, namely limitations 
on media freedom through the influence of powerful elites (political and economic, and 
state institutions) as well as courts where journalists are often charged with defamation 
DQGVODQGHU0LOLYRMHYLüHWDO 
Lawsuits are filed against journalists, most often by police, judges, politicians 
and businessmen and laws are not applied correctly by local court judges, or are 
misinterpreted because judges remain unaware of legal standards (for example 
defamation law, or libel law, which remains criminalised). The gap between legal 
provision and the actual practice of media freedom is widening. Local judges are also 
likely to be influenced by pressure from politicians or interest groups, and succumb out 
of fear of placing themselves in danger. Crimes against journalists in Serbia include 
assaults, threats or having their cars burned; these crimes are not prosecuted because 
WKHSROLFHDQGMXGLFLDU\RIWHQGRQRWJHWLQYROYHG,5(;VHHDOVR-DQNRYLüHWDO
2009). The combination of political pressure, physical threats and attacks, and limited 
                                                          
36
 These consist of a panel of local experts ± reporters, editors, media managers or owners, professors and human 
rights professionals ± selected from diverse media outlets, NGOs or academic institutions throughout Serbia. 
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legal protection has had the effect of restricting investigative reporting (also 
compounded by financial pressure, discussed later). Journalists and media outlets are 
often banned from press conferences (or simply not invited) depending on their 
reporting reputation or relationship with the political elite, or are denied scoops on 
exclusive stories (IREX 2013). 
Through a series of interviews and focus groups with journalists, editors and 
PDQDJHUVDQGPHGLDRZQHUVLQ6HUELD0LORMHYLüDQG8JULQLü(2011) explored the level 
of media freedom by relying on three indicators: the effect of political and economic 
pressure on the work of journalists, market conditions (expanded on later) and 
professional community standards (also discussed further on in the paper). The study 
finds that the media and its professionals still cannot be seen as practicing in an 
environment conducive to democracy building, evident in the overall politicisation of 
the media system, pressure exerted by political and economic parallelism, dominance 
of tabloidisation and sensational media, and a lack of professional journalistic identity 
H[SDQGHGXSRQIXUWKHURQLQWKHSDSHUVHH0LORMHYLüDQG8JULQLü 
As highlighted earlier (see footnote2) international media assistance 
organisations and donors played an extensive role in Serbia during the 1990s and 
2000s in supporting the development and strengthening of independent media. While 
much of this funding had initially been directed at opposition media with a view to 
providing alternative voices in support of political resistance to the regime, post-2000 
it was being redirected towards the WUDQVIRUPDWLRQRI6HUELD¶VVWDWHEURDGFDVWHU, 
µ5DGLR 7HOHYL]LMD 6UELMD¶ (Radio-Television Serbia, RTS) into a public service 
broadcaster (PSB). Thompson (2013) looks at the development of PSBs in several ex-
Yugoslav states, including Serbia, where the development of a functioning PSB was 
SDUW RI WKH FRXQWU\¶V HQJDJHPHQW ZLWK WKH (8 DQG WKHSURFHVV RI(8 PHPEHUVKLS
(Serbia became an EU candidate couQWU\ LQ6HUELD¶VVWDWHEURDGFDVWHURTS 
became a PSB in 2006, and at that point split into two services, one for Serbia and the 
other for the province of Vojvodina (Thompson 2013, p.10). According to the new 
Public Media Services Act, adopted in 2014, RTS is financed through the state budget 
and will continue to be until 2016, when subscription fees will become obligatory again.  
'XULQJWKHWUDQVLWLRQSURFHVVLQWHUQDWLRQDODVVLVWDQFHLQFOXGHG³H[WHUQDODXGLWV
technical assistance, training in journalism and management, various kinds of 
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H[SHUWLVHVDOHVDQGPDUNHWLQJ´ibid. pp.15±16). A series of surveys and interviews 
FRQGXFWHGE\.QHåHYLüZLWKSDUWLFLSDQWVLQODWHUMRXUQDOLVPWUDLQLQJLQWKLVFDVH
by the BBC) at the RTS, revealed that attendees found it beneficial. The training 
program was part of broader media reform aiming to strengthen the professional 
capacity of journalists and improve technological capacity and programming diversity, 
WKHUHE\LPSURYLQJWKHPHGLD¶VGHPRFUDWLFSHUIRUPDQFH DQGWKHFRXQWU\¶VSDUWQHUVKLS
with the EU (ibidVHHDOVR0DWLüIRUDQRYHUYLHZRI6HUELD¶VVWDWHRIPHGLD
freedom in relation to EU standards). While there is limited insight into whether RTS 
content fulfils its public service mandate, it is ³ZLGHO\ FRQVLGHUHG WR KDYH WKH EHVW
TXDOLW\ QHZV RI DQ\ 6HUELDQ WHOHYLVLRQ VWDWLRQ´ ZLWK D KLJK OHYHO RI SXEOLF WUXVW
(Thompson 2013, p.16). Funding remains a challenge due to a weak advertising 
market and low monthly licence fees. Although the broadcaster is legally independent, 
its independence from interference by political or business powers cannot be 
FRQILUPHG$FFRUGLQJWR0DWLüWKH3XEOLF%URDGFDVWLQJ$JHQF\KDVPRQLWRUHG
WKHSXEOLFEURDGFDVWHU¶VSHUIRUPDQFHLQWHUPVRI³FRPPHUFLDODGYHUWLVLQJ restrictions, 
>«@VSHFLDOSURJUDPPLQJREOLJDWLRQV>DQG@FRGHRIFRQGXFW´KRZHYHUQRDVVHVVPHQWV
KDYHEHHQPDGHRIWKHEURDGFDVWHU¶VOHYHORILQGHSHQGHQFHibidS0DWLü
(ibid., p.62) explains that media legislation at the time of writing did not feature 
PHFKDQLVPV ³WR DFFRXQW IRU IXOILOPHQW RI ZKDW WKH\ >RTS] have been mandated to 
DFKLHYH LQFOXGLQJ SURJUDPPLQJ SURGXFWLRQ LQGHSHQGHQW RI SROLWLFDO LQIOXHQFH´
Protection from political interference is insured through independent editorial policy 
and management as well as independent financing through subscriptions and 
advertising; however, these have been inadequate to ensure financial stability, while a 
ODFNRIWUDQVSDUHQF\UHJDUGLQJWKHEURDGFDVWHU¶VVRXUFHVRIIXQGLQJUDLVHVVXVSLFLRQV
that RTS LV³VXVFHSWLEOHWRH[WHUQDOLQIOXHQFHV´ibid. p.62). 
Serbia has a dual broadcasting system consisting of public service 
broadcasters and private electronic media (radio and television) ± and an independent 
regulatory body, the Republic Broadcasting Agency (RBA) (Marko 2013). According 
to Glas Srbije (Voice of Serbia), WKH5%$FKDQJHG LWVQDPH WR µ5HJXODWRU\%RG\RI
(OHFWURQLF0HGLD¶ LQ$XJXVW *ODV6UELMH LQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK WKHQHZO\
adopted Electronic Communications Act. The RBA is responsible for the distribution of 
broadcast licenses and the monitoring of media content to ensure programming 
compliance, but is seen as lacking transparency and underperforming its mandated 
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responsibilities (in spite of evidence that it is well funded and sufficiently resourced). It 
is also suspected of not being truly independent of political and economic pressures, 
evident in a lack of transparency when it comes to decision-making processes and 
criteria on broadcasting licence distribution and refusal to make licensing debt data 
publicly available. For example, the agency took licences away from some TV stations 
who owed licence fees, but wrote off the debts of others (IREX 2013).  
In 2011, a µStrategy for the Development of the Public Information System 
in SHUELD¶ to the year 2016 was initiated by a coalition of media associations, outlining 
DILYH\HDUSODQZKLFKLQFOXGHVWKHZLWKGUDZDORIWKHVWDWHIURPPHGLDRZQHUVKLS.UVWLü
0LOLYRMHYLüHWDODQG0DUNR7KHQHZPHGLDVWUDWHJ\¶VYLVLRQDLms 
WRDGGUHVVLVVXHVVXFKDV³DPHQGPHQWRIQHZPHGLDOHJLVODWLRQSULYDWL]DWLRQRIVWDWH
RZQHGPHGLDQHZUXOHVRQVWDWHDLGDQGWUDQVSDUHQF\RIPHGLDRZQHUVKLS´6XUüXOLMD
HWDOS.UVWLüSSRLQWVRXWWKDWXQWLOWKHWLPHWKDWWKLVstrategy is 
fully implemented, private broadcasters will continue to compete with state-owned 
EURDGFDVWHUVZKLFK³RSHUDWHXQGHUPXFKIDYRXUDEOHFRQGLWLRQV´VXFKDVIRUH[DPSOH
EHLQJH[HPSWIURPSD\LQJEURDGFDVWLQJ WD[HV WR WKH5%$DQGWKH6HUELDQ$XWKRUV¶ 
Music Organisation. It is important to note the process of switchover from analogue to 
digital which was originally set to take place in 2012, but due to various challenges has 
been rescheduled for mid-.UVWLüDUJXHVWKDWWKHGHOD\FDQEHDWWUibuted 
to political and legal inconsistencies as well as financial challenges faced by 
broadcasters, the complex media ownership landscape and lack of public awareness 
of digital switchover requirements. One of the first obstacles is the complexity of 
SerbLD¶VPHGLDPDUNHWDQGRXWGDWHGUHJXODWRU\ ODZVWKDWGLGQRWDFFRXQWIRUGLJLWDO
DQGWHFKQRORJLFDOVKLIWVLQWKHPHGLDEXWDUHDOVRUHTXLUHGWRSXW³RUGHULQWRWKHPHGLD
PDUNHW´ibid. p.243).  
)ROORZLQJ WKHHQGRI0LORVHYLF¶V UHJLPH WKUHHPDMRU media regulation laws 
were passed ± the Broadcasting Act, the Public Information Act, and the 
Telecommunications Act (as well as the Strategy for the Development of 
Telecommunication in Serbia from 2006 to 2010). These laws were created by media 
and legal experts as well as EU representatives, and envisioned various strategies 
ZKLFKZRXOGHQVXUHWKHWUDQVIRUPDWLRQRIWKHPHGLDV\VWHPLQ6HUELDĈRNRYLü
p.10; Veljanovski 2012). The aim of the Public Information Act was to promote the 
protection of sources, media freedom of journalists and public communications 
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participants, while The Broadcasting Act would regulate the broadcasting system and 
HVWDEOLVKDSXEOLFEURDGFDVWLQJV\VWHPDQGLQGHSHQGHQWUHJXODWRU\ERGLHV0LOLYRMHYLü
HWDO.UVWLüKLJKOLJhts some of the limitations of these laws in the digital 
switchover process: the Strategy for Development of Telecommunications stresses 
digital broadcasting as a main goal but does not provide details of the process; the 
Broadcasting Act37 was created for the purpose of regulating electronic media in the 
analogue environment; the Public Information Act, does not deal with digital 
broadcasting; and the Telecommunications Act does touch on the issue, but briefly 
.UVWLü7KHDGRSWLRQRIWKH(OHFWURQLF&ommunications Law, which provides a 
regulatory framework for media that minimises political influence on spectrum 
DOORFDWLRQZDVDVWHSLQWKHULJKWGLUHFWLRQ.UVWLü'HOD\VFDQDOVREHDWWULEXWHG
to political circumstances between 2006 and 2014, during which period several 
elections took place also resulting in changes in the jurisdiction responsible for 
GLJLWLVDWLRQ/LNHZLVH.UVWLüQRWHVWKDWWKHKLJKFRVWRIWKHGLJLWDOVZLWFKRYHU
for both broadcasters and government, has been another obstacle, as has the weak 
campaign to inform citizens and consumers about the switchover process and its 
EHQHILWV 6XUüXOLMD HW DO  DGG WKDW VXEVLG\ VFKHPHV ZKLFK ZRXOG DOORZ
households to purchase digital television sets and decoders were not implemented. 
6HUELD¶Vmedia market is saturated, the majority of TV stations are commercial 
and privately owned and approximately 70 TV stations are owned by local 
JRYHUQPHQWV.UVWLü$FFRUGLQJWR6XUüXOLMDHWDOSmedia ownership 
lacks transpDUHQF\DQGSRLQWVRXWWKDWWKHUHLVQR³SXEOLFO\DYDLODEOHUHJLVWHURIPHGLD
RZQHUV´6HYHUDOPHGLDRXWOHWVFRQWLQXHWREHRZQHGDQGFRQWUROOHGE\WKHVWDWHRU
local governments, while at the same time, commercial media ownership lacks 
transparency, and is often controlled by financial lobbies and advertisers (for a 
EUHDNGRZQRIRZQHUVKLSRIVHYHUDOPHGLDRXWOHWVLQ6HUELDLQVHHĈRNRYLü
The high media saturation has increased competition for the limited advertising 
                                                          
37
 Veljanovski (2012) observes that at the time of its establishment the Broadcasting Act did not take into account 
or adequately predict some of the limitations (and necessary solutions) which would emerge in light of digital and 
technological shifts in the media. A lack of adherence to the law and establishment of contradictory laws resulted 
in the slowing down of the transformation and finally a call for a re-evaluation of the existing law. Changes to the 
Broadcasting Act were mandated to be made in 2007 but those tasked with the responsibility realised that it was 
no longer sufficient to make amendments, but rather to create a new Electronic Media law. In line with European 
broadcast media standards, some of the changes outlined in the new law include a clear separation between the 
providers of programming (radio, television and online media) and providers of broadcast satellite/cable networks. 
Another important provision of the new law is the introduction of an electronic media agency, whose elected 
members would be diverse and representative of a variety of groups including civil society and human rights groups, 
creative industries (film, theatre and music) and national minority groups (Veljanovski 2012).  
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UHYHQXH0LOLYRMHYLüHWDO2012). Additionally, the financial crisis had a negative effect 
on the media market; during the crisis over 50 print media outlets were closed, foreign 
media companies left the Serbian market and commercial stations stopped 
broadcasting because they could no longer afford to pay broadcasting taxes to the 
5%$.UVWLü$GYHUWLVLQJUHYHQXHLQZDV(85PLOOLRQRIZKLFK(85
million went to television media, EUR42 million to print outlets, EUR8 million towards 
radio and EUR6.5 million to internet-based media. Such relatively limited access to 
ILQDQFLDOVXSSRUWPDNHVPHGLDDUJXDEO\ ³YXOQHUDEOHDQGHDV\ WRPDQLSXODWHE\ WKH
VWDWH´HVSHFLDOO\ZKHUH(85PLOOLRQRIWKLVDGYHUWLVLQJUHYHQXHFDPHGLUHFWO\IURP
the state (Marko 2013, p.16, see also BIRN 2012). This level of competition, financial 
vulnerability and active monetary support by the state arguably pressure the media to 
SURGXFH ³SRVLWLYH FRYHUDJH RI WKH LQFXPEHQW SROLWLFLDQV DQG SDUWLHV´ 0DUNR 
p.16). Overall financial sustainability of media was at its worst in 2012 with a continued 
GHFOLQH ,5(;  2Q D SRVLWLYH QRWH 6XUüXOLMD HW DO  ZULWH WKDW
telecommunication operators are among the largest advertisers in the market; 
however, it seems that they have not taken advantage of their position to exert 
pressure on the media. 
7KH%DONDQ ,QYHVWLJDWLYH5HSRUWLQJ1HWZRUN¶V %,51 RYHUYLHZRI WKH
distribution of government funding among broadcasters in Serbia highlights the 
need for these channels of allocation to be transparent in order to maintain fair 
competition and neutrality in budget distribution across the media market, ensure 
editorial autonomy, and that funding supports the production of programming content 
(as opposed to human resource costs). Among the channels of financial support are 
the Ministry of Culture and Information, various other ministries, the secretariat for 
culture and public information pertaining to national minorities, local government 
bodies, and public companies. Although consolidated figures are difficult to obtain, 
according to BIRN (2012), state budget funding contributed 15 per cent to the entire 
Serbian media market. A total of 159 media institutions receive state funding, and 
among those, electronic media (TV and radio) are the biggest, followed by print media 
(for a detailed breakdown of financial distribution according to media type, ownership 
type, regions/cities, etc. see BIRN 2012). The state bodies rely on different 
methods/models of financial allocation to media institutions, and the report highlights 
that the absence of standardisation across distribution practices results in a lack of 
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transparency. Media institutions are funded through four major models: subsidies; 
direct contracts; competition for the improvement of public information; and public 
procurement (for further breakdown of subcategories of each model see BIRN 2012, 
pp.17±32). Some media institutions in receipt of state funding are obliged to deliver 
reports (depending on type of funding model/relationship with government) outlining 
expenditure ± DQREOLJDWLRQZKLFK LVRIWHQQRW IXOILOOHG ,QDQDO\VLQJ WKH LQVWLWXWLRQV¶
financial reports submitted to the study, BIRN (2012) concludes that funding is primarily 
spent on human resources and operational costs, instead of programming content as 
LQWHQGHG ,Q KHU UHSRUW ³+LGGHQ &RQWURO´ 0DWLü  H[SODLQV WKDW VWDWH ILQDQFLQJ
mechanisms and their preferential and non-transparent funding methods are having 
the effect of subtle and indirect censorship and control, by affording those in power and 
their activities positive media portrayals (and by penalising, by the withdrawal of 
ILQDQFLDOVXSSRUWWKRVHZKRSXEOLVKFULWLFDOFRYHUDJH0DWLüSZKRDUJXHV
that the Serbian media system has not much improved since 2000, stresses that the 
FXUUHQW RZQHUVKLS DQG ILQDQFLQJ VLWXDWLRQ LV ³VHULRXVO\ GLVWRUWLQJ IUHH PDUNHW
FRPSHWLWLRQDQGREVWUXFWLQJWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIIUHHLQGHSHQGHQWDQGSOXUDOPHGLD´
In-GHSWKLQWHUYLHZVRIMRXUQDOLVWVLQ6HUELDE\0LORMHYLüDQG9RELþIRXQGWKDt 
journalists felt increased responsibility to those in power (politicians and media owners) 
DV RSSRVHG WR WKH SXEOLF EDVHG RQ QRUPDWLYH GHILQLWLRQV VHH 0LORMHYLü DQG 9RELþ
 ,Q FRQVLGHULQJ WKH +DOOLQ DQG 0DQFLQL¶V PHGLD V\VWHPV GLPHQVLRQV 0DUNR
(2GUDZVFRPSDULVRQVEHWZHHQ6HUELD¶VPHGLDV\VWHPWR WKDWRI WKH polarized 
pluralist model, as characterised by political parallelism, a strong role of the state in 
the media, and a weak development of the rational legal authority. The media 
landscape is externally pluralised and reflective of a political and ethnically diverse 
VRFLHW\.UVWLüDGGVWKDW6HUELD¶VPHGLDV\VWHPVKDUHVPDQ\FKDUDFWHULVWLFVRI
the Mediterranean media system, as recognized by Hallin and Mancini (2004) and 
PapathanassopoXORVD³WUDGLWLRQRIDGYRFDF\UHSRUWLQJSROLWLFL]DWLRQRISXEOLF
broadcasting and broadcast regulation, as well as limited development of journalism 
DVDQDXWRQRPRXVSURIHVVLRQ´.UVWLü 
The number of licensed media outlets on the Serbian market is constantly 
fluctuating. Compared to the start of the 2000s, when over 1000 electronic media 
RXWOHWVZHUH LQH[LVWHQFH0LOLYRMHYLüHWDOZULWHWKDW LQWKHUHZHUH
print media, 186 radio stations, 96 TV channels and 90 online publications, while Marko 
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(2013) reports there were 173 TV and 186 licensed radio stations in 2013 ± numbers 
which indicate a high ratio of media per capita. Consulting the Republic Broadcasting 
Agency and the Business Register Agency as sources, IREX (2013) breaks the media 
market down as follows: print, 591 outlets (including 20 dailies, 94 weeklies, 43 bi-
weeklies, and 224 monthlies); radio stations, 214 radio stations (2 public service + 4 
national coverage, 48 regional, 267 local); television stations, 111 on air, 134 licensed 
(2 public service, 4 national, 30 regional, and 98 local, plus 39 cable stations); internet, 
107 news and information sites (IREX 2013). 
Print media circulation is low and television is the most popular medium and 
the dominant form of public communication in Serbia, with almost all households 
owning a television set resulting in a 77 per cent audience concentration across major 
79FKDQQHOV6XUüXOLMDHWDO0LOLYRMHYLüHWDO&RPPHUFLDOFKDQQHOVDUH
observed to lack programming diversity and the most popular and successful content 
WHQGVWREHVHQVDWLRQDOLQQDWXUHZKLOHLQYHVWLJDWLYHUHSRUWLQJLVGZLQGOLQJ0LOLYRMHYLü
et al. 2012). Digital migration has led to a decrease in print sales; however, those 
newspapers that have migrated online have seen a rise in online visits. Growing 
segments of the population in Serbia are accessing online news, and media outlets 
DUHLQYHVWLQJPRUHLQWUDQVIHUULQJWKHLUFRQWHQWRQOLQH6XUüXOLMDHWDO:LWKWKH
help of social media, news outreach has expanded, however due to low income and a 
great digital divide between rural and urban internet access, many continue to rely on 
traditional media (IREX 2013). At the end of 2009, almost a quarter of the Serbian 
population (7.2 million) had internet access (increasing to over 40 per cent by 2012) 
ZLWKJUHDWHVWFRQVXPSWLRQEHLQJDPRQJWKH\RXWKDJHGWR6XUüXOLMDHWDO
0LOLYRMHYLF HW DO  $FFRUGLQJ WR .UVWLü   SHU FHQW RI KRXVHKROGV LQ
Serbia had internet access in 2013. With digital migration likely to continue growing, 
âLMDQHPSKDVLVHVWKHQHHGIRU6HUELDQPHGLDWREHWWHUXWLOLVHWKHLQWHUQHWDQG
social media, not only to improve the distribution of information and programming to its 
audiences, but also to boost targeted advertising, and therefore financial sustainability. 
She suggests Serbian media need to shift away from broadcasting towards 
narrowcasting, by producing programming which targets specific audiences, and 
WKHUHIRUHDGYHUWLVHUVâLMDQ$FFording to IREX (2013) media are willing to report 
on social issues such as gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity and religion, but often 
these topics are reported on in the context of accidents or extreme events. There has 
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also been a drop in cultural and educational programming, though there are efforts by 
RTV Vojvodina to increase programming on issues affecting minorities (IREX 2013). 
In 2012, the Serbian media industry had approximately 4000 active media 
professionals. Journalists regard education as an important condition for entry into their 
professional field. Just over 70 per cent of journalists surveyed in one study claimed 
to have formal education,38 0LOLYRMHYLüDQGPDQ\FRQVLGHULWYLWDOWRFRQWLQXH
attending mid-career development media training which is often offered by 
LQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQLVDWLRQV0LOLYRMHYLüHWDO7KURXJKRXWWKHVSURIHVVLRQDO
media associations were important, but remained ideologically divided (in continuation 
of political division during the regime). Nevertheless, in 2010 five different associations 
formed a media coalition aiming to draft the Strategy for the Development of the Public 
Information System in Serbia (Marko 2013).  
The Ethical Code, created in 2006, outlined professional values such as 
objectivity, independence, protection of sources and so on; however, these values are 
often violated, and most frequently by tabloids which frequently discredit or campaign 
against particular people or organisations (Marko 2013). The Press Council was 
established in 2010 to monitor media adherence to the Ethical Code and deal with 
complaints in relation to violations of the code (Marko 2013). According to a study by 
0LOLYRMHYLüEDVHGRQVXUYH\VDQGIRFXVJURXSLQWHUYLHZVZLWK6HUELDQMRXUQDOLVWVOHVV
than 2 per cent of journalists are familiar with and adhere to the principles of the ethical 
code and some of the biggest problems facing media are a lack of journalistic quality 
DQGWKHGRPLQDQFHRIWDEORLGMRXUQDOLVP0LOLYRMHYLü7DEORLGPHGLDFRQWHQWLV
populated by stories on criminal arrests and charges, used to discredit public officials. 
In a race to break stories and report scoops, journalists are failing to check facts and 
information before publishing, and often do not adhere to ethical codes. Some are even 
believed to intentionally commit ethical violations to attract public attention and 
increase sales (IREX 2013). 
Digitisation has allowed journalists greater access to diverse sources and 
LQIRUPDWLRQ6XUüXOLMDHWDO+RZHYHUDFFHVVWRWHFKQRORgical resources varies 
                                                          
38
 µ)RUPDOHGXFDWLRQ¶UHIHUVWRDFRPSOHWHGXQLYHUVLW\GHJUHH2IWKHSHUFHQWVXUYH\HGMRXUQDOLVWVSHUFHQW
completed a degree in journalism studies, 35 per cent in social sciences and humanities, and 6 per cent in technical 
and natural sciences. 
 88 
 
greatly and there can be vast contrasts between outlets, some of which rely on 
RXWGDWHG IRUPVRIFRPPXQLFDWLRQ 0LOLYRMHYLüHWDO$OWKRXJKGLJLWLVDWLRQKDV
technically given journalists greater opportunity to carry out investigative journalism, 
they remain hindered by political and economic pressures. In addition to that, increased 
GHPDQG IRU LQIRUPDWLRQ E\ WKH SXEOLF KDV IRUFHG MRXUQDOLVWV WR SUDFWLFH ³*RRJOH
MRXUQDOLVP´DWUHQGDOORZLQJMRXUQDOLVWVWRTXLFNO\UHF\FOH LQWHUnet content into news 
PHGLDSURGXFWV6XUüXOLMDHWDOS,5(;DOVRQRWHVWKDWGXHWRWKHKLJKFRVW
of news production, media outlets rely on the internet and a variety of other free 
sources, to illegally download programs (IREX 2013). Low salaries are also putting a 
strain on professionalism. In 2012, the average salary at a local media outlet was 
EUR250 per month and salaries are often up to four to seven months late (IREX 2013). 
,Q MRXUQDOLVWVVWUHVVHG WKDW µEDGVDODULHV¶DUH WKHELggest problem facing their 
profession, with only a quarter of those surveyed earning more than RSD50,000 
(Serbian dinars) per month, which at current exchange rates equates to just over 
(850LOLYRMHYLü$VDUHVXOWRIWKHGHFOLQHLQSURIHVVLRQDOLVP³WKHSXEOLF¶V
confidence in the media is becoming undermined and journalists are not seen as 
PHPEHUV RI D UHVSHFWHG SURIHVVLRQ´ ,5(;  S -RXUQDOLVWV FRQVLGHU ORZ
professional status and social reputation to be the third biggest threat to their 
SURIHVVLRQ0LOLYRMHYLü$OVRLPSRUWDQWWRPHQWLRQKHUHDUHGHEDWHVRQWKHUROH
RI FLWL]HQ MRXUQDOLVP ZLWKLQ WUDGLWLRQDO MRXUQDOLVP +HUH .UVWLü  H[SORUHV WKH
relationship between the two and their meaning for free expression within a democratic 
society, while considering traditional indicators of journalistic professionalism such as 
editorial obligations, regulation and transparency. Based on a literature review, the 
monitoring of online content and interviews with professional and citizen journalists, 
.UVWLüILQGVWKDWFLWL]HQMRXUQDOLVPFDQQRWEHVHHQWRLQWHUIHUHRUMHRSDUGLVHMRXUQDOLVWLF
norms, if it is perceived as an opportunity for participating citizen journalists to collect, 
exchange and distribute information, as opposed to perforPMRXUQDOLVP.UVWLü
VHHDOVR%RJGDQRYLü 
To sum up, against a background of the communist legacy and nationalist 
ideological conflicts of the 1990s, the structural conditions of journalism in Serbia are 
characterised by political institutions in the process of consolidation towards 
democratisation and a media system which is influenced by the state as well as by 
market-driven constraints. Thus, structural conditions indicate an increasing 
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institutionalisation of professional and independent journalism, as well as in many 
respects, fragility and ambivalence. Media and journalism are in line with the ongoing 
democratic process though do little to push it forward. 
South Africa39  
Dutch settlers first arrived in South Africa in 1652. In 1800 the first newspaper 
was established, and 20 years later freedom of the press was introduced (adapted 
from the British Great Charter). The Union of South Africa, made up of Cape, Natal, 
Free State and Transvaal was founded in 1910. In 1913, the Black Land Act was 
legislated, marking the beginning of segregation for all people of colour, a process that 
ZDV ³IRUPDOO\ OHJDOL]HG LQWR DSDUWKHLG´ DQ authoritarian regime) in 1948 when the 
National Party came into power (Wasserman and de Beer 2005, p.196). In 1960, sixty-
nine people were killed in police clashes during the Sharpeville demonstration against 
pass laws 40  after which the anti-apartheid movement shifted from non-violent 
resistance to armed struggle, leading to the imprisonment of African National Congress 
(ANC) leader, Nelson Mandela in 1963. The ongoing liberation movement was marked 
by another historically significant protest on 16 June 1976, known as the Soweto 
uprising, during which thousands of high school students marched peacefully against 
the introduction of Afrikaans as the language of instruction at school, but were met with 
armed police. The brutality of the event, which received international exposure, 
³VLJQDOOHGWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKHHQGRIDSDUWKHLG´± a two-decade-long process which 
culminated in 1994 with the first democratic elections and the election of Nelson 
Mandela as president (Wasserman and de Beer 2005, p.196). In 1996, a democratic 
constitution was adopted, guaranteeing freedom of expression. 
6RXWK$IULFD¶Vdemocratic transition from apartheid to democracy began almost 
simultaneously alongside the democratisation processes in post-communist Eastern 
(XURSHVKRUWO\DIWHUWKHIDOORIWKH%HUOLQ:DOOEULQJLQJZLWKLW³SROLWLFDOSOXUDOLVPIUHH
PDUNHW HFRQRPLFV DQG PHGLD OLEHUDOL]DWLRQ´ DQG PDNLQJ WKH FRXQWU\ DQ LQWHUHVWLQJ
case for comparative analysis with other emerging democracies (Wasserman 2010, 
p.568). Bond (2004) highlights some of the events and decisions that in many ways 
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 We thank our colleagues Herman Wasserman, Tanja Bosch and Wallace Chuma for their valuable contribution 
to the South African report. 
40
 An internal passport system which limited the movement of black South Africans 
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GHWHUPLQHGWKHQDWXUHDQGGLUHFWLRQRI6RXWK$IULFD¶VWUDQVLWLRQ and subsequently saw 
the country go from racial apartheid to one defined by class. The transition, 
characterised by the adoption of neoliberal policies, failed to address the fundamental 
and structural wealth gap between the black majority and white minority (which was 
allowed to retain ownership of the mines, large portions of the best land, and financial 
institutions). Bond (2004) explains that one of the first decisions that led to 
socioeconomic inequality was the decision by the then interim government to accept a 
loan from the International Monetary Fund which came with a set of conditions, 
includiQJFXWV WRSXEOLF VHFWRUZDJHV7KHVHFRQGGHFLVLRQ LQYROYHG6RXWK$IULFD¶V
implementation of an economic strategy built on a World Bank econometric model, with 
a promise to create 400,000 jobs every year. The strategy did not benefit anyone other 
than priYDWH EXVLQHVVHV DQG WKH FRXQWU\ KDV VLQFH H[SHULHQFHG ³V\VWHPLF
underdevelopment and segregation of the oppressed majority through structured 
HFRQRPLF SROLWLFDO OHJDO DQG FXOWXUDO SUDFWLFHV´ %RQG  S ,QVWHDG RI MRE
creation, the economic model saw unemployment rise in the decade that followed, 
primarily affecting the black population, while white people continued to thrive 
economically due to the post-apartheid transition deal affording them continued 
ownership of economic institutions. Poverty increased, as well as the cost of water, 
electricity and telecommunications. These basic amenities were disconnected from 
many homes, or residents were evicted. Public health services have declined due to 
healthcare privatisation, while male unemployment and the feminisation of poverty has 
led to an increase in violence against women (ibid.). Another proposal (made by the 
World Bank) rejected the development of public housing (because of a reliance on 
commercial instead of state development) ± an initiative that would have enabled the 
socially and economically disadvantaged to reside across various parts of the city ± 
but has instead forced the poor to live on the peripheries of urban and rural areas, 
resulting in a form of residential/class apartheid (ibid.). Duncan (2000) observes a 
FRQWUDGLFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VTXHVWIRUQDWLRQ-building while pursuing a neo-
OLEHUDODSSURDFKWRWUDQVIRUPDWLRQDQGDUJXHVWKDW6RXWK$IULFD¶VGHYHORSPHQWQHHGV
WREHLQIRUPHGE\DQ³HFRQRPLFMXVWLFH´SHUVSHFWLYHZKLch would address the cause of 
racial and gender inequality, and would shift away from the argument and conviction 
that the only way for the country to transform is to continue to be part of the 
³FRPSHWLWLYHQHVVUDFH´'XQFDQS 
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It is within these historical developments and the consequent social and 
economic reality that the media in South Africa negotiate their democratic role and 
responsibility. During apartheid, media freedom was restricted through censorship and 
threat of imprisonment, and journalists were forbidden from quoting or using pictures 
of anti-DSDUWKHLGOHDGHUV7KHRXWFRPHRIWKHVHPHDVXUHVZDVDQ³HVVHQWLDOO\:KLWH
public sphere, polarized along ethnic lines with an English press tied to capital putting 
forward a liberal critique in terms of human rights (rather than structural inequalities) 
DQGDODUJHO\VXEVHUYLHQW$IULNDQHUQDWLRQDOLVWSUHVVVXSSRUWLYHRIWKHDSDUWKHLGVWDWH´
(Wasserman and de Beer 2005, p.196). Even though the media contributed to a 
peaceful first election, it was biased in its representation of political choices to South 
African voters, which could be attributed to the fact that media content remained largely 
characterised by white values (Duncan 2000). Top editorial and sub-editorial positions 
and newsrooms continued to be largely occupied by white, male journalists (Berger 
1999), and the media was politically polarised, with English and Afrikaans press being 
the most dominant and supportive of their respective political parties; only the Mail & 
Guardian and Sowetan backed the ANC (Wasserman and de Beer 2005). The 
transformation of editorial appointments along racial and gender lines was slower for 
print than for broadcasting but eventually black journalists (men and women) took up 
these positions (Wasserman 2010) and print content began to feature images and 
voices of black citizens (Berger 1999). Since the collapse of apartheid, in response to 
data showing that 50 per cent of Cape Town-based newsrooms were white, with 
Johannesburg the exception where more than 50 per cent were black, and Durban 
where 51 per cent of reporters were women, the ANC has been calling for the 
transformation of race and gender representation in the media industry (Daniels 2013, 
p.23). A 2013 study looking at the gender and race breakdown across newsrooms of 
major, largely Johannesburg-based media houses (CNBC Africa, Eyewitness News, 
City Press, Mail & Guardian, Sunday Times, Beeld, SABC, The Witness and the 
Sowetan), found that 61 per cent of journalists were black (African, Coloured, Indian), 
and 49 per cent were women, while 55 per cent of editors were black and 55 per cent 
were male (Daniels 2013, p.22). Looking at the racial and gender diversity of editors 
across the country showed further imbalances, where out of 49 editors, 23 were white 
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and 29 were male (Daniels 2013, p.22). (For a detailed breakdown of employment 
equity policies and gender/race distributions per media house see Daniels 2013).41  
Relying on political discourses, Berger (1999) suggests four different 
perspectives from which to analyse the role of media in South Africa post-1994, 
DJDLQVW LWV UROHXQGHUDSDUWKHLGEHDULQJ LQPLQGWKDW ³« WKHPHGLDGRHVQRWDQG
FDQQRWVWDQGRXWVLGHRI WKHVRFLDO UHODWLRQVZLWKLQZKLFK LWRSHUDWHV´DQG WKDWDQ\
analysis of South AfriFD¶V PHGLD SRVW-DSDUWKHLG WKHUHIRUH QHHGV WR ³IRFXV RQ WKH
H[SHFWHG LQGHHG LQH[RUDEOH DOLJQPHQW RI PHGLD WR WKH FKDQJHG SRZHU VWUXFWXUH´
including racial make-up of media ownership and professionals ± journalists and 
editors (Berger 1999, p.83). Using the first perspective, Berger (1999) argues that the 
media was ³DIDFWRULQWKHSURGXFWLRQDQGUHSURGXFWLRQRIDUDFLVWDXWKRULWDULDQV\VWHP´
(ibid., p.82) and in this sense, an essential part of the political and legal system, which 
was reflected in the medLD¶V³RZQHUVKLSDQGFRQWUROUHYHQXHVWUHDPVVWDIILQJFRQWHQW
DQGDXGLHQFHV´ibid.S,QFRQWUDVWHYDOXDWLQJWKHPHGLD¶VUROHLQSRVW-apartheid 
6RXWK$IULFD UHTXLUHVH[DPLQDWLRQRI WKHQDWXUHRI WKHPHGLD¶V UHODWLRQVKLSZLWK WKH
new system by evaluating whether it is genuinely part of a democratic transformation, 
RUPHUHO\ ³VHUYLFLQJDQHZ UXOLQJFODVVDOOLDQFH´ ibid., p.83). A possible conclusion 
here is that the media has not made enough of a shift and contribution to the new 
South Africa in terms of building up democracy (ibid. 1999). 
The second perspective considers the media during apartheid as having played 
the UROHRI³UHVLVWLQJDQGRUUHIRUPLQJWKDWV\VWHP´ (Berger 1999, p.82). Relying on this 
perspective would inform post-apartheid analysis differently: the media is seen as 
having acted as the fourth estate, characterised by autonomy and professional 
journalistic values. Therefore, in evaluating the post-apartheid media, one would have 
to ask whether the media continued to exercise the same liberal values or succumbed 
WR WKH ³LOOLEHUDO SUHVVXUHV RI D QHZ JRYHUQPHQW´ ibid., p.84). Here two assertions 
emerge: that media aligned with the new system and failed to play a democratising 
role; and that it exposed flaws in the new government (ibid. 1999). 
The third perspective argues that the media, which once enjoyed its place in the 
privileged apartheid system, took on a critical watchdog role once that privilege was 
                                                          
41
 According to StatsSA 2014 demographics, 80% of the South African population is black, 4.77 million is coloured, 
4.55 million is white, and 1.34 million is Asian/Indian. Over 51% of the total population is female (Stats 2014, p.7). 
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taken away ± not because of a responsibility to support or reinforce the new ruling 
power but because of vested interests reflected in the ownership of media. Here the 
suggestion is that the media did not support the interests of democracy either during 
or after. 
The fourth perspective argues that media, who felt their role was to be critical of 
apartheid governments and systems, became ³¶UHGXQGDQW¶RQFH WKHQHZO\HOHFWHG
democratic government came into power, raising the question whether journalists who 
opposed the old government should automatically support the new one. Berger (1999) 
concludes that the media carried their critical role over to the new system and 
inadvertently hindered democratic growth by opposing the new government.  
Overall, the first two perspectives could be seen as having contributed to 
democratic transformation, while the second two hindered it. At the same time, in 
observing elements of all of the above four perspectives emerging and interplaying, it 
EHFRPHVFOHDUWKDWDWWKHWLPHRI%HUJHU¶VVWXG\WKHPHGLDZDVFRPSOH[DQGLWVUROH
overlapping and contradictory (Berger 1999). 
A topic dominating debates within South African journalism scholarship is the 
TXHVWLRQRIWKHPHGLD¶Vrole and responsibility  in facilitating the ongoing consolidation 
and deepening of democracy in South Africa; a discussion evolving against the 
EDFNJURXQG RI WKH FRXQWU\¶V DXWKRULWDULDQ SROLWLFDO KLVWRU\ UDFLDO VHJUHJDWLRQ DQG D
racially, culturally, religiously and linguistically diverse society, within a population of 
approximately 54 million people and 11 official languages (StatsSA 2014). 
6RXWK$IULFD¶VPHGLDV\VWHPLVEDVHGRQWKH%ULWLVK-American media system of 
democratic libertarianism (Wasserman and de Beer 2005). Since the first democratic 
elections, remarkable political changes have had a significant effect on the 
reorganisation of media and civil society structures; a process which has rendered the 
PHGLDLQ6RXWK$IULFDERWK³DVLWHDQGDQDJHQWIRUFKDQJH´:DVVHUPDQS
,QPDQ\ZD\VWKLVUHIRUPKDVDOORZHGWKHPHGLDWR³HPHUJHDVDSROLWLFDOSOD\HULQ
WKHLURZQULJKW´ and take on the quasi role of opposition to the ruling ANC party. This 
in turn encourages the government to validate their interventions in the media, such as 
threatening to pull advertising (ibid., p.573). Based on interviews with journalists and 
political actors in South Africa (and Namibia) which explored their understanding of 
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freedom of speech, democratic role and responsibility of the media, Wasserman (2010) 
found that the most important role and responsibility of journalists was to act as a 
watchdog and opposition to the government (ibid. 7KHµZDWFKGRJ¶UROHKDVEHHQ
so tightly defined and fiercely defended that the media has often been perceived as 
DQWDJRQLVWLF DQG ³VHHQ WR XQGHUPLQH WKH IUDJLOH WUXVW LQ D QHZ JRYHUQPHQW´ (ibid., 
p.569).  
Ongoing debates on the responsibility and role of media have progressed 
alongside emerging definitions of what might be a useful ethical framework guiding 
South African media. The relationship between the new government and the media 
has been strained and characterised by clashes over respective perceptions of their 
roles in transforming post-DSDUWKHLGVRFLHW\7KHGHILQLWLRQRIWKHPHGLD¶VUROH± that is, 
ZKHWKHU LW VKRXOG DFW LQ WKH µSXEOLF LQWHUHVW¶ RU WKH µQDWLRQDO LQWHUHVW¶ ± has been 
contested and debated against the normative ethical frameworks of libertarianism and 
communitarianism (Wasserman and de Beer 2005). Wasserman and de Beer (2005) 
propose conceptual clarification of the relationship between the two, and finding the 
middle ground within a framework of mutualism; a space where the two established 
concepts, overlap (ibid. 2005). While it is still unclear whether an orientation towards a 
SXEOLF RU QDWLRQDO LQWHUHVW IRFXV ZRXOG EH RI JUHDWHU EHQHILW WR WKH FRXQWU\¶V
transformation, national interest is often understood in the context of apartheid era 
government control of media, and is therefore looked upon unfavourably by the media 
who defend their independence and ability to self-regulate under the public interest 
concept (ibid. 2005). South AfriFD¶V GHPRFUDWLVDWLRQ SURFHVV DFFRPSDQLHG E\ D
liberalisation / commercialisation / marketisation of media, has seen the media 
driven by economic imperatives over responsibilities to the public or community which 
would be encouraged by an ethical framework RI FRPPXQLWDULDQLVP 7KH PHGLD¶V
reorientation towards the market has been criticised for privileging those in a position 
to access the media - reinforcing elite voices and narrow interests while marginalising 
others - and appears to be at odds with the mHGLD¶VSRVW-apartheid vision of promoting 
social cohesion and nation building (ibid. 2005). Wasserman and de Beer (2005) call 
IRU DQ HWKLFDO IUDPHZRUN UHVHPEOLQJ ³civic journalism´ JXLGHG E\ D ³SHRSOH-centred 
DSSURDFK´± an approach that emphasises the medLD¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRWKHSXEOLFE\
devoting attention to the needs of the marginalised and poor, not only as watchdogs 
RIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSHUIRUPDQFHDQGDFFRXQWDELOLW\WRWKHSXEOLFEXWDOVRDVVROXWLRQ-
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VHHNHUVWRVRFLHWDOLVVXHV³:LWKLWVHPSKDVLVRn participation and interdependence, 
journalists working according to this normative framework will not only highlight 
SUREOHPVDQGFRQIOLFWVEXWDOVRDWWHPSWWRILQGVROXWLRQVIRUWKHSUREOHPVRIµRUGLQDU\
SHRSOH¶´ibid. 2005).   
Adding to this, Blankenberg (1999) and Hyde-Clarke (2011) suggest the 
relevance of liberation journalism and peace journalism practices. Blankenberg (1999) 
explores some defining elements of the philosophy of Ubuntu, and how it might be 
relevant to the development of a form of journalism that is of value to South Africa, and 
globally. Ubuntu could be used as a foundation for liberatory or liberation journalism 
(borrowing elements of participatory communication and development journalism) 
which in its ideal would combine various roles: facilitator of participation in political and 
public spheres; mediator of conflict; catalyst for development of critical consciousness 
(the empowerment of people to think critically about surrounding power dynamics); and 
storyteller, where ultimately the information received from the people is also returned 
to and for the people (ibid. 1999). Hyde-Clarke (2011) argues that there is a need for 
South African journalists to employ peace journalism practices especially when 
reporting on issues of race, adGLQJWKDWFRPPHUFLDOPHGLDRIWHQUHO\RQ³VHQVDWLRQDO
DQG LQIODPPDWRU\ GLVFRXUVH´ LQ RUGHU WR DWWUDFW DXGLHQFHV ibid. p.41). Hyde-Clarke 
(2011) analyses media coverage of a controversial political figure, Julius Malema, 
known for his antagonistic discourse, to evaluate whether the media narrative is conflict 
driven, and if so, whether peace journalism could be a solution (ibid. 2011). Terms 
considered as markers of conflict discourse and found in the monitored media were: 
attacks, threat, factions, battle and warnings, as well as power struggles, internal 
GLIIHUHQFHVDQGGLYLVLRQV7KHWHUPVµUDFLVP¶DQGµKDWHVSHHFK¶DSSHDUHGLQDOPRVW
half of the entire sample. The author argues that in a sensitive and fragile democratic 
environment such as South Africa, use of conflict discourse and media frames, is 
³KLJKO\ SUREOHPDWLF´ EHFDXVH RI LWV ³SRWHQWLDO WR VWLU XS SXEOLF RXWUDJH DQG SRVVLEOH
YLROHQWDFWLRQ´ibid., p.49). Alternatively, peace journalism practices would avoid use 
of inflammatory language which appears to take sides, and rather seek peaceful 
solutions and alternate sources (not just official ones) and highlight peaceful initiatives.  
6RXWK$IULFD¶VPHGLDV\VWHP LV highly legalised and self-regulated, bodies 
such as South African National Editors Forum (SANEF) protect media freedom and 
the South African Press Council regulate ethical conduct. Despite this, government 
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and political actors are often perceived as exerting pressure on both independent 
media and the public broadcaster, the South African Broadcasting Corporation 
(SABC), through accusations of interference in governance and editorial decisions, 
DQGE\VXEWO\SUHVVXULQJMRXUQDOLVWVDQGHVSHFLDOO\EODFNMRXUQDOLVWVH[SHFWHGWR³WRH
WKH OLQH´ DQG SOD\ D UROH LQ ³QDWLRQ EXLOGLQJ´ :DVVHUPDQ 0, p.573). The Press 
Council, which has received an increasing number of complaints each year, (nearly 
300 in 2012 compared to 150 in 2009), has faced criticism by the ruling party for being 
³WRRWKOHVV´ WKDW LV ODFNLQJ WKH ³SRZHU WR VDQFWLRQ WKH SUHVV LQ D PHDQLQJIXO ZD\´
(Daniels 2013, p.46), leading to a proposal by the government to establish a statutory 
media regulation body, the Media Appeals Tribunal. The proposal was rejected and 
criticised by journalists and the media industry as an attack on media freedom 
(Wasserman 2010). (For further analysis of complaints to the Press Council, outcomes 
of rulings and nature of resolutions see Daniels 2013). The first of two reviews into the 
system of press regulation took place in 2011 and was carried out by the Press Council 
LWVHOIUHVXOWLQJLQDUHSRUW³UHDVVHUWLQJWKHSULQFLSOHRIVHOI-UHJXODWLRQ´'DQLHOV
p.47). The second review, initiated by the Press Freedom Commission, an 
independent body set up by Print Media South Africa and the South African National 
(GLWRUV¶)RUXPZDVWDVNHGWR³LQYHVWLJDWHWKHEHVWSRVVLEOHUHJXODWRU\V\VWHPVXLWDEOH
IRUWKH6RXWK$IULFDQSULQWPHGLD´FDOOLQJIRUD³V\VWHPRIFR-UHJXODWLRQ´,5(;
p.376). The South African Press Council has led reforms on the establishment of the 
co-regulation system which allows the public and media equal representation within 
WKHFRXQFLODQGJUHDWHURSSRUWXQLW\ WR ³DSSHDOGLUHFWO\ WRRUGLQDU\FRXUWV´ )UHHGRP
House 2015b). Most recently, a Press Council Appeals Panel has called on the ruling 
party to publish an official document outlining the intentions of the Media Appeals 
Tribunal to initiate informed public debate (ENCA 2015).  
Journalists interviewed by Wasserman (2010) stressed that the 
commercialisation of, and state intervention in SABC was threatening press freedom. 
$OWKRXJK 6RXWK $IULFD¶V SUHVV IUHHGRP SURJUHVV LQ  ZDV ³PDUNHG E\ ODXGDEOH
OHJLVODWLYHGHYHORSPHQWV´QDPHO\WKHGHFLVLRQE\3UHVLGHQW=XPDQRWWRVLJQLQWRODZ
the Protection of Information Bill) and saw South Africa rise 11 places to 42nd in the 
World Press Freedom Index (Reporters without Borders 2014b), according to Freedom 
House (2015b) press freedom has declined in recent years. There is growing pressure 
from political and economic actors
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DVDQ³XSWLFN LQYLROHQFH´ibid. 2015b) marked by the killing of a journalist, the first 
such incident since the democratic elections in 1994. Based on data collected by the 
Committee to Protect Journalists, four journalists have been killed since 1992, two of 
these deaths being classified as murder, one in 1993 and another in 2014 (CPJ 2015). 
According to IREX (2012), between 2011 and 2012, 12 journalists and photographers 
reporting from crime scenes were ³GHWDLQHG DQG DUUHVWHG´ MRXUQDOLVWV KDYH
experienced harassment while attending political conferences and there have been 
FODLPV WKDW LQYHVWLJDWLYH MRXUQDOLVWV¶ SKRQHV KDYH EHHQ WDSSHG ibid., p.378). 
Journalists have been intimidated and forced by the police to delete photos (CPJ 
/HJLVODWLRQVXFKDVWKH/DZRQ$QWLWHUURULVPSUHYHQWVWKUHDWVWRWKHµQDWLRQDO
LQWHUHVW¶ E\ UHVWULFWLQJ MRXUQDOLVWV¶ UHSRUWLQJ RQ VHFXULW\ RU SHQDO LQVWLWXWLRQV 7KH
coverage of political or business actors carries the risk of fines or legal action 
(defamation), while the National Key Points Act prohibits journalists from accessing, 
photographing or conducting investigations in a number of locations such as President 
=XPD¶V1NDQGODKRPHZKLFKZDVFRQWURYHUVLDOO\UHPRGHOOHd at an estimated cost of 
over US$200 million (Freedom House 2015b). Until the start of 2015, the list of national 
key points was not publicly available, meaning journalists could be arrested for 
accessing a restricted location unknowingly. Even after local civil society organisations 
VXFFHVVIXOO\FDPSDLJQHGIRUWKHGRFXPHQW¶VSXEOLFUHOHDVHWKHOLVWLVLQFRPSOHWHDQG
contradicts prior declarations of key points (Right to Know 2015). In 2014, a journalist 
was detained for taking photographs of one such national key point (a coal silo collapse 
at a power station) and was only released once copies of his press credentials were 
made by officials.  
Applications under the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA), which 
allows members of the public to request access to information held by the State or any 
private and public institutions, were granted in 16 per cent of cases between August 
2012 and July 2013 (Freedom House 2015b). Approval of access was a slow and 
stalled process, viable only to journalists working on investigative stories with extended 
deadlines (IREX 2012, p.378). The Protection of State Information Bill, dubbed the 
µ6HFUHF\ %LOO¶ PDQGDWHG WR SURWHFW FODVVLILHG LQIRUPDWLRQ DQG QDWLRQDO VHFXULW\ LV
perceived to be in direct conflict with the 3$,$ 7KH %LOO ³DLPV WR UHJXODWH WKH
classification, protection, and dissemination of state information [and] gives ministers 
WKHSRZHUWRFODVVLI\GRFXPHQWVDVVWDWHUHFRUGV´ibid. p.373) and threatens up to 25 
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\HDUV¶LPSULVRQPHQWIRUMRXUQDOLVWVIRXQGLn possession of information deemed by state 
DJHQFLHV DV FRPPXQLFDWLQJ LVVXHV RI µQDWLRQDO LQWHUHVW¶ )UHHGRP +RXVH E
Following ongoing debates and numerous reviews and amendments over the past five 
years, in April 2015 the bill was voted through parliament and passed on to President 
Zuma to sign into law, while media practitioners and civil society organisations continue 
WRDSSHDORQ WKHJURXQGVRI WKHELOO¶VDOOHJHGXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO3UHVV
Institute 2015; IREX 2012) and the risk of iWVPLVXVHWR³FRYHUXSFULPHDQGFRUUXSWLRQ
E\JRYHUQPHQWRIILFLDOV´)UHHGRP,QIR 
%HUJHU  GHVFULEHV 6RXWK $IULFD¶V KLVWRULFDO media ownership as an 
oligopoly, made up of state-owned broadcasters and a privately-owned print industry 
dominated by English and Afrikaans language newspapers. After 1994, the 
introduction of foreign ownership to the media landscape resulted in an increase in 
newspaper titles, racial diversification of ownership (media were increasingly owned 
by black professionals) and greater competition (for detailed breakdown of newspaper 
titles and ownership at that time see Berger 1999, pp.97±98). Media ownership 
restructuring was seen as proof of a political transition happening in line with 
democratic principles, resulting in a media industry which, although free and pluralised, 
FRQWLQXHV WR UHLQIRUFH ³VRFLHWDOSRODUL]DWLRQVRI WKHSDVW´ :DVVHUPDQDQGGH%HHU
2005, p.38). A vision for post-apartheid media in South Africa was one that would serve 
DVDVSDFHIRU³QDWLRQDOXQLILFDWLRQDQGGHPRFUDWLFFLWL]HQVKLS´%DUQHWWS
However, the legacy of apartheid means that structural limitations created by 
separating broadcast programming along linguistic, cultural and racial lines continue 
to affect the media by creating a fragmented media market and audience. Radio and 
television were not equally distributed geographically, with urban areas having greater 
access to broadcast signal and programming than rural (and often poorer) areas. More 
money was invested in broadcasting services targeted at white audiences, and 
programming content was aimed at black and white audiences separately. On this 
EDVLV 6RXWK $IULFDQ EURDGFDVW PHGLD ³KDV QRW EHHQ RUJDQL]HG HLWKHU FXOWXUDOO\ RU
technologically to provide a common space of communicatiRQ´%DUQHWWS
The South African media market remains racialised and class-determined, with tabloid 
newspapers mainly targeted at a black audience, challenging the extent to which the 
PHGLD¶V SRVW-apartheid diversification and pluralisation has contributed to the 
construction of a participatory and democratic public sphere (Wasserman and de Beer 
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2005). The bulk of the media is owned by four companies: Times Media Group, 
Independent News and Media, Media 24 and Caxton/CTP, alongside TNA Media 
which owns The New Age newspaper, Primedia and Kagiso which dominate radio, 
Sabido Investments which own e.tv and eNCA, and Naspers-owned DStv, as well as 
smaller independent media houses (Freedom House 2015b; IREX 2012; Daniels 
2013). In 2012 and 2013 two major ownership changes occurred when Independent 
Newspapers were sold to Sekunjalo Independent Media and Avusa was bought out by 
Times Media Group (Daniels 2013). According to Freedom House (2015b), ownership 
of private media is increasingly dominated by government allies, bringing with it 
growing political interference. One such case is the newspaper publisher Independent 
News and Media South Africa whose change in ownership in 2013 resulted in several 
editors and journalists leaving or being fired (Freedom House 2015b). Alongside calling 
for race and gender transformation within newsrooms, the ruling party has criticised 
WKHSULQWPHGLDVHFWRU IRUEHLQJ ³KLJKO\FRQFHQWUDWHG´DQG ODFNLQJEODFNRZQHUVKLS
which, according to Media Development and Diversity AgHQF\¶V VWDWLVWLFV LQ 
stood at 14 per cent (Daniels 2013, p.4). Further highlighted imbalances in the print 
media industry were a lack of diversity of voices, marginalisation of rural and poor 
communities and white-dominated ownership, which trickled down into selection of 
issue coverage; all these challenges were noted and measures to tackle them were 
WDNHQE\WKHµ3ULQWDQG'LJLWDO0HGLD7UDQVIRUPDWLRQ7DVN7HDP¶LQVWLWXWHGLQE\
industry bodies following the parliamentary Communication PortfoliR &RPPLWWHH¶V
emphasis on the need for a Media Charter (Daniels 2013, p.4). (For a breakdown of 
responses by individual print media members see Daniels 2013, pp.5-6). 
When observing broadcasting governance in South Africa, it is important to 
note that the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) Act was passed in 1993, with 
a mandate to oversee the transition of the SABC from a state-owned and controlled 
broadcaster to a public service broadcaster, ensuring diversification of the 
broadcasting landscape by including and catering for all linguistic and cultural groups 
in South Africa, and diversifying media ownership (Barnett 1999). Over the past two 
decades, several other pieces of legislation aimed at regulating broadcasting have 
been developed and implemented, including the Broadcasting Act, the Icasa Act, and 
the Electronic Communications Act (ICASA 2015). A policy review, known as the Triple 
Inquiry, (published in 1995), to which the IBA submitted recommendations on the 
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restructuring of the SABC, concluded that the SABC would sell off six of its eight radio 
stations to independent/private bidders, retaining three television stations. The process 
ZDVVHHQDVDWHVWRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRWKHSULYDWLVDWLRQRIPHGLDDQG
black empowerment, by setting XSDUHJXODWRU\IUDPHZRUNZKLFK³REOLJHGZKLWH-owned 
FDSLWDOWRIRUJHSDUWQHUVKLSVZLWKEODFNHPSRZHUPHQWJURXSV´%DUQHWWS
for a detailed breakdown of stakeholders in the sale of SABC¶s radio stations see also 
Barnett 1999, p.657). No matter how noble the intention, Barnett (1999) argues that 
due to the limitations of market-driven broadcasting, the diversification of ownership 
did not necessarily lead to a greater diversity of programming and opinions (and 
therefore nation-building). In fact, this increase in diversity has instead led to bigger 
FRPSHWLWLRQ DPRQJ H[LVWLQJ DXGLHQFHV QDPHO\ DQ ³DIIOXHQW PLQRULW\´ VRFLR-
economically placed as consumers of advertising (ibid., p.660). With this in mind, the 
PHGLD¶VSRVLWLRQDVDVSDFHIRUDQLQFOusive public sphere or agent of nation-building 
should not be overestimated, especially in a country where access to media and 
technology is unequal (ibid.). Duncan (2000) adds that the restructuring of the SABC 
had a negative effect on the financial sustainability of the broadcaster following 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V GHFLVLRQ WR NHSW SURFHHGV IURP WKH VDOH RI LWV VL[ UDGLR VWDWLRQV %\
dividing itself into commercial and non-commercial arms, with the intention of the 
former funding the latter, the SABC aimed to become self-sufficient. However, 
increased competition led to decreased advertising revenue, and high unemployment 
rates and poverty meant that the broadcaster was unlikely to be able to rely on licence 
fees. Given that the non-commercial arm of the SABC consists of radio stations serving 
many of the rural and non-English speaking communities, any financial strain would 
undermine these radio stations and the vital role they serve in informing these 
communities (Duncan 2000). SABC¶s commercial radio stations Metro FM and 5FM, 
as well as commercial TV channel SABC 3, depend on advertising revenue meaning 
WKH EURDGFDVWHU LV ³FRQVWDQWO\ FDXJKW EHWZHHQ WKH FRQIOLFWLQJ GHPDQGV RI SXEOLF
VHUYLFHDQGFRPPHUFLDOLVP´'DQLHOVS,QUHFHQW\HDUVWKHSABC has been 
fDFLQJ³DFUHGLELOLW\FKDOOHQJH´,5(;S7KHSXEOLFEURDGFDVWHUKDVEHHQ
FULWLFLVHGIRU³GLVSOD\LQJDSUR-$1&ELDV´)UHHGRP+RXVHEDQGVWUXJJOLQJZLWK
financial  mismanagement, irregular recruitment practices for senior staff, and self-
censorship following cancellations of political programming deemed critical of the ruling 
party (Freedom House 2015b; IREX 2012, p.382). In the lead up to the 2014 national 
elections, SABC journalists were instructed to reduce coverage of protests and 
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opposition parties, and the broadcaster refused to air political advertising by two of the 
major opposition parties, the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom 
Fighters (EFF) (Freedom House 2015b). Journalists were also warned by the 
EURDGFDVWHU¶V FKDir at the time that the SABC ZDV D µQDWLRQDO NH\ SRLQW¶ PHDQLQJ
MRXUQDOLVWV¶SKRQHVZHUHPRQLWRUHGDQGLQIRUPDWLRQRQLQWHUQDOSUDFWLFHVZDVQRWWREH
leaked (Freedom House 2015b). In light of these challenges within the SABC, a 
coalition of trade unions aQGFLYLOVRFLHW\RUJDQLVDWLRQVFDOOHG µ6266XSSRUW3XEOLF
%URDGFDVWLQJ¶ZDVVHWXSLQWR³FUHDWHDSXEOLFEURDGFDVWLQJV\VWHPGHGLFDWHGWR
the broadcasting of quality, diverse, citizen-oriented public programming committed to 
GHHSHQLQJ6RXWK$IULFD¶V FRQVWLWXWLRQ´'DQLHOVS 
6RXWK$IULFD¶Vmedia landscape has witnessed considerable changes over the 
past two decades. In the immediate post-apartheid period radio was the most popular 
PHGLXPIROORZHGE\WHOHYLVLRQZLWKQHZVSDSHUV¶FLUFXODWLRQfalling dramatically (with 
the exception of new mass-market tabloids that gained, and seem to retain, huge 
popularity). Reasons behind this decline are thought to be a drop in the quality of news 
content and lack of investment in investigative journalism due to transition towards a 
profit-driven media; alternatively, following the democratic elections, the public lost 
interest in serious news content and developed a preference for entertainment (Berger 
1999). At that time, South Africa had the second lowest number of newspaper titles 
and fifth lowest level of circulation in relation to its population, attributed to high 
unemployment rates (Duncan 2000). Radio FRQWLQXHVWREHWKH³PRVWZLGHVSUHDGDQG
SRSXODUPHGLXPLQWKHEURDGFDVWODQGVFDSH´LQ6RXWK$IULFD there are 18 public radio 
stations (SABC) and several private ones (702 Talk Radio, Cape Talk 567, Kaya FM, 
etc.) with a listening population of 31.26 million of which 8.74 million tune into 
community radio (Daniels 2013, p.7). According to 2013 statistics there were 16 
commercial, 20 public and 130 community radio stations in South Africa, with 
audiences listening to radio for an average of 3.5 hours a day (ibid., p.9). (For a detailed 
breakdown of major public and community radio listenership see Daniels 2013, pp.9-
10). In 2013, 241 newspapers were registered with Print and Digital South Africa; 
however, according to circulation statistics monitored by the South African Audit 
Bureau of Circulations, within the first quarter of 2013 there were 359 newspapers of 
which 219 were free publications. The majority catered for English language speakers, 
followed by Afrikaans and isiZulu (ibid. 2013). According to the South African Audit 
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Bureau of Circulations, newspaper circulation has steadily declined by an average 5.5 
per cent each year since 2008, with biggest effect on English titles (ibid.). (For a 
detailed breakdown of circulation per newspaper see Daniels 2013, pp.2-3). The 
downward economic trend has resulted in staff cuts, redundancies, voluntary and early 
retirement packages (ibid.). The SABC operates three national television channels, 
each catering to different audiences, with SABC1 focusing on youth, drama and sport, 
in Nguni languages and English; SABC2 focusing on nation building, culture, tradition 
and history broadcasting in Sesotho, Afrikaans, XiTsonga, TshiVenda and English; and 
SABC3 with a spectrum of programming, broadcasting in English (ibid., p.8). Although 
SABC dominates television viewership, availability of a relatively affordable paid 
channel (DStv) is reducing viewership of the public broadcaster (ibid.). Despite that, 
SABC¶V PRVW KLJKO\ ZDWFKHG FKDQQHO SABC1, continued to attract over 27 million 
viewers per week, while subscription TV was reaching 27 per cent of South African 
households, with DStv claiming 9.1 million viewers weekly (IREX 2012, p.381). 
Similarly, SABC3¶VSPQLJKWO\QHZVKDVDOVREHHQORVLQJLWVDXGLHQFHWRe.tv¶VSP
news (Daniels 2013, p.8). Although there is a plurality of media channels, the 
diversity of news sources is limited, particularly evident in the gender distribution, with 
only 19 per cent of sources being female (IREX 2012, p.382). Information is often 
shared among major media houses resulting in the replication of urban-centric news; 
some of this geographic and economic disparity is bridged by community radio which 
has a growing reach of over 24 per cent of South Africans (ibid., p.382) and community 
papers based in smaller towns and focusing on local issues, as well as the national 
newspaper The New Age, which focuses on regional and rural news coverage (Daniels 
7KH6RXWK$IULFDQ3UHVV$VVRFLDWLRQ6$3$LVWKHFRXQWU\¶VOHDGLQJORFDOQHZV
agency (IREX 2012, p.374) alongside international organisations such as Reuters, 
AFP and Bloomberg which often employ local journalists (IREX 2012, p.383). 
6RXWK $IULFD¶V journalistic professionalism has also been affected by 
commercialisation of the industry. Newsrooms have been juniorised and staff numbers 
have been cut; there has been an increase in tabloidisation and an erosion of 
investigative and in-depth reporting (Wasserman and de Beer 2005, p.39; Wasserman 
2010). Journalists find this development ironic and consider it a wasted opportunity: 
although there is more press freedom than before, investigative reporting has suffered, 
ZKLFK LV ³SDUWLFXODUO\ SUREOHPDWLF LQ D QHZ GHPRFUDF\ ZKHUH WKH PHGLD VKRXOG
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contribute to the strengthening of democratic institutions and root out corrupWLRQ´
:DVVHUPDQ  S ,QYHVWLJDWLYH UHSRUWLQJ ZDV VDLG WR EH ³FRVWO\ DQG WLPH-
FRQVXPLQJ´DQGIRFXVHVPRUHRIWHQRQ³SROLWLFVDQGHFRQRPLFV´RYHULVVXHVDURXQG
³KHDOWKHGXFDWLRQJHQGHUDQGSRYHUW\´,5(;S)ROORZLQJFRQFHUQVDQG
criticisms that the journalistic profession was failing to transform to the highest 
standard, the South African Editors Forum (SANEF) instigated a skills audit in 2002 
looking into the reporting and writing skills and accuracy of 112 reporters across 32 
media institutions, who had been in the industry for up to five years (Steyn and de Beer 
2004). (For the full media section of the skills audit, see de Beer and Steyn 2002). More 
recent investigations into the state of news reporting in the country (Daniels 2013) also 
show that the South African media is in turmoil, partly as a result of commercial 
pressures and the need to adapt to a global industry undergoing rapid change as a 
result of technological developments and shifts.  
6$1()¶VVWXG\QRWHGDWWKHWLPe that due to residual and persistent socio-
economic inequality black journalists often left the profession to pursue jobs paying 
higher salaries. While some editors maintained they would not hire black journalists 
for the purpose of achieving racial quotas, others said they would pay black journalists 
a higher than average salary to stop them from leaving the profession. Over a decade 
later, interviews with journalists and editors showed continued disagreement over the 
H[WHQWWRZKLFKQHZVURRPVZHUH³EDODQFHGDQGGLYHUVH´ZLWKVRPHVD\LQJWKDWPRUH
needs to be done to increase black representation (Daniels 2013, p.33). In 2002 
reporters were being paid between ZAR1000 and ZAR5, 999 (USD 96-573) per month 
(Steyn and de Beer 2004). A more recent survey of 196 respondents (South African 
journalists, editors and sub-editors) randomly recruited via journalism forums and 
various social media platforms found that in 2013 the average salary for men was 
ZAR26, 906, while for women it was ZAR23, 821, with some women earning more than 
the average (The Media Online 2013). In 2002 most journalists had a diploma in 
journalism, and employers preferred some formal education over none at all (Steyn 
and de Beer 2004), while the 2013 survey indicated that the majority of respondents 
KDGDEDFKHORU¶VGHJUHH 7KH0HGLD2QOLQH6RXWK$IULFDQ MRXUQDOLVWVGRQRW
QHHGOLFHQFHVWRSUDFWLFHWKHSURIHVVLRQDQGDUH³IUHHWRIRUPXQLRQVRUSURIHVVLRQDO
RUJDQLVDWLRQVWRSURWHFWWKHLUULJKWV´WKRXJKWKH\DUHVDLGQRWWRWDNHIXOODGYantage of 
this freedom (IREX 2012, p.379).  
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In 2002, juniorisation was not found to be as much of a challenge (with only 
10 per cent of reporters classified as junior) however, the progression of junior 
reporters into higher positions too early in their career, before they acquired the 
necessary skills, was seen as problematic (Steyn and de Beer 2004). In recent years, 
efforts to cut costs and increase profit have seen media institutions lose experienced, 
more costly journalists and increase juniorisation of newsrooms. Exacerbating the 
situation further are high unemployment rates, especially among students and junior 
journalists, who are prepared to work for low salaries in order to gain employment. 
Those who leave the profession tend to do so after five years in order to pursue higher 
SD\LQJ MREV RIWHQ LQ JRYHUQPHQW ,5(;  S :DVVHUPDQ¶V  VWXG\
revealed that journalists and political actors perceived juniorisation to be a problem 
DQGVWUHVVHGWKDWPDQ\MRXUQDOLVWVDUH³LQDGHTXDWHO\VNLOOHGto obtain all sides of a story 
RUWRSURYLGHFRQWH[WWRQHZVHYHQWV´ibid., p.579). Faced with pressing deadlines and 
increasing workloads, journalists often succumb to accessing the most readily 
available and reliable news sources, often those in government and the corporate 
world (Duncan 2000). Journalists and political actors interviewed by Wasserman 
(2010) expressed that the media are increasingly perceived to be irresponsible and 
inaccurate, while tabloid newspapers were seen to be sensational, superficial and 
lacking context in stories. Politicians stressed that newspapers were rarely willing to 
admit mistakes or correct inaccurate reporting leading politicians to cut off journalists 
working for them from any further engagement (Wasserman 2010). In 2002, reporters 
were found to lack awareness of media ethics, especially the sensitivity to deal with 
issues such as violence against women or HIV/Aids, while media law was something 
that editors most often dealt with and was therefore out of the scope of thHMRXUQDOLVWV¶
everyday practice and knowledge base (Steyn and de Beer 2004). According to IREX 
(2012) the standard of the South African Press Code developed by the print media 
LQGXVWU\ LV ³LQ OLQH ZLWK LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRGHV´ DQG ³SURPRWHV WKH SULQFLSOHV RI fair, 
EDODQFHGDQGDFFXUDWH´ UHSRUWLQJKRZHYHU MRXUQDOLVWVDUHVDLG WRGHPRQVWUDWH OD[
adherence to ethical principles, engaging in unverified/inaccurate, subjective/bias 
reporting, brown-envelope journalism and plagiarism, and lacking diverse perspectives 
and opportunity for sources to respond (ibid., p.379). 
6$1()¶VDXGLWDOVRIRXQGWKDWUHSRUWLQJDFFXUDF\VXIIHUHGGXHWRDODFN
of writing and interviewing skills, and an ability to think critically, signalling weaknesses 
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in journalistic skills training and development (Steyn and de Beer 2004). 
Journalists lacked the conceptual and analytical skills to develop a potential story fully, 
source follow-up stories looking at the issue creatively, in depth and from different 
angles. Reported events were not contextualized with background information, and 
journalists lacked awareness of important, historical news events and general 
NQRZOHGJH 6LPLODU FKDOOHQJHV ZHUH QRWHG LQ ,5(;¶V  UHSRUW MRXUQDOLVWV RIWHQ
focused on covering events rather than the issues behind them, failing to unpack 
complexities through analytical and in-depth reporting, and concentrating more on 
urban over rural stories, leaving the stories of ordinary people under-reported. 
6SHFLILFDOO\ LQUHIHUHQFHWRWKHFRYHUDJHRI µVHUYLFHGHOLYHU\SURWHVWV¶ MRXUQDOLVWVDUH
VDLGWR³IROORZWKHELOORZLQJVPRNHZLWKRXWFRQGXFWLQJSURSHUDQDO\VLVDQGUHVHDUFK´
LQWRWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKHSURWHVWVDQGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VUROHLQGHOLYHULQJVHUYLFHV
(ibid.S ,QD ³VQDSVKRW´ VWXG\ZKLFK ORoked into financial investment in 
training and skills development in three media houses, conducted discussions with 
media trainers and voluntary online surveys with 131 journalists on their training needs, 
IRXQG WKDW LQFRQWUDVW WR WKHDXGLW ³PXFK LV EHLQJVSHQWRQ WUDLQLQJ´DQG WKDW
MRXUQDOLVWV¶WUDLQLQJLQWHUHVWVDQGQHHGVKDYHVKLIWHGPRVW MRXUQDOLVWVUHTXLUHGPRUH
training in online and new-media journalism, followed by creative writing, investigative 
reporting and media law and ethics (Daniels 2013, p.55). (For further training needs 
and a breakdown of financial investment, training programmes and policies across 
media institutions included in the study, see Daniels 2013.)  
The need for journalists to develop new-media skills is all the more pressing in 
light of media institutions shifting towards new-media strategies and growing online 
audiences (locally and internationally); interviews showed that South African editors 
encouraged media professionals to use social media (Twitter, Facebook, blogging 
SODWIRUPVHWFWR³EUHDNVWRULHV´DQGWR³HQJDJHZLWKUHDGHUV´'DQLHOVS
However, new-media changes within newsrooms have affected journalists differently, 
ZLWK VRPH H[SUHVVLQJ ³H[FLWHPHQW´ DQG RWKHUV ³FRQIXVLRQ DQG VWUHVV´ FRQWUDU\ WR
stereotypes, sometimes younger journalists felt more overwhelmed trying to cope with 
the changes than older journalists with more experience (ibid., p.42). Journalists 
revealed that the digitisation of journalism has intensified the need to multitask and 
³UHSDFNDJ>H@ LQIRUPDWLRQ IRU GLIIHUHQW SODWIRUPV´ ibid., p.43). Interviews with media 
trainers also revealed that skills development among newly qualified journalists would 
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VLJQLILFDQWO\LPSURYHLIVWXGHQWVZHUH³HQFRXUDJHGWRIUHHODQFHZKLOHVWLOOVWXG\LQJ´ and 
PRUHHPSKDVLVZDVSODFHGRQ³FORV>LQJ@WKHJDSEHWZHHQXQLYHUVLW\SURJUDPPHVDQG
UHDOQHZVURRPV´ibid., p.57). 
$JDLQVWWKHFULWLFLVPRIWUDGLWLRQDOPHGLD¶VVWUXJJOHWRFUHDWHDQGXSKROGDVSDFH
for a truly democratic public sphere, it is important to highlight the role of digital 
communication in creating an online public sphere in South Africa. According to 
Bosch (2010), journalists in South Africa are using online media to practice journalism 
and communicate to different audiences, but also to re-evaluate the meaning and role 
of journalism and citizen journalism, through emphasis on civic journalism. She 
evaluates two online platforms and their role in facilitating online public discourses ± 
The Mail & Guardian QHZVSDSHU¶V µ7KRXJKWOHDGHU¶ EORJ DQG MyNews24, a citizen 
journalism website, launched by the mainstream and commercial news site News24 ± 
and finds that both serve the role of forming a discursive online public sphere in 
GLIIHUHQW ZD\V 7KH 7KRXJKWOHDGHU LQYLWHV ³KLJK-TXDOLW\ FULWLFDO FRPPHQWDU\´
contributions from experts in a variety of fields; the public is able to comment, debate 
and discuss, generating a high level of engagement between the authors and readers. 
An evaluation of this interaction shows evidence of reasoned and sustained debate ± 
the kind that Habermas (1991) argued was necessary in order to form a true and 
democratic public sphere. In looking at the MyNews24 citizen journalism website, the 
website offers readers the opportunity to freely (without invitation) post comments on 
news reports, generating high interactivity among those who comment (Bosch 2010). 
In South Africa, digital journalism serves a strong democratic role in providing a space 
for the promotion of local news and interaction of local views. Examples of how the 
new online space provides opportunity for alternative voices and community-oriented 
journalism are the Daily Maverick (www.dailymaverick.co.za) and Groundup 
(www.groundup.org.za). These spaces are, however, not without challenges. Most 
RQOLQH PHGLD FRQWHQW WHQGV WR EH LQ (QJOLVK ZKLFK FUHDWHV ³OLQJXLVWLF DQG FXOWXUDO
EDUULHUV´DQGKDVEHHQGHVFULEHGDV³LQWHOOHFWXDOFRORQLDOLVP´ibid., p.267). Another 
challenge is varying access to the internet as well as the different levels of computer 
literacy across the country, especially between rural and urban areas. Access to the 
internet increased from 3.6 million users in 2010 to 8.2 million in 2012 (Daniels 2013), 
with 7.9 million of these accessing the web via their cell phones (IREX 2012, p.374) 
and predictions that two out of every three South African adults would have access by 
 107 
 
2016 (Daniels 2013). Economic constraints and the fact that most online content is in 
English means that a large majority still have little or no access to online news, and the 
most affected are those living in poorer areas and informal settlements (Freedom 
House 2015b). In order to address this, the Open Society Foundation for South Africa 
and Project Isizwe have recently launched a joint pilot project to establish two free 
LQWHUQHW ]RQHV IRU UHVLGHQWV RI *XJXOHWKX DQG .KD\HOLWVKD DLPLQJ WR ³NLFN VWDUW D
µERWWRP-XS¶FDPSDLJQIRUIUHHDQGVXEVLGLVHG Lnternet access for people who live in 
XQGHUUHVRXUFHGFRPPXQLWLHV´26)6$ 
In summary, the structural conditions of journalism in South Africa should be 
viewed against a background of overcoming the authoritarian apartheid regime 
(specifically its political system and culture, and legal framework), and redefined within 
a post-apartheid, neo-liberal economic context (market, ownership). In terms of 
professionalisation of self-regulation, journalism continues to perform its role as 
watchdog within a racialised and class determined media space, while evolving against 
notions of the philosophy of Ubuntu, peace journalism, civic and development 
MRXUQDOLVPLQDQHIIRUWWRDGGUHVVWKHFRXQWU\¶VPRVWSUHVVLQJVRFLDOLVVXHV 
Discussions and conclusions 
x What are the main characteristics of structural dimensions shaping media and 
journalism in general, and especially in Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and South Africa?  
x Where do gaps exist in knowledge of the structural conditions of journalism in these 
countries? 
x What arguments and hypotheses can be derived from the state of knowledge on 
structural conditions for the empirical study in MeCoDEM work package 4?  
x What conclusions can be drawn and investigated further? 
 
On a general level, both the scheme of dimensions (Chapter 2) and the country 
reports (Chapter 3) confirm that structural conditions of journalism are complex 
formations, consisting of many elements related by complex interplays and interfaces. 
As each country features a unique set and combination of structural factors relevant to 
PHGLDDQGMRXUQDOLVP µPRGHOV¶RU µW\SHV¶RIVWUXFWXUDOFRQGLWLRQVDUHEHVWGHVFULEHG
and conceptualised as case studies. There is still a long way to go in terms of 
conceptualising and collecting empirical data from case-studies in order to develop a 
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concise theory of journalism and media and the impact of structural conditions in 
transitional societies.  
It comes as no surprise that the country reports in Chapter 3 show unique 
patterns of structural conditions shaping media and journalism in each of the four 
countries. As the MeCoDEM countries have established different levels of 
democratisation and are at varying stages of transition and consolidation, naturally 
they also feature different degrees of democratisation relating to media structures, 
evident, for example, in levels of media freedom and state interference in the media 
sector. Moreover, there are significant differences in the media landscapes and 
structures of media markets (audience/usage of different media types, diversity etc.), 
which reflect the size, economic situation, infrastructure, and cultural, ethnic and 
linguistic diversity of the four countries, as well as the differing degrees of literacy and 
spending power of their inhabitants.  
In general, the comparative analysis reveals structural conditions specific to 
each country, despite the fact that some procedures and institutions have been 
borURZHGIURPWKHVDPHZHVWHUQµVRXUFHV¶7KLVFRQILUPVDQREVHUYDWLRQE\9ROWPHU
S³QHLWKHUWKHH[SRUWRISROitical institutions or of journalism and media has 
resulted in uniformity, let alone convergence toward the liberal model of media 
V\VWHPV´5DWKHU³RQWKHLUZD\IURPWKHLUZHVWHUQRULJLQWRWKHLUGHVWLQDWLRQLQDQHZ
political and cultural environment institutions change their structure and functioning, 
RIWHQLQDVXEWOHEXWDOPRVWDOZD\VLQDIXQGDPHQWDOZD\´ibid.). 
Despite the many differences, there are various common features across all 
four countries. In each country media and journalism face highly complex, ambivalent, 
contradictory and changing structural conditions. These are shaped by legacies of the 
past (marked by non-democratic regimes and sometimes colonial rule), which can be 
identified as key ingredients in the structural conditions of journalism. While political 
systems are characterised by hybrid forms of political governance, political cultures 
feature a divergence of ideologies and a high level of clientelism ± these patterns are 
(to varying degrees) reflected in the media systems of all countries. 
The constitutional guarantee of media freedom, which forms part of the legal 
framework in all four countries, is challenged by ambivalent or openly repressive media 
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laws and the reluctance of governments to implement fundamental reform. 
Accordingly, the state plays an important role in the media sector, mirrored in (different 
types of) political influence. This particularly applies to governance of public/state 
broadcasting and regulatory bodies, financing and (accusations of) interference in 
editorial decisions. Though safety concerns vary, journalists in all four countries are 
likely to face pressure and harassment, and risk prosecution. In summary, there is a 
considerable gap between legal provision and media freedom in practice in all 
countries.  
All four countries appear to have a relatively high level of media concentration 
and a significant degree of political ownership. While the state is a direct owner of 
media outlets in only some of the countries, in others political ownership is mirrored in 
the (obvious or subtle) alignment of media owners with politicians or political groups. 
These conditions lead to a concordant journalism culture in Egypt and ambivalent 
journalism cultures in Kenya, Serbia and South Africa, with media switching between 
critical and concordant, clientelist reporting. 
All the case study countries face challenges relating to journalistic education 
and training, professional organisation and self-regulation, which impact on journalistic 
professionalism. Journalists in all four countries work under precarious conditions, 
marked by high professional insecurity, low salaries, and a low professional status and 
fragile social reputation. 
On a general level, the country reports demonstrate the importance of conflict 
communication as a case study with regard to structural conditions: in fact, conflicts 
(and communication about them) can be considered as test cases for the function of 
media-related structures, and hence feature as possible catalysts for changes to these 
structures. 
Although literature allowed for comprehensive country reports, various 
knowledge gaps exist regarding the dimensions of structural conditions in the 
different countries. This applies, for instance, to ownership structures which lack 
transparency in all four countries. Moreover, difficulties in getting reliable and up-to-
date information arise from the rapidly changing circumstances, especially in Egypt. 
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Regarding the overall approach to analysis of structural conditions in this 
working paper, in general, the developed list of dimensions building on the work of 
Hallin/Mancini (2004, 2012) and recently Blum (2014), has proven its validity in guiding 
the analysis towards the central factors of structural conditions relevant to media and 
journalism in Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and South Africa. However, the nature of these 
dimensions and their relative influence varies between the different countries. 
Additionally, the influence of the internet and social media on structural conditions of 
journalism have not been systematically considered in (theoretical) literature on media 
systems so far. While some of the implications for media-related structures are 
mentioned in the country reports, they will be explored in more detail in future 
MeCoDEM research, focussing on the role of information and communication 
technologies in democratisation conflicts (work package 7). 
For all four countries, central structural factors of both the political, economic 
and legal framework are established at the level of the nation-state and therefore, the 
country-specific analysis of structural conditions is justified. However, several 
transnational influences have been identified in the country reports, for example the 
importance of transnational Arabic media in the Middle East region, foreign media 
ownership in all countries under study, the case of China as an investor in Sub-
Saharan African countries such as Kenya and the impact of µZHVWHUQ¶ IRUHLJQ
broadcasting stations such as the BBC. Hence, although the nation-state remains the 
central unit of analysis at the beginning of 21st century, the transnational level should 
be an additional frame of investigation.  
The need to consider agency and the procedural dimension while investigating 
structural conditions of media and journalism (as highlighted in the introduction), has 
been confirmed by the country reports: in all MeCoDEM countries, structural conditions 
have been (re-)designed by both central political incumbents, economic actors and 
media practitioners to serve their personal interests. Moreover, the structural 
conditions changed repeatedly during the different phases of transition and 
consolidation.  
In conclusion, this working paper provides a basis for informed analysis of 
MeCoDEM interviews with journalists with regard to the structural conditions shaping 
media and journalism in Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and South Africa. While the list of 
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dimensions developed in Chapter 2 provides insights into the general factors with the 
potential to shape journalism and media on a structural level and how these factors 
interrelate, the country reports provide a comprehensive overview of the current 
structural conditions of media and journalism in respective countries ± the 
LQWHUYLHZHHV¶ VWDWHPHQWV RQ WKHLU ZRUNLQJ SUDFWLFHV UROH SHUFHSWLRQV HWKLFDO
orientations and overall performance in the various democratisation conflicts can be 
analysed and better explained against this background.  
Moreover, as the paper includes analysis of political systems, socioeconomic 
frameworks and political cultures of politicians and citizens of the case study countries, 
it provides a useful background for MeCoDEM research on conflict communication by 
civil society actors and political activists (work package 5) and for analysis of conflict 
management by governmental actors (work package 6). 
MeCoDEM interviews with journalists will provide additional empirical-based 
knowledge of cases and the types of journalism embedded in certain structural 
conditions, i.e. how journalists behave within these structures. This research will not 
only allow us to broaden knowledge of the particular dimensions of structural conditions 
mentioned in this working paper, but will likely elicit new structural factors of media and 
journalism which have not so far been considered in literature. 
On this basis, findings from MeCoDEM research on journalists will constitute a 
first step towards reconsidering and potentially expanding existing work on media 
systems and structural conditions of journalism; further insights can be expected from 
research into civil society actors and political activists (work package 5), and 
governmental actors (work package 6).  
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